In 2011, Cypress Semiconductor was doing well. Their 2010 revenues had grown 32 percent to $884 million, and coupled with diligent cost reduction efforts, their profits before taxes were up nearly 23 percent. In the preceding two years Cypress had eliminated its debt and built up a large cash position. But the semiconductor business was a brutal one demanding both continual cost reductions and innovation. Cypress was a comparatively small player, competing with firms like Samsung that was more than 40 times its size. Cypress founder and CEO, T.J. Rodgers reflected on the challenge of fighting large competitors in a tough environment by saying, "It's all about execution because if you haven't done what you said you were going to do it doesn't matter if you have a good plan or not." In Rodgers' view this meant that to be successful Cypress had to continue to be relentless in driving out costs and be able to generate a stream of new innovations. His solution was to manage Cypress as "a federation of entrepreneurs." This case details the history of the firm and its philosophy and practices that it uses to encourage innovation within its organization. The case gives a comprehensive account of Cypress's approach, people management including hiring and compensation procedures, and information systems. The focus is on Cypress's strategy and practices to stimulate innovation and launch successful new ventures.

Dynamic capabilities have been proposed as a useful way to understand how organizations are able to adapt to changes in technology and markets. Organizational ambidexterity, the ability of senior managers to seize opportunities through the orchestration and integration of existing assets to overcome inertia and path dependence, is a core dynamic capability. While promising, research on dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity has not yet been able to specify the specific mechanisms through which senior managers are actually able to reallocate resources and reconfigure assets to simultaneously explore and exploit. Using interviews and qualitative case studies from thirteen organizations, this article explores the actions senior managers took to implement ambidextrous designs and identify which ones helped or hindered them in their attempts. A set of interrelated choices of organization design and senior team process determine which attempts to build ambidextrous organizations are successful.

JetBlue Airways grew rapidly from its founding in 2000, focusing on providing low-cost service to previously underserved cities, while giving passengers a high-quality experience, ("bringing humanity back to air travel"). An ice storm at JFK airport on February 14, 2007 caused 1,195 flights to be cancelled over a six day period, and stranded several planes on the taxiway for many hours. JetBlue, previously viewed as one of the best airlines (if not the best) for customer service, took extensive criticism from the public, press, and Congress. In addition, the disruptions caused by the storm cost the company over $41 million. The 2007 storm highlighted deficiencies in JetBlue's operational infrastructure. Some top-down changes were made, but disruptions caused by thunderstorms in summer 2008 demonstrated that the airline's ability to deal with irregular operations (IROPs) was woefully inadequate. The company instituted a program (IROP Integrity) that utilized the talents of more than 200 employees, from all levels, and all parts of the airline, to address these problems. This was done through process mapping, root cause analysis, and cross-discipline cooperation working on 100 projects to improve both technology and processes. In February 2010, an ice storm far worse than the 2007 event again disrupted operations at JFK. This time, the airline had to cancel far fewer flights, which were mostly done before passengers arrived at the airport, operations the next day, and the cost was a small fraction of the cost of the 2007 disruption. This case describes the IROP Integrity project-its origins, the role of executive sponsors, project leadership and organization, and the processes used to identify and carry out improvement projects. It also describes the legacy of IROP Integrity on the JetBlue organization and culture.

The empirical evidence is that only a tiny fraction of organizations live to age 40. Why this should be is a puzzle, since when firms are doing well they have all the resources (financial, physical, and intellectual) to continue to be successful. Yet the evidence is that most organizations fail. Drawing on recent advances in evolutionary theory, this article illustrates how multi-level selection processes help organizations adapt in the face of technological and market changes. This process, along with the concepts of organizational ambidexterity and dynamic capabilities, may help organizations survive over long time periods. One deliberate and repeatable version of this process enabled IBM to generate more than $15 billion in growth between 2000 and 2005.

In the past 15 years, IBM has undergone a remarkable transformation from a struggling seller of hardware to a successful broad range solutions provider. Underlying this change is a story of foresighted strategy and disciplined execution--of connecting knowing to doing. In strategic terms, the IBM transformation illustrates the ideas behind dynamic capabilities, showing how the company has been able to sense changes in the marketplace and to seize these opportunities by reconfiguring existing assets and competencies. We review the literature on dynamic capabilities and, using IBM as an example, show how their strategy process permits them both to explore new markets and technologies (e.g., life sciences, pervasive computing) as well as to exploit mature products and markets (e.g., mainframe computers, middleware).

In 2001, Libby Sartain, chief people officer, arrived at Yahoo! to find a demoralized Internet company without a well-defined culture, a coordinated method to communicate with employees, or developed processes, policies, and procedures. In Sartain's first year at Yahoo!, the company was sent reeling by the collapse of the dot-com bubble. For the first time in its history as a public company, Yahoo! was forced to lay off a substantial part of its workforce. Predictably, morale at Yahoo! was shaken. There was also uncertainty at the senior executive level. Many of the company's top officers departed during the turmoil, leaving the newly installed chairman and CEO, Terry Semel, with an incomplete executive team. Moreover, Semel had yet to articulate his vision and strategy for the company, and the economic landscape was deteriorating. Almost three years had passed since Sartain's arrival, and the company overcome some crucial challenges. For the moment at least, it seemed the worst was over. Sartain had been working hard at launching an internal branding campaign at Yahoo! to transform the company's start-up culture into a more traditional one.

Like many technology organizations in the late 1990s, Cisco was booming. It grew so quickly, in fact, that it was bringing in up to 1,000 new employees each month. Cisco's solution was to acquire talent by buying small firms, topping out in one year with 24 separate acquisitions. However, in 2000, the dot-com bubble burst and Cisco quickly realized that it had another human capital challenge on its hands: how to develop, rather than hire, the strategic thinkers and leaders needed for the future. Explores the challenges facing Mary Eckenrod, Cisco's vice-president of worldwide talent, in developing a new human capital strategy to identify and develop leaders from within the company--and to do this in a company with no tradition of developing people internally. How can Cisco move from a "buy" to a "make" human capital strategy?

Richard Townsend has recently been elected CEO of Liberty Medical Foundation (LMF), a nonprofit HMO. Due in part to a rapidly changing competitive environment, LMF has faced serious financial problems over the past two years. Confounding the problem are low morale among physicians and staff and declining patient satisfaction. Townsend will present to the board of directors the two strategic choices that he sees for keeping LMF alive. One choice involves LMF regaining its low-cost position that originally attracted so many of its members. LMF's low-cost, high-efficiency positioning has historically been its competitive advantage. Regaining the low-cost position would mean implementing prior authorization requirements, drastically cutting the number of physicians and staff, and copying other cost savings measures that for-profit HMOs use. The other option is to change radically LMF's positioning so that it is the quality and service leader. This option assumes that customers will be willing to pay a premium for excellent service. Either option will require drastic changes to LMF's culture.

On June 8, 1998, California-based Wells Fargo and Minneapolis banking company Norwest announced a "merger of equals" in a stock deal valued at $34 billion and one that created the Western Hemisphere's most extensive and diversified financial services network. The Wells-Norwest combined company would have $191 billion in assets, more than 90,000 employees, approximately 20 million customers, and 5,777 financial services "stores" (mortgage, consumer finance, or banking stores) in 50 states, Canada, the Caribbean, Latin America, and internationally. The new combined company, Wells Fargo & Co., would be the sixth largest bank in the United States and have the largest supermarket branch network and the largest Internet bank of any U.S. bank. With the merger, Paul Hazen, chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo at the time, became chairman of the new organization. Richard Kovacevich, chairman and CEO of Norwest, became president and CEO of the new organization. Despite Kovacevich's and Hazen's enthusiasm for the merger, they had a series of potential barriers to overcome: First, Wells Fargo and Norwest had contrasting cultures--Norwest was known for customer service and a superior sales culture, whereas Wells Fargo was a leader in online banking and technology, with a focus on efficiency. Second, in 1998, Wells Fargo was still in the process of overcoming a merger with First Interstate that was widely considered a failure. Finally, many industry analysts viewed the Wells-Norwest merger with much caution. Given such barriers, Kovacevich and his team wondered how they could overcome such issues through an optimal integration strategy and effective execution toward that plan.

On June 8, 1998, California-based Wells Fargo and Minneapolis banking company Norwest announced a "merger of equals" in a stock deal valued at $34 billion and one that created the Western Hemisphere's most extensive and diversified financial services network. The Wells-Norwest combined company would have $191 billion in assets, more than 90,000 employees, approximately 20 million customers, and 5,777 financial services "stores" (mortgage, consumer finance, or banking stores) in 50 states, Canada, the Caribbean, Latin America, and internationally. The new combined company, Wells Fargo & Co., would be the sixth largest bank in the United States and have the largest supermarket branch network and the largest Internet bank of any U.S. bank. With the merger, Paul Hazen, chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo at the time, became chairman of the new organization. Richard Kovacevich, chairman and CEO of Norwest, became president and CEO of the new organization. Despite Kovacevich and Hazen's enthusiasm for the merger, they had a series of potential barriers to overcome: First, Wells Fargo and Norwest had contrasting cultures--Norwest was known for customer service and a superior sales culture whereas Wells Fargo was a leader in online banking and technology, with a focus on efficiency. Second, in 1998, Wells Fargo was still in the process of overcoming a merger with First Interstate that was widely considered a failure. Finally, many industry analysts viewed the Wells-Norwest merger with much caution. Given such barriers, Kovacevich and his team wondered how they could overcome such issues through an optimal integration strategy and effective execution toward that plan.

Following the dot-com bubble burst in August 2001, Libby Sartain, new chief of people and senior vice-president of human resources at Yahoo!, must determine the direction of human resources management at the traumatized media company. Suffering revenues, a collapsed stock price, several executive resignations, and recent layoffs have created anxiety and fear among employees. Furthermore, new CEO Terry Semel, former co-CEO of Warner Brothers, had arrived in May but had not yet provided his new plan for the company. Considers how Sartain, previously VP of people at Southwest Airlines, understands the problems facing Yahoo! and the role of human resources in facilitating organizational renewal.

Corporate executives must constantly look backward, attending to the products and processes of the past, while also gazing forward, preparing for the innovations that will define the future. This mental balancing act is one of the toughest of all managerial challenges, and it's no surprise that few companies do it well. But as every businessperson knows, there are companies that do. What's their secret? These organizations separate their new, exploratory units from their traditional, exploitative ones, allowing them to have different processes, structures, and cultures; at the same time, they maintain tight links across units at the senior executive level. Such "ambidextrous organizations," as the authors call them, allow executives to pioneer radical or disruptive innovations while also pursuing incremental gains. Of utmost importance to the ambidextrous organization are ambidextrous managers--executives with the ability to understand and be sensitive to the needs of very different kinds of businesses. They possess the attributes of rigorous cost cutters and free-thinking entrepreneurs while also maintaining the objectivity required to make difficult trade-offs. Almost every company needs to renew itself through the creation of breakthrough products and processes, but it shouldn't do so at the expense of its traditional business. Building an ambidextrous organization is not easy, but the structure itself, combining organizational separation with senior team integration, is not difficult to understand.

In 1999, Richard Townsend, M.D. was the newly appointed executive director (CEO) of the Liberty Medical Foundation (LMF). Townsend was responsible for both the Liberty Medical Group (LMG), a large, 3,000 physician multispecialty medical group that provided health care to two million subscribers, and the Liberty Medical Plan (LMP), a nonprofit insurance company. This was his first official meeting as CEO with the board of directors and a critical one. In it, he would formally present to the board his strategy for the struggling LMF. Townsend believed that Liberty faced a stark strategic choice: either dramatically lower its rates through cost cutting to become a cost leader once again or to differentiate itself by building a reputation for both quality and service. The first option would require them to re-establish a price advantage by reducing the cost structure by 10% to 15%. This tact would almost certainly entail layoffs and salary reductions. The second option would be to raise rates and rely on a service, access, and quality strategy.

In 2003, Norman Walker, head of HR at Novartis, received approval from the management board to implement a global human resources information system (HRIS). Although Walker had made substantial progress in transforming the HR function, much of their efforts remained transactional and not strategic. If successful, the implementation of HRIS would change the role and responsibilities of not only the HR organization but how it added value to the company. Since its formation in 1996, Dan Vasella, the CEO, had transformed the organization from one with slow-moving functional silos into a high-performance company. His goal was to make Novartis a "premier talent machine by 2005." The new global HRIS was a key element in this transformation. It was clear to Walker that this was a major organizational change effort, not simply an IT implementation. The case describes the changes Walker had already made and poses a set of challenges that need to be addressed to implement the new HRIS project.

In 1999, Hewlett-Packard (HP) split into two companies. The issue facing human resources (HR) had to do with creating loyalty and enthusiasm for a new company (Agilent) whose roots lay in an established institution with an extremely loyal workforce who identified with the HP brand. How could they create a new culture of more focus and accountability with the same people? Developing an organizational culture that supported business performance and accountability was the foremost HR task. This case provides detailed background on the company's key initiatives and projects to transform HR organization and culture in the new company. The HR transformation marked a change from an egalitarian, safe culture to a performance culture characterized by a strong meritocracy and a results-based rewards program. In 2001, the company faced increasing financial challenges that would test the newly developing culture. How could top management continue building the Agilent culture--especially in the face of layoffs and restructuring?

JetBlue Airways shows how an entrepreneurial venture is able to use human resource management, specifically a values-centered approach to managing people, as a source of competitive advantage. The major challenge faced by Ann Rhoades is to grow this people-centered organization at a rapid rate, while retaining high standards for employee selection and maintaining a small company culture.

Spreadsheet supplement for case 801-354.

PSS World Medical has grown rapidly since its founding in 1983, largely by acquisitions. It has recently had some trouble digesting a large acquisition, and its stock price is quite depressed. The CEO and his senior management team confront the question of whether the strong culture organization they have built, and the practices they are using to manage the company, will stand it in good stead at its larger size and facing the current challenges. Also, the senior management team is wondering why Wall Street doesn't fully appreciate what the company has accomplished and its management strengths.

New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI) is a joint venture between General Motors (GM) and Toyota. Begun in 1983, NUMMI continues to be one of the most efficient of U.S. manufacturing plants and produces automobiles that are at the top of the quality ratings. The case describes how Jamie Hresko, an experienced GM manager, spent several weeks at NUMMI as an operator working on the assembly line. Uses background data and Jamie's experience to illustrate how the NUMMI system operates. Designed to explore how the alignment of HR practices can produce extraordinary results in a manufacturing facility. Challenges the reader to explain why NUMMI is so successful and whether this approach can be used in other settings.

How does a high technology firm successfully grow and compete in a market where software may be obsolete in 12 months? Cisco Systems, with annual revenues of more then $8 billion and a market capitalization larger than General Motors, is a leader in the market for computer networking equipment. They have achieved this remarkable success by designing a unique approach to a technology business that is based on people, frugality, and attention to customers. It is a success born out of a winning human resources approach that adds real value to the business.