Leaders of the many Fortune 500 firms headquartered in Minneapolis-St. Paul have a long history of engaging collectively, and with educational, political and social leaders, to deal with important community issues. Focusing on the participation of leading CEOs in the 2008-2011 Minnesota Education and Learning Foundation's efforts to promote early childhood education for low-income children, this case series explores the nature of their engagement and source of their sustained commitment.
Leaders of the many Fortune 500 firms headquartered in Minneapolis-St. Paul have a long history of engaging collectively, and with educational, political and social leaders, to deal with important community issues. Focusing on the participation of leading CEOs in the 2008-2011 Minnesota Education and Learning Foundation's efforts to promote early childhood education for low-income children, this case series explores the nature of their engagement and source of their sustained commitment.
Leaders of the many Fortune 500 firms headquartered in Minneapolis-St. Paul have a long history of engaging collectively, and with educational, political and social leaders, to deal with important community issues. Focusing on the participation of leading CEOs in the 2008-2011 Minnesota Education and Learning Foundation's efforts to promote early childhood education for low-income children, this case series explores the nature of their engagement and source of their sustained commitment.
For over half a century, most of the world's economies have enjoyed steady growth and prosperity. However, beginning in the 1980s, and continuing essentially unabated to the present, the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots" in developed countries has widened, with a small proportion of the population reaping an increasingly larger share of a country's economic rewards. This growing economic inequality has been particularly pronounced in the United States, but the phenomenon has also occurred in many nations, among them Germany, Japan and Sweden. This note provides background on aspects of economic inequality. It begins by describing both income inequality and wealth inequality, providing an explanation of two widely used metrics and data that show increasing inequalities over time. It then moves to the factors that might contribute to this inequality, as well to propositions of economic and social consequences that might result from the widening gap. Finally, it addresses the issue of "equality of opportunity" or social mobility.
This note draws on academic work, as well as social and economic data across several countries, to provide a basic understanding of some of the differences among capitalist systems. It begins with a description of the system of capitalism, and characteristics that to a greater or lesser degree are universally shared. It then moves to describing two models of "comparative capitalism," as well as examining state capitalism. Finally, for additional perspective the note provides cross-sectional and time-series data for social, economic and political metrics for five different capitalist systems - China, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the United States.
In December 2013 a group of angry protesters blocked one of the commuter bus provided by the large Silicon Valley firms (known as "Google buses") which was stopped in San Francisco on its way to the company's headquarters 40 miles south. The protests were a tangible manifestation of the sharp increase in tensions between citizens upset with changes they saw in San Francisco and the "techies" and technology companies they held responsible for the disappearing middle class, increased homelessness, languishing public education, and a sense of departure from the unique culture and values of the city's past. This case explores some of the substantial economic inequality problems facing San Francisco, and how much responsibility for creating or exacerbating the problems rests with the government, technology firms, their employees, and the nature of capitalism, among others. It also allows for discussion of what technology firms and the "techies" might do to help alleviate the problem.
For Kai Teckentrup, the owner and co-CEO of the German "Mittelstand" door manufacturer Teckentrup, balancing competitive pressures, demographic realities and values were at the heart of the diversity program that he had started and championed at the company. Beyond this, attracting skilled workers to Germany was a national imperative; as the native population aged and its numbers in the workforce shrank, it would be critical to find new workers to fund and maintain the retirement and social service programs provided by the government. The company had made significant progress, and Kai was a recognized leader in German business for his attention to and success in managing diversity, but he knew there was much more to do.
Provides the opportunity to value a leveraged buy-out; and to examine the nature and extent of a company's responsibilities to its bondholders. Here, the context is a "going private" transaction in Europe, where the financing plan called for the addition to the company's balance sheet of a significant amount of new debt and a reshaping of the capital structure. While leveraged buyouts had been used in Europe for several years, this was likely the first LBO done with a company that had publicly traded investment grade debt outstanding. The increased debt from the deal would increase the risk to the company and to the existing bonds, and the bonds' prices would fall significantly as a result. Students can use discounted cash flow techniques to value the LBO. They can then consider the wisdom of undertaking the LBO at the offered price, and work out a sensible debt schedule for the company. Students must also evaluate the effect of the transaction on the existing bonds, and understand the principles governing contractual duties (and how they differ from fiduciary obligations) towards bondholders (accounting for a business and social culture outside the United States) in order to determine the best course of action for the private equity buyers.
After years of vigorous denials, on January 14, 2013 Lance Armstrong admitted in a television interview with Oprah Winfrey that he "doped" in each of his record seven consecutive Tour de France victories, confirming the findings a few months earlier by the US Anti-Doping Agency that he had orchestrated "a massive team doping scheme, more extensive than any previously revealed in professional sports history." Until that moment with Oprah, Armstrong had consistently and strenuously denied using performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs), blood transfusions, or other artificial enhancers to compete in the grueling, three-week race throughout France. He verbally thrashed, bullied and threatened legal action against riders, journalists, race officials, and anyone else who had suggested he had cheated. This case explores Armstrong's leadership of a corrupt culture, the extensive nature of the cheating scandal among elite athletes, the decisions taken by other riders to both support Armstrong and his scheme and ultimately to admit to cheating, and the costs borne by those associated with Armstrong. It allows for discussion of the responsibilities that leaders have to followers, and that followers have to themselves and to others.
In June of 2012, Barclays plc admitted that it had manipulated the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)-a benchmark interest rate that was fundamental to the operation of international financial markets and that was the basis for trillions of dollars of financial transactions. Between 2005 and 2009, Barclays, one of the world's largest and most important banks, manipulated LIBOR to gain profits and/or limit losses from derivative trades. In addition, between 2007 and 2009, the firm had made dishonestly low LIBOR submission rates to dampen market speculation and negative media comments about the firm's viability during the financial crisis. In settling with U.K. and U.S. regulators the firm agreed to pay $450 million in fines. Within a few days of the settlement, Barclays' CEO, Robert Diamond, had resigned under pressure from British regulators. Diamond blamed a small number of employees for the derivative trading-related LIBOR rate violations and termed their actions as "reprehensible." As for rigging LIBOR rates to limit market and media speculation of Barclays' financial viability, Diamond denied any personal wrongdoing, and argued, that if anything, Barclays was more honest in its LIBOR submissions than other banks-questioning how banks that were so troubled as to later be partly nationalized could appear to borrow at a lower rate than Barclays. This case explains why LIBOR was an essential part of the global financial market, the mechanism used to establish the rate, and what Barclays did wrong. The case allows for an examination of: i) the consequences of violating the trust of market participants, ii) cultural and leadership flaws at Barclays; iii) the challenge of effectively competing in a market where systemic, and widely understood, corruption is taking place, iv) the complicity of regulators in perpetuating a corrupt system; v) what might, or might not, be effective remedies for the systemic flaws in LIBOR.
On July 13, 2012, JPMorgan Chase & Co. announced a larger than expected loss for the quarter, $4.4 billion from positions held in the Chief Investment Office (CIO), raising the total losses to $5.9 billion. Since the substantial risks in the CIO had first been revealed on April 5, the firm and its CEO, Jamie Dimon, had been the source of intense scrutiny by regulators, legislators, the media, shareholders and analysts. The situation represented a rare, but significant, misstep by Dimon who had successfully steered Morgan through the financial crisis and was regarded as one of the financial industry's best leaders and risk managers. The firm also revealed that it was restating its first quarter 2012 results because of what it had learned as it investigated the CIO losses.
This case explores the reputational and legal issues that arise as Barclays Capital attempted to manage client conflicts by following established industry practice in the face of changing legal norms. In February 2011, Judge Travis Laster granted a preliminary injunction that delayed for 20 days a shareholder vote on the sale of Del Monte Foods Co. (Del Monte) to a consortium of three private equity firms. In his opinion, Laster was critical of Del Monte's board, noting that the directors may not have properly exercised their fiduciary duties, and the private equity firms. However, he saved his most severe criticism for an organization that was not even a party to the suit: the company's financial advisor, Barclays Capital. He suggested that Barclays had placed its own interests ahead of the company's in its actions and advice.
In November of 2011 Transatlantic Holdings, Inc., a global property and casualty reinsurance company, announced it had agreed to sell itself to Alleghany Corporation, ending "the most frenzied takeover battle" of 2011, which involved competitors, Warren Buffett's National Indemnity, and private equity investors. The agreement with Alleghany came after Transatlantic's failed effort at a merger of equals, and a several other unsuccessful bids for the company, one that was hostile.
On October 16, 2011, El Paso agreed to sell itself to Kinder Morgan for just over $21 billion. Shareholders filed suit, arguing that the process was tainted by conflict and that a higher price could be obtained. Delaware Chancellor Leo Strine agreed with the plaintiffs on the conflicts, and in his opinion expressed serious concerns with how El Paso advisor Goldman Sachs and El Paso CEO Douglas Foshee conducted themselves in the process. The case examines these conflicts, Strine's view of their effects on the outcome, and the reason he was unable to grant the plaintiff's request, instead allowing the merger vote to proceed. The case is a companion case to "Barclays Capital and the Sale of Del Monte Foods," HBS No. 313-036.
In 2010, Friend Bank was entering the fifth year of Hope Harris Johnson's ambitious 20-year growth plan to transform her family's one-branch community bank into an institution with a substantial presence in southeastern Alabama. Harris Johnson was pleased, so far, with the results. Strategically they had exceeded expectations in opening a second office and execution of the plan was going well. And while the financial and economic crisis that began in 2008 had affected the financial results, it also presented Friend with competitive opportunities. Nonetheless, realizing her ultimate goals for Friend would not come easily. This is a shorter version of "Friend Bank: The Time for Hope," HBS No. 310-070.
A business unit leader faces a major decision when an employee critical to a high profile transaction asks for a unique compensation arrangement that has implications for the culture of the business.
Meredith, the head of a major division of a financial firm, must confront an unexpected response and challenge from a senior colleague when she proposes shutting down an underperforming unit.
A business unit leader faces a major decision when an employee critical to a high profile transaction asks for a unique compensation arrangement that has implications for the culture of the business.