Traditionally, the most reliable way for a firm to find its next wave of growth was to apply the capabilities of its core business in an adjacent market. But recently a new pattern has begun to emerge. More firms are learning the art of building large second cores--what Bain's Zook and Allen call "engine twos." Given that in the past five years, 60% of big public companies have seen their growth stall out or stagnate--often because of technological disruption--finding an engine two has become increasingly imperative. What does it entail? Successful engine twos have four factors in common. They target markets where the profit pool is sizable and growing or shifting, as Amazon's cloud computing business did. They have a differentiated competitive advantage, which is often built up through acquisitions, as happened at Disney+. They adopt entrepreneurial approaches, like Bradesco's digital unit, Next, and leverage the scale and assets of the original core, as the industrial cleaning company Ecolab's new water-purification business did. In combination these four elements magnify one another's effects, often creating businesses that have much greater potential than firms' original cores.

Most successful new companies eventually face a predictable crisis that the authors call "stall-out"--a sudden large drop in revenue and profit growth or a collapse of once high shareholder returns to well below the cost of capital. Stall-out occurs when the growth engine that powered companies to success stops working. This rarely happens because the business model has suddenly become obsolete--a common misconception. Rather, research by Zook and Allen shows that the business has almost always become too complex, most often owing to bureaucracy that slows the company's metabolism, or internal dysfunction that distorts information and hampers managers' ability to make rapid decisions and take swift action on them. But stall-out can be overcome. The authors find that most companies that achieve sustainable growth share attitudes and behaviors: (1) They view themselves as business insurgents, fighting in behalf of underserved customers; (2) They have an obsession with the front line, where the business meets the customer; and (3) They foster a mindset that includes a deep sense of responsibility for how resources are used and for long-term results. Those qualities can help any company restart its growth engine by removing gunk and complexity that have built up over the years, inhibiting the clean execution of strategy.

The sharper a company's differentiation, the greater its competitive advantage. In studying companies that sustained a high level of performance over many years, the authors, both partners at Bain, have found that more than 80% of them had a well-defined and easily understood differentiation at the center of strategy. But differentiation can wear with age: The growth it generates creates complexity, and complex companies tend to forget what they're good at. Often they respond by trying to reimagine their entire business models quickly and dramatically. That's rarely the answer, the authors write. Really successful companies relentlessly build on their fundamental differentiation, going from strength to strength. They learn to deliver it to the front line, creating an organization that lives and breathes its strategic advantages day in and day out. They learn to sustain it through constant adaptation to changes in the market. And they learn to resist the siren song of today's hot market better than their less-focused competitors do. The result is a simple, repeatable business model that a company can apply to new products and markets over and over again to generate sustained growth.

How do you know when your core needs to change? And how do you determine what should replace it? From an in-depth study of 25 companies, the author, a strategy consultant, has discovered that it's possible to measure the vitality of a business's core. If it needs reinvention, he says, the best course is to mine hidden assets. Some of the 25 companies were in deep crisis when they began the process of redefining themselves. But, says Zook, management teams can learn to recognize early signs of erosion. He offers five diagnostic questions with which to evaluate the customers, key sources of differentiation, profit pools, capabilities, and organizational culture of your core business. The next step is strategic regeneration. In four-fifths of the companies Zook examined, a hidden asset was the centerpiece of the new strategy. He provides a map for identifying the hidden assets in your midst, which tend to fall into three categories: undervalued business platforms, untapped insights into customers, and underexploited capabilities. The Swedish company Dometic, for example, was manufacturing small absorption refrigerators for boats and RVs when it discovered a hidden asset: its understanding of, and access to, customers in the RV market. The company took advantage of a boom in that market to refocus on complete systems for live-in vehicles. The Danish company Novozymes, which produced relatively low-tech commodity enzymes such as those used in detergents, realized that its underutilized biochemical capability in genetic and protein engineering was a hidden asset and successfully refocused on creating bioengineered specialty enzymes. Your next core business is not likely to announce itself with fanfare. Use the author's tools to conduct an internal audit of possibilities and pinpoint your new focus.

Growth in an adjacent market is tougher than it looks; three-quarters of the time, the effort fails. But companies can change those odds dramatically. Results from a five-year study of corporate growth conducted by Bain & Co. reveal that adjacency expansion succeeds only when built around strong core businesses that have the potential to become market leaders. And the best place to look for adjacency opportunities is inside a company's strongest customers. The study also found that the most successful companies were able to outgrow their rivals consistently and profitably by developing a formula for pushing out the boundaries of their core businesses in predictable, repeatable ways. Companies use their repeatability formulas to expand into any number of adjacencies. Some companies make repeated geographic moves, whereas others apply a superior business model to new segments. In other cases, companies develop hybrid approaches. The successful repeaters in the study had two common characteristics: they were extraordinarily disciplined, applying rigorous screens before they made an adjacency move, and in almost all cases, they developed their repeatable formulas by carefully studying their customers and their customers' economics.

Companies in many industries are feeling immense pressure to improve their ability to innovate. But executives know that the best ideas aren't always coming out of their own R&D labs. That's why a growing number of companies are exploring the idea of open-market innovation--an approach that uses tools such as licensing, joint ventures, and strategic alliances to bring the benefits of free trade to the flow of new ideas. For instance, when faced with the unanticipated anthrax scare last fall, Pitney Bowes had nothing in its R&D pipeline to help its customers combat the deadly spores. So it sought help from outside innovators to come up with scanning and imaging technologies that could alert its customers to tainted letters and packages. In this article, Bain consultants Darrell Rigby and Chris Zook describe the advantages and disadvantages of open-market innovation and the ways some companies are using it to gain competitive advantage. Creative types within a company will stick around longer if they know their ideas will eventually find a home--as internal R&D projects or as concepts licensed to outside buyers. However, the authors warn against entering into open-market innovation without properly structuring deals: Xerox and TRW virtually gave away their innovations and had to stand by while other companies capitalized on them. The company with the most powerful assets will have the greatest growth potential.

George Caldwell, cofounder of Advaark, a cutting-edge ad agency, was listening hard to his biggest client, John McWilliams, CEO of GlobalBev. McWilliams ran a multibillion-dollar holding company for an assortment of food and beverage brands but was giving credit to Advaark for his latest product line. "We were completely blindsided by this whole 'energy drink' craze," McWilliams was saying, clearly delighted that Advaark had steered his company into the business. Then he enthused, "I'd love to get your thinking about our snack lines." "Oh, no," George thought. He hadn't realized that his partner, Ian Rafferty, had made this foray into strategic consulting. Traditionally, their agency focused only on the creative execution of ad campaigns. In fact, they'd disagreed before about whether it was wise to follow customers' needs into areas where they had no skills advantage. George thought Advaark should stick to its core competence. Ian saw a source of easy revenue and an enhanced offering to clients who, he claimed, wanted one-stop shopping. The potential was appealing, but for George, it hardly outweighed the downsides. They'd risk alienating the strategy companies that now referred clients to Advaark. They'd need to recruit or develop new kinds of talent and create a methodology and training. George was just deciding to nix the expansion when a chance meeting with a former client made him pause. She'd heard about GlobalBev's success and wanted the same kind of help. Eager to win back a lapsed account, George was tempted. Should Advaark meet more of its customers' needs by expanding its services or stay focused on what it does best? In R0202A and R0202Z, commentators Gordon McCallum, John O. Whitney, Roland T. Rust, and Chris Zook weigh in on this fictional case.

George Caldwell, cofounder of Advaark, a cutting-edge ad agency, was listening hard to his biggest client, John McWilliams, CEO of GlobalBev. McWilliams ran a multibillion-dollar holding company for an assortment of food and beverage brands but was giving credit to Advaark for his latest product line. "We were completely blindsided by this whole 'energy drink' craze," McWilliams was saying, clearly delighted that Advaark had steered his company into the business. Then he enthused, "I'd love to get your thinking about our snack lines." "Oh, no," George thought. He hadn't realized that his partner, Ian Rafferty, had made this foray into strategic consulting. Traditionally, their agency focused only on the creative execution of ad campaigns. In fact, they'd disagreed before about whether it was wise to follow customers' needs into areas where they had no skills advantage. George thought Advaark should stick to its core competence. Ian saw a source of easy revenue and an enhanced offering to clients who, he claimed, wanted one-stop shopping. The potential was appealing, but for George, it hardly outweighed the downsides. They'd risk alienating the strategy companies that now referred clients to Advaark. They'd need to recruit or develop new kinds of talent and create a methodology and training. George was just deciding to nix the expansion when a chance meeting with a former client made him pause. She'd heard about GlobalBev's success and wanted the same kind of help. Eager to win back a lapsed account, George was tempted. Should Advaark meet more of its customers' needs by expanding its services or stay focused on what it does best? In R0202A and R0202Z, commentators Gordon McCallum, John O. Whitney, Roland T. Rust, and Chris Zook weigh in on this fictional case.