In early April 2008, economic conditions in Europe appeared to be deteriorating on almost all fronts: sales figures were falling, business and consumer confidence were slumping, forecasts for European growth were being revised downward, and inflation was rising. In fact, figures for the month of March revealed that inflation had reached an annualized rate of 3.5%, Europe's highest level since 1992. On top of these broad economic problems, the European financial sector-indeed, the financial sector worldwide-was in turmoil. By April 2008, global financial institutions had written down the value of their mortgage-related investments and other assets by at least $230 billion, and businesses around the world were complaining that it was ever more difficult to secure credit. In America, meanwhile, consumer confidence was falling, consumer spending had slowed to a near halt, and inflation had crept above 4%. In reaction to these dismal economic conditions, the Federal Reserve had steadily cut interest rates over a seven-month period, most recently lowering its key rate to 2.25% on March18. In sharp contrast to the Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB) had long held its key rate at 4%, where it stood when the ECB's Governing Council reconvened on April 10, 2008. Given both the market turmoil and the evident inflationary pressure, members of the ECB's Governing Council would have to weigh the available data extremely carefully as they decided whether to raise, lower, or maintain their benchmark interest rate. The significance of this decision could hardly be overstated, since it had the potential to send a strong signal about the nature of European monetary policy and the priorities of the ECB going forward.
By the summer of 2009, many observers concluded that a catastrophic financial collapse- which seemed all but imminent the previous fall and winter - had been averted. Although the recession had still yet to be declared over and the economy's footing remained far from solid, many believed that the worst of the crisis was over. With the global financial system no longer spiraling into an abyss, government officials, business leaders, and American taxpayers could now take stock of where they had been and where they should be headed. In particular, many wondered how the disaster had happened in the first place: what exactly had caused the brutal financial crisis of 2007-2009?
In 1932, in the depths of the Great Depression, the Senate Banking Committee began a much-publicized investigation of the nation's financial sector. The hearings, which came to be known as the Pecora hearings after the Banking Committee's lead counsel Ferdinand Pecora, revealed how the country's most respected financial institutions knowingly misled investors as to the desirability of certain securities, engaged in irresponsible investment behavior, and offered privileges to insiders not afforded to ordinary investors. During the famous "Hundred Day" congressional session that began his presidency, Roosevelt signed two bills meant to prevent some of these abuses, but he also believed that the government should play a more active role in the financial system by regulating national securities exchanges. In February 1934, the president urged Congress to enact such legislation, prompting the introduction of a bill entitled the Securities Exchange Act, which would force all securities exchanges to register with the Federal Trade Commission, would curtail the size of loans that could be advanced to securities investors, and would ban a number of practices (such as short-selling) that were thought to facilitate stock manipulation. Additionally, the legislation would require that all companies with exchange-listed securities publish detailed business reports as frequently as the FTC desired. Wall Street, represented in particular by New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) President Richard Whitney, took a strong position against the Securities Exchange Act. Whitney was ultimately summoned to testify during the congressional hearings on the Securities Exchange Act in late February 1934. Would he be able to convince lawmakers to take a different course, or would his arguments fail to win over those who believed that strict regulations were exactly what financial markets required following the Great Crash?
In the summer of 1931, Germany was struggling with a deepening economic crisis. Production had fallen, unemployment was high, and bank deposits and gold were being withdrawn from the country at a rapid pace, threatening the value of the German mark. The country's third largest bank, the Danatbank, was especially hard hit by the flagging economy and the flight of capital. By July, the Danatbank was on the verge of collapse, and the bank's charismatic and controversial senior partner, Jakob Goldschmidt, appealed personally to the government, the central bank, and his private banking rivals for a lifeline.
In 1987, President Ronald Reagan established the President's Commission on Privatization to identify federal government functions that could be shifted to the private sector. One agency that the Commission considered was the Federal National Mortgage Association, or Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae was a Depression-era creation that was charged with establishing a secondary market for home loans. By purchasing qualifying residential mortgages from individual home loan issuers, Fannie Mae provided these institutions with funds for the continued issuance of mortgages, thereby promoting the government's goal of increased homeownership. Although lawmakers had already partially privatized Fannie Mae in 1954 and again in 1968, the agency in 1987 still retained close links to the federal government, including an emergency line of credit from the U.S. Treasury. After its deliberations, the President's Commission recommended Fannie Mae be restructured into a fully private firm. Now it was up to Congress and the President to decide whether to accept and implement the Commission's findings.
In early October 1931, in the midst of a global economic depression, the U.S. banking system was in crisis - - with bank suspensions running at near record levels. At the same time, the broader economy was sputtering, and U.S. gold reserves had come under severe pressure after Britain abandoned its gold standard in mid-September. As pressure continued to mount, the leaders of the Federal Reserve faced several critical decisions. Should they adjust interest rates? Was abandoning the gold standard an acceptable option? Should they lend more freely to the nation's commercial banks? Or would this only ensure the sorts of financial excess that had gotten the country into trouble in the first place? Was it time to give in to the mounting pressure, or to hold firm?
At the start of WWI, the United States faced a significant housing shortage. Public officials feared the spread of disease--and even communism-- in the nation's cramped urban centers where vacancy rates held near zero and families often "doubled up" in single housing units. Hoping to spark a burst of new construction, New York Senator William Calder called for the creation of eleven regional Federal Building Loan Banks that would serve as a new source of funds for mortgage lenders. The proposal was controversial, however. Opponents disliked the fact that the Federal Building Loan Banks would have the authority to issue tax-free, mortgage backed bonds, and many claimed that the private market would solve the housing shortage on its own. Proponents of the bill, meanwhile, believed that it was necessary to stave off a potentially disastrous and protracted housing shortage, and they cited the long-successful mortgage bond markets in France and Germany as evidence that their plan could succeed. Federal lawmakers had to assess the arguments on both sides and render a decision.
In the early 1790's, a flood of newly issued public and private securities sparked an investment boom in the nascent United States. In New York, the bustling commercial district along Wall Street emerged as the center of the city's securities trade. One of the many Americans drawn into the frenetic and largely unregulated securities market was William Duer, who ultimately became a major player on the Street. As it turned out, however, Duer's financial dealings proved unsustainable, and his financial collapse helped to bring the securities boom to a halt. Shocked by the widespread devastation wrought by Wall Street's first panic, the New York legislature acted quickly to ban outdoor securities auctions and a popular class of financial instruments known as "time bargains," both of which were thought to have contributed to the boom and bust on Wall Street. Facing public outrage along with the new legal restrictions, New York's top brokers had to decide whether a new system for securities trading was needed and, if so, what it should look like.
The New York State Legislature had come to a standstill in 1829 as lawmakers refused to charter any new banks or recharter any existing banks. Four of New York's forty banks had failed since 1825, and many legislatures believed that a significant change in the banking regime was needed to shore up the state's financial systems. Others, however, feared that a major change in the law was too risky, especially since over three-quarters of the state's banks held charters that were slated to expire over the next four years. On the table was a completely untested proposal to create a mandatory public insurance fund that would back the banknotes and deposits of every state bank. As bank charters throughout New York State rapidly approached expiration, lawmakers faced a tough decision: should they pass the bill and gamble with the untried insurance fund, or should they go seek a more traditional solution to the state's banking woes?
Banks throughout New York State suspended specie payments (i.e., payments in gold and silver) in May 1837 following the collapse of several state banks, and the onset of a nationwide financial panic. Amid the chaos, the upstart Whigs were able to depose the longstanding Republican majority in the state legislature. Responding to citizen anger, as well as perennial calls for more banking capital, the Whigs drafted a novel "free banking" bill, which would override the established bank chartering mechanism and allow any association with sufficient capital the opportunity to open a bank and issue bank notes (a widely accepted form of paper money at the time). The bill also required that every note issued by a New York bank be fully backed by bonds or mortgages. if enacted, the bill seemed likely to encourage the establishment of many new banks. There was no telling what the economic impact of the bill's special bank note provisions would be. Once the bill passed the legislature, Governor Marcy had to decide whether to sign this radical proposal into law.