This case examines the myriad of issues facing two entrepreneurs who use the search fund model to search for, purchase, and ultimately operate a home health care services company. The search fund is a proven investment vehicle through which a group of experienced investors support the efforts of aspiring entrepreneurs who wish to buy and run a small company, despite their lack of operating experience. After an arduous three-year search, Peter Landry, Paul Brooke, and a group of investors purchased SunWest Medical Services. However, shortly after the deal closed, Landry and Brooke realized that SunWest was a different company from the one they thought they had purchased. Among other things, the company was not as profitable and was shrinking rather than growing. Issues are tracked over an 11-year period. The case concludes with a review of ways an entrepreneur might best balance personal career interests with the financial interests of investors.
Examines issues encountered by a third-generation, family-owned business. Northwest Security Services (NSS) is a 55 year-old company that has developed a rich history since its founding by Ernest Wilson, a less-than-affable, junior college-educated family patriarch. The majority of the case is spent focusing on several NSS business challenges that are unique to family-owned businesses, including bringing younger generation family members into a business, underperformance by certain family member employees, asset diversification, establishing a corporate advisory board comprised of nonfamily members, division of ownership, payment of dividends, transferring authority and power to younger family members, and the sometimes hazy line between where business stops and family begins.
This case examines the growth and development of Fogdog, an online sporting goods retailer, from its founding through multiple rounds of venture capital financing to an IPO and, ultimately, to its sale to Global Sports--one of its publicly traded competitors. The Fogdog story is set in the late 1990s, when the Internet economy was virtually exploding with new opportunities. Built to capitalize on the new Internet medium, Fogdog faced a number of issues specific to the unique economic climate surrounding the company at the time. However, the company also faced a number of timeless issues that many emerging companies experience, such as board composition and development, communication between a company and its board, and the respective positions and responsibilities of both management and a company's investors when tough company decisions have to be made. Woven throughout the case are additional themes of hiring management, raising capital, and forming strategic alliances. It ends with the "forced" sale of Fogdog by the company's board at a time when the near-term outlook for Internet-related companies was uncertain. This sale took place despite management's stated desire to continue running the company.
Examines the challenges encountered by a start-up company that seeks to operate on a global basis virtually from Day One. Based in Mountain View, CA, NetLogic Microsystems is a semiconductor company that was founded by a semiconductor industry veteran in 1996. Follows the founder's efforts to identify and research the initial opportunity, hire staff and senior management, fund product development, generate sales, form partnerships and alliances (many of them international), raise institutional capital, and evaluate a possible acquisition. Because of the nature of the semiconductor industry, which finds many steps of its value chain rooted in Asia and other countries around the world, NetLogic had to be global early on in its life cycle. Despite the fact that its founder and management team possessed international roots and connections, being global presented NetLogic with a host of challenges not typically faced by an average start-up.
Three fictional vignettes expose the less glamorous side of venture capital and the decisions that venture capitalists have to make when their investments are not performing according to plan. The three vignettes cover venture capitalists that must handle portfolio company underperformance and/or management problems, evaluate acquisition offers in the "forced sale" of a portfolio company, and decide when to put more money in a portfolio company that may have promise but has been unsuccessful in raising capital from other sources.
Introduces Handspring, a manufacturer of handheld devices, and concentrates particularly on the company's and founders' historical and forward-looking relationships. At the time of the case, Handspring is generating approximately $500 million annually in sales and is a leading brand of PDAs. The company founders are Donna Dubinsky, Ed Colligan, and Jeff Hawkins--the "legendary" team that developed Palm Computing's handheld PDA in 1992. The founders look back to their rationale for striking out on their own from Palm and the lessons learned and different paths followed in this second company founding. Focuses on the creation, valuation, and nurture of Handspring's myriad relationships, including supplier and manufacturer relationships, marketing agreements, and new business partnerships.
eCircle, a German Internet-based group communications company, was founded in 1999 with a half-dozen employees and a few hundred thousand users on its new C2C platform. By early 2001, the cofounders had built eCircle's technology platform, had acquired 4.5 million users and 90 employees, and had raised two rounds of financing. It appeared that the company had overcome the initial challenges of a start-up--it had cash, advertising customers for its C2C business, and two customers for its new B2B business. However, despite their early success, the cofounders faced a number of challenges. Could they leverage a relatively successful C2C group communications platform into other profitable business lines, especially B2B offerings? Could they fend off new competition within Europe and the United States? And could they manage their cash flows to survive the financing market slump? The tight economic environment and the struggles and failures of numerous Internet start-ups in early 2001 made growth strategy more of a challenge for eCircle. Its margin for error in such an environment was smaller than when the company first started.