This is an abridged version of note NR14-04-1771.0. On December 11, 2001, China became a member of the World Trade Organization. Many say the 1999 US-China bilateral trade agreement and the vote in Congress to permanently establish normal trade relations with China paved the way for China''s WTO accession. Even though China was not a WTO member, the United States had granted China Most Favored Nation trading status (MFN) since 1979. However, under US law, China''s trade status required an annual renewal that often became a focal point in Congress for protests over human rights issues, security concerns, and the growing US trade deficit with China. In order to support China''s WTO accession, the United States had to commit to non-discriminatory treatment by agreeing to make China''s MFN status permanent-known as PNTR or Permanent Normal Trade Status-thereby giving up the right to annual reviews. The vote in Congress generated a lobbying battle on Capitol Hill of historical proportions. Why did PNTR pass? What role should trade agreements play in promoting human rights, enhancing domestic reform, encouraging the rule of law, and promoting national security? How were the US-China bilateral agreement and the PNTR vote linked to other key negotiations? What is the role of trade in advancing America''s economic interests? (Revised August 2005) HKS Case Number 1771.3

This is an abridged version of case NR15-04-1736.0. The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the most comprehensive and far-reaching international agreement on intellectual property rights ever made. Perhaps the most widely discussed TRIPS-related issue was the debate over the impact of the agreement on efforts to improve public health in the developing world. Some developing countries held that TRIPS patent rules prevented them from having access to essential medicines, concerns that were intensified by the dramatic rise in the incidence of HIV/AIDS. Nonprofits such as Doctors without Borders accused drug companies of putting "patents over people." Negotiations ensued at the WTO to address these concerns. HKS Case Number 1736.3

This is an abridged version of note NR15-02-1661.0. The focus of international trade negotiations was once quotas and tariffs - how much of a particular product could be imported and the duty levied at the border. As the world economy has experienced deeper integration, attention has shifted away from tariffs and quotas to the complex policies and rules that affect the international movement of goods, services and investment. Such policies include protections for intellectual property rights. Negotiated during the Uruguay Round, the 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) significantly broadened the reach of the trading regime by establishing .a comprehensive set of global trade rules for intellectual property. World Trade Organization (WTO) members are now obliged to adopt policies that protect patents, trademarks, and copyrights. While countries remain free to provide even more protection than the TRIPs requires, the agreement sets minimum standards. 1661.3

In the United States, the president has the Constitutional authority to negotiate international trade agreements. But the Congress has the ultimate authority over trade. This arrangement blunts the negotiating power of the United States in trade talks because other countries know that any commitments made at the table could be altered or rejected by Congress. Therefore, from 1974 to 1993, Congress granted the president fast track authority by committing to an expeditious yes-or-no vote on trade implementing egislation with no amendments or changes in return for regular consultations and timely notification on the part of the administration. However, beginning in the early 1990s, fast track became the subject of fierce political debate and a focal point for concerns about global trade liberalization. HKS Case Number 1660.3

Those familiar with transatlantic trade relations are well aware of the longstanding US-EU dispute over trade in beef. This note traces the history of the quarrel, beginning with the introduction of the use of growth-promoting hormones for raising beef cattle. In 1989, Europe banned the use of these hormones. The ban covered all beef, including meat imported from the United States where growth-enhancing hormones were widely used. In retaliation, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on approximately $100 million worth of European food imports. In the years that followed, the rules changed. New multilateral institutions and agreements were put in place to govern disputes like the beef quarrel such as the SPS Agreement negotiated during the Uruguay Round of trade talks. Despite these changes, the story was very much the same a decade later. Though the new World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled against the European ban, the EU continued to refuse beef raised with growth-promoting hormones. In 1999, once again, the United States imposed punitive tariffs on approximately $117 million on foods imported from Europe. The rules had changed, but the endgame remained much the same. At the core of the dispute lay fundamental disagreements about trade in food. The United States argued that the European regulatory process had been captured by politics. US officials were frustrated by what they saw as a political move to protect the EU beef market by invoking scientifically unsupported claims about the detrimental health effects of hormones. The real issue, Europe retorted, was that the US trade system had been captured by industry-the United States had soured the entire transatlantic trade relationship by capitulating to the demands of the corporate beef lobby. Furthermore, some consumer groups argued that it was not the role of a group of trade lawyers and diplomats at the WTO to make decisions related to health and safety. HKS Case Number 1677.3

This case traces the development of genetically-modified (GM) foods in the United States and in Europe. The US had from the start a commanding lead in GM food developmentand a correspondingly large stake in global acceptance of GM seeds and foods. The case describes evolving and contrasting US and European consumer attitudes toward GM foods, a general acceptance in the US, versus a worried rejection in Europe. The case discusses how US government and corporate leaders were convinced at first that Europe was indulging in protectionist activity, but came over time to understand that the European reaction was mostly consumer-driven and derived from citizens' suspicion of government's ability to understand and regulate scientific discoveries sufficiently to protect public health. Still, US food corporations were alarmed when in 2002 Zambia refused to accept desperately-needed US food aid on the grounds that US-made GM products might preclude Zambia selling its own produce to Europe. HKS Case Number 1832.0

This case traces the development of genetically-modified (GM) foods in the United States and in Europe. The US had from the start a commanding lead in GM food developmentand a correspondingly large stake in global acceptance of GM seeds and foods. The case describes evolving and contrasting US and European consumer attitudes toward GM foods, a general acceptance in the US, versus a worried rejection in Europe. The case discusses how US government and corporate leaders were convinced at first that Europe was indulging in protectionist activity, but came over time to understand that the European reaction was mostly consumer-driven and derived from citizens' suspicion of government's ability to understand and regulate scientific discoveries sufficiently to protect public health. Still, US food corporations were alarmed when in 2002 Zambia refused to accept desperately-needed US food aid on the grounds that US-made GM products might preclude Zambia selling its own produce to Europe. HKS Case Number 1833.0

On December 11, 2001, China became a member of the World Trade Organization. Many say the 1999 US-China bilateral trade agreement and the vote in Congress to permanently establish normal trade relations with China paved the way for China''s WTO accession. Even though China was not a WTO member, the United States had granted China Most Favored Nation trading status (MFN) since 1979. However, under US law, China''s trade status required an annual renewal that often became a focal point in Congress for protests over human rights issues, security concerns, and the growing US trade deficit with China. In order to support China''s WTO accession, the United States had to commit to non-discriminatory treatment by agreeing to make China''s MFN status permanent-known as PNTR or Permanent Normal Trade Status-thereby giving up the right to annual reviews. The vote in Congress generated a lobbying battle on Capitol Hill of historical proportions. Why did PNTR pass? What role should trade agreements play in promoting human rights, enhancing domestic reform, encouraging the rule of law, and promoting national security? How were the US-China bilateral agreement and the PNTR vote linked to other key negotiations? What is the role of trade in advancing America''s economic interests? (Revised August 2005) HKS Case Number 1771.0

The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS) at the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the most comprehensive and far-reaching international agreement on intellectual property rights ever made. Perhaps the most widely discussed TRIPS-related issue was the debate over the impact of the agreement on efforts to improve public health in the developing world. Some developing countries held that TRIPS patent rules prevented them from having access to essential medicines, concerns that were intensified by the dramatic rise in the incidence of HIV/AIDS. Nonprofits such as Doctors without Borders accused drug companies of putting "patents over people." Negotiations ensued at the WTO to address these concerns. HKS Case Number 1736.0