This case features a protagonist (Gen Isayama - GSB 2003) who established and runs a VC firm/incubator called World Innovation Lab (WiL) that is based in Palo Alto and focuses on Japanese companies. The case explores the state of entrepreneurship in Japan; the launch of the VC, and its novel approach to LP relationships. It provides examples of corporations who have undergone successful transformation after working with WiL and of joint ventures in which WiL has invested.

In 2020, NEC focused on providing advanced IT, network, and data solutions, including cloud computing, AI and machine learning, Internet-of-Things platforms, and 5G networks as well as communication equipment installations. An award-winning company, NEC ranked fifth in the world in AI-related patents. The case study describes NEC's pathway towards accelerating in-house innovation, and commercializing what its global labs had invented. In 2013, the company established a Business Innovation Unit (BIU) to boost in-house innovation, and tap into the sense of urgency, risk-taking, and promise of rewards that helped drive technology start-ups elsewhere. In 2018, the BIU formed a Silicon Valley subsidiary called NEC X to structure a new "inside-out" accelerator. By 2020, two start-ups had graduated from the program, and others were well underway. Could NEC X become a trailblazer, creating new standards and processes for "inside-out" accelerators?

Intel established the Emerging Growth and Incubation (EGI) Group in 2018 with a charter to build a disruptive innovation engine. The EGI Group was seen as essential-even existential-for Intel to expand beyond its core business, find new ways to add significant value to the company, and once again be perceived as an engine of growth. Given Intel's size and the perceived urgency of the need for growth, it was decided that EGI would incubate only businesses with perceived billion-dollar plus potential. By early 2021, the EGI portfolio included 14 ventures in various growth stages with a total valuation greater than $2 billion; revenue had tripled over two years, and one venture was already valued at more than $1 billion. EGI had provided a sandbox for exploration and experimentation, acted as a force multiplier, and had a tremendous impact on Intel's culture. This case documents the process, purpose, and progress of establishing and running the EGI Group.

Transformational leaders challenge the status quo, provide a vision of a promising future, and motivate and inspire their followers to join in the pursuit of a better world. But many of these leaders also fit the American Psychiatric Association classification for narcissistic personality disorder. They are grandiose, entitled, self-confident, risk seeking, manipulative, and hostile. This article reviews the literature on narcissism and shows how what we think of as transformational leadership overlaps substantially with grandiose narcissism. As grandiose narcissists can appear as transformational leaders, it is important to distinguish between what leadership scholars have characterized as "transformational" and these "pseudo-transformational" candidates.

Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. in 2014 was the world's largest glass company, but the company faced flat revenues and increased global competition. Several of its flagship businesses projected few prospects for growth unless the company could develop new products and identify competitive strengths to compete within the rapidly changing global economy. AGC held leading global market shares in four major products: architectural glass, automotive glass, quartz glass, as well as fluorinated resins. The case study details the new CEO's plans to revitalize the thinking and workforce at AGC, and shift to an outward-looking focus that embraced change and could lead the company forward into new areas of business.

In 2007, California-based Pannacotta Development had built iPort 12 near two active New Jersey shipping ports for $122 million. Now in 2011, with only one tenant, the property was losing $2.7 million at the operating level, and the project's $76.5 million construction loan was in default. The lender, Bank of America (BofA), had taken control of the property and decided to sell the buildings. The transaction market was at a standstill and BofA knew iPort 12 would certainly sell for less than the loan balance. KTR, one of only a few buyer prospects, was under contract to purchase the project for $53 million-less than half of Pannacotta $122 million cost. It was a heady time for KTR. The fully integrated real estate private equity fund manager specializing in industrial property was sitting on $375 million of uninvested capital from KTR's $700 million second fund, a 2008-vintage vehicle whose investment period was due to expire at the end of 2011. On the heels of the financial crisis, KTR's 2009 and 2010 investments were priced to deliver relatively safe 13 percent IRRs, with potential upside if the market recovered. But the investment market had begun to shift in late 2010. Prices for well-located, leased properties had firmed as the capital markets recovered. In sharp contrast, the market for properties with substantial vacancy was an entirely different story as leasing activity remained depressed. As debt service shortfalls mounted, lenders became impatient, seized control and began selling the distressed collateral for defaulted loans. Buying these properties meant considerably greater risk than KTR's 2009 and 2010 acquisitions. But, with more risk came the prospect of 20 percent or higher IRRs.

Facing imminent disruption, many large, established firms have embraced innovation as a way to develop new growth businesses. To succeed in the face of disruptive change requires established firms to master three distinct disciplines: ideation, to generate potential new business ideas; incubation, to validate these ideas in the market; and scaling, to reallocate the assets and capabilities needed to grow the new business. This article illustrates how two successful firms (Amazon and IBM) have developed approaches that address all three disciplines.

Brown Bag Films produced programming for Disney, Amazon, BBC, and Nickelodeon, reaching an audience of more than 100 million pre-school children around the world. This case examines the development of Brown Bag Films, which began in 1994 as a partnership between two art school students in Ireland who had a passion for making animated children's films-but no business plan, and only a few thousand pounds of borrowed funds. Early successes like an Oscar nomination meant name recognition, but the company had a decidedly non-linear track before it became known for producing popular animated series. The company pivoted a number of times, yet still saw itself as a start-up, a technology venture that was also a creative venture, at the cutting edge of 3D animation. Topics discussed include strategic thinking, mission alignment, management training, and corporate culture.

Brown Bag Films produced programming for Disney, Amazon, BBC, and Nickelodeon, reaching an audience of more than 100 million pre-school children around the world. This case examines the development of Brown Bag Films, which began in 1994 as a partnership between two art school students in Ireland who had a passion for making animated children's films-but no business plan, and only a few thousand pounds of borrowed funds. Early successes like an Oscar nomination meant name recognition, but the company had a decidedly non-linear track before it became known for producing popular animated series. The company pivoted a number of times, yet still saw itself as a start-up, a technology venture that was also a creative venture, at the cutting edge of 3D animation. Topics discussed include strategic thinking, mission alignment, management training, and corporate culture.

Brown Bag Films produced programming for Disney, Amazon, BBC, and Nickelodeon, reaching an audience of more than 100 million pre-school children around the world. This case examines the development of Brown Bag Films, which began in 1994 as a partnership between two art school students in Ireland who had a passion for making animated children's films-but no business plan, and only a few thousand pounds of borrowed funds. Early successes like an Oscar nomination meant name recognition, but the company had a decidedly non-linear track before it became known for producing popular animated series. The company pivoted a number of times, yet still saw itself as a start-up, a technology venture that was also a creative venture, at the cutting edge of 3D animation. Topics discussed include strategic thinking, mission alignment, management training, and corporate culture.

This case describes the challenges facing CEO Kent Thiry and DaVita as they being thinking about how to integrate a recent acquisition, Health Care Partners (HCP). DaVita had been primarily a kidney dialysis company with a very strong culture built around teamwork, fun, continuous improvement, accountability, and service. The senior management saw DaVita as "a community first and a company second." HCP was an integrated health care provider with a substantially different workforce from DaVita. The case describes the history of DaVita, its industry, its unique culture, and its success over the previous 15 years. It provides a detailed description of how the culture was developed and managed through the use of a series of processes and events including the careful use of language, symbols, and traditions (the company is a "village," team members are "citizens," the use of slogans such as "one for all and all for one," three musketeer costumes, wide sharing of information, involvement of team members, extensive recognition and reward programs, investment in training and socialization, and even a company song). This culture was a competitive advantage in DaVita's financial success by attracting and retaining staff and patients, maintaining control of costs, and improving clinical outcomes. The new challenge was whether this culture could, or should, be exported to Health Care Partners.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. What does it take to transform an organization before a crisis hits? How can leaders initiate major transformations proactively? The key often lies in strategic renewal - a set of practices that can guide leaders into a new era of innovation by building strategy, experimentation and execution into the day-to-day fabric of the organization. It's not easy: leaders find it much easier to resist change than to embrace it.

Yasuchika Hasegawa, president of Takeda Pharmaceutical Company, had a vision to make Takeda a top tier company in oncology by 2015. In 2008, Takeda acquired Millennium Pharmaceuticals, a respected oncology company with annual sales of $528 million in 2007 and a promising pipeline of new drugs. Hasegawa and Millennium CEO Deborah Dunsire believed that it was critical to convey a consistent vision for the future of Millennium within Takeda and help Millennium employees feel positive about the company's future. Millennium would operate independently and become Takeda's "Center of Excellence in Oncology." This case explores the steps that Hasegawa took to successfully integrate Millennium. His priorities centered on retaining Millennium talent and addressing the friction that arose from two very different corporate cultures. He also used the opportunity to transform Takeda's risk averse culture into a more innovative and flexible one that would support Takeda becoming a truly global pharmaceutical company.

In 2007, Takeda was a leading Japanese pharmaceutical company with sales primarily in Japan and the U.S. Although Takeda ranked around 15th in global sales, the pharmaceutical market had been shifting due to major industry consolidation. Yasuchika Hasegawa, the president of Takeda, was concerned about the future of the company. To counter the shrinking Japanese pharmaceutical market, Takeda had expanded its business to overseas markets. But Takeda's attempts to become a global company had been criticized as slow and not sufficiently aggressive. One reason for this was Takeda's risk-averse corporate culture. Worse, Takeda's R&D pipeline was shrinking, and patents on several of its major products were about to expire-which would inevitably lead to a decline in profits as generics entered the market. This case explores Hasegawa's plan to transform Takeda into a global pharmaceutical company in a rapidly changing market. It covers Takeda's history, industry trends, and Hasegawa's acquisition strategies.