This case describes the challenges faced by Thoughtworks China (hereinafter ""Thoughtworks"") and Yuelong Automobile (hereinafter ""Yuelong"") while working together on the development of a digital tool for Yuelong car owners: What did they aim to achieve through innovation-beat the competition or meet consumer needs? Was this digital transformation project beyond the purview of Yuelong's New Retail Department, with General Manager Wang Jie championing it directly? Was market research needed to explore innovation opportunities? Should they consider all users' pain points and needs or focus solely on key issues? What issues should be prioritized-high-value or high-risk ones? Should the company adapt to market change after the launch of Minimum Viable Products (MVPs)? Which department should manage this innovative digital product? How should they transcend temporal and spatial boundaries to replicate such an innovation product?Clues can be found in Thoughtworks' agile innovation process. As described in the case, only one month after release, the app co-developed by Thoughtworks and Yuelong, the result of intense debate between the pair, was well-received by the market. In January 2021, Zhang Min, Chairperson of Tengfei Group, Yuelong's parent company, invited Wang Jie, Yuelong's General Manager, Li Chuang, Yuelong's Director of New Retail Department, and Zhao Xin, Thoughtworks' Chief Project Manager, to discuss how to replicate the app's development process and apply it to other Tengfei subsidiaries. While the digital age continuously demanded innovation from carmakers, Zhao knew these subsidiaries needed to understand their market position and priorities before introducing new tools rather than simply following the latest digital trends. This case may spark further discussions about the difficulties with product innovation, helping students understand the characteristics and applications of Thoughtworks' agile innovation methodology.
This case describes Shentong Metro Group's ("Shentong Metro Group" or "the Group") strategic transformation ("Three Transformations"), focusing on its transit-oriented development (TOD) between 2009 and 2020. As the world's most extensive urban metro system ("Metro"), its strategic transformation grew from the strategic intent to contribute to Shanghai's vision of improving residents' quality of life while ensuring the Group's sustainable development. The Group successfully planned and implemented its TOD initiative, completing three projects between 2012 and 2019. However, as a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE), the Group faced multiple challenges. First, conceptualizing and implementing the TOD initiative was not easy as Shentong Metro Group has to meet various social, financial, and operational goals. These goals were often vaguely defined (e.g., more environment friendly), while others were incompatible or even contradictory (e.g., increase employment while reducing costs). Second, the Group's core capabilities were in engineering, construction, and operational management of the Metro system. It lacked real estate development and management capabilities that were fundamental to the initiative. Third, the institutional environment and policies relating to TOD in Shanghai were underdeveloped and continually evolving. While the past TOD projects had, to some extent, overcome these challenges, the Group still faces many more ahead of future TOD projects. Some important questions include: What lessons could be gleaned from previous TOD projects? How should the Group fine-tune future TOD initiatives to realize the "Three Transformations?" How could it seize new opportunities based on Shanghai's urban development master plan?
This case follows the development of Daddy Lab, a Chinese social enterprise founded in 2015 by Wenfeng Wei. With extensive experience in product safety testing, Wei started Daddy Lab to tackle the social problem of poor-quality and hazardous consumer products used by children and their families in China. By identifying, testing, and reporting such products to the public via social media, Wei became an internet celebrity. Nicknamed "Daddy Wei," he racked up millions of followers on China's most popular social media platform, WeChat. In 2018, Daddy Lab received China Gold Social Enterprise certification from the China Charity Fair. That same year, Daddy Lab generated average monthly revenue of approximately ¥5 million by selling high-quality, non-hazardous products online. As Daddy Lab continued to grow and tackle its social mission, it faced numerous challenges. Social entrepreneur Wei realized that he faced the dilemma of trying to make the world a safer place for children and their families while making a profit to sustain this purpose. Wei had established a model to make profits through Daddy Lab's dual roles as a "reviewer" and a "seller" but wondered whether it was appropriate for this social enterprise. As Wei considered Daddy Lab's future, the following questions kept him awake at night: Was Daddy Lab's current business model effective in achieving its social and financial goals? How could Daddy Lab better manage its dual roles as a "reviewer" and a "seller"? How could Daddy Lab become more sustainable in the future?
This case describes the bribery accusations and subsequent investigation of the Chinese subsidiary of a U.S. publicly listed Fortune 500 company, disguised as "Voles System". The primary purpose of the case is to illustrate the internal corporate governance challenges of developed-market multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in emerging markets. This case stands out in the management education field, as it fills a gap where there are very few teaching cases discussing the dark side of international business in emerging markets. After a brief introduction of the company's background, the case describes two anonymous internal "whistleblower" allegations that the Mainland China business unit (BU) had been bribing Chinese officials to win contracts. In response to these reports, the Legal Department conducted two investigations in late 2015 and 2016, respectively, but neither found concrete evidence of bribery, and the allegations could not be substantiated. A third report was subsequently made to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in April 2017. The DOJ placed Voles under formal investigation. While the investigation found that there was no concrete evidence of bribery of Chinese officials, several managers and staff of Voles's Mainland China BU had established a slush fund and related business entities to entertain senior managers of its key customers in China. The DOJ's investigation came at a great financial cost and hurt the company's reputation in the oil and gas industry. This case ends with multiple questions facing Voles and many MNCs operating in emerging markets: How did Voles fail to prevent such management malfeasance even after implementing industry best practices for corporate governance? What are some short-term measures through which Voles can address the situation in the Mainland China BU as revealed by the DOJ's investigation? What long-term measures should Voles implement to prevent such corporate governance failures from happening again?
This case explores the opportunities and challenges of building a sustainable social enterprise in China. It traces the development in Shenzhen, China, of Shenzhen Xihaner Car Wash Center ("Xihaner Car Wash"), founded in August 2015 by Mr. Jun Cao, the father of a Xihaner child. Cao's goal was to provide gainful employment and continuing care for Xihaners. From the start, he was determined to build a social enterprise that could generate enough profits to become sustainable over the long term and not a charitable organization that relied on donations. With a carefully designed business model, Xihaner Car Wash made good progress in its first two years. Its achievements won the enterprise the Gold Award at the Sixth China Charity Fair on September 24, 2017. Despite these achievements, Xihaner Car Wash still faces many challenges. Cao wonders: "Do we have a sustainable business model for our social enterprise? How can we grow Xihaner Car Wash further to benefit more Xihaners in China?"
This case presents an overview of China's FMCG industry in the early 2010s from the perspective of WinChannel, an information service provider to major FMCG companies in China. It describes the three major distribution channels (i.e., Routes-to-Market) and focuses on the challenges facing the traditional trade channel through which FMCG companies provide their products to millions of "mom-and-pop" stores (i.e., small, independently owned and operated convenience stores), especially in rural parts of China. In early 2015, Zhen (Andrew) Cui, Founder and CEO of WinChannel, is exploring how he can help improve the reach and efficiency of the traditional trade channel and wonders if the emerging online/mobile B2B FMCG platforms offer the best solution for the increasingly digitized FMCG retail industry in China.
This case aims to help students understand how digitization is enabling and shaping the transformation of the traditional FMCG industry in China. It introduces Andrew Cui's response to the challenges posed in Case (A)-i.e., how WinChannel could improve the reach and efficiency of the traditional trade channel when online/mobile B2B FMCG platforms were emerging in the market. In May 2015, Cui launched Huixiadan, a mobile-based B2B FMCG ordering platform, connecting a select group of leading FMCG companies and their numerous distributors and wholesalers with potentially millions of mom-and-pop stores in China. Huixiadan has used mobile technologies to develop an inclusive and collaborative business model linking most players in the existing traditional trade channel. However, it faces fierce competition from many online competitors seeking to disrupt the FMCG industry, including Chinese e-commerce giants Alibaba and JD.com. Cui is wondering how competitive and sustainable Huixiadan's business model is and what he should do to withstand the competitive threats even as he tries to exploit opportunities in the traditional FMCG industry in China.
Branded Lifestyle Holdings Limited (Branded Lifestyle) was an Asian apparel retail company that emerged in 2011 after Fung Retailing Limited acquired Hang Ten Group Holdings Limited, a company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. With five apparel brands, Branded Lifestyle was profitable in most of its Asian markets. However, it was struggling in China and had reported annual loses until the acquisition. In 2014, a new managing director of global brands was appointed at Branded Lifestyle. Looking at the evolving apparel industry in China, and reviewing the company’s weak performance over the past years, the managing director knew he needed to develop a strategic plan to turn around the company’s operations. His aim was to build a strong and sustainable business in the Chinese market.
Branded Lifestyle Holdings Limited (Branded Lifestyle) was an Asian apparel retail company that emerged in 2011 after Fung Retailing Limited acquired Hang Ten Group Holdings Limited, a company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. With five apparel brands, Branded Lifestyle was profitable in most of its Asian markets. However, it was struggling in China and had reported annual loses until the acquisition. In 2014, a new managing director of global brands was appointed at Branded Lifestyle. Looking at the evolving apparel industry in China, and reviewing the company's weak performance over the past years, the managing director knew he needed to develop a strategic plan to turn around the company's operations. His aim was to build a strong and sustainable business in the Chinese market.
In 2013, Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd. (STP) was facing the threat of bankruptcy. The chief executive officer (CEO), who had founded the company in China in 2001, was aware of the complexity and challenges of an emerging global industry (solar energy) and economy (China). Fears of energy shortages had fuelled the growth rate for the global solar energy industry, and governments in many countries had introduced subsidies for solar energy initiatives. Consequently, the company had grown from a technology start-up to the leading global producer of photovoltaic solar cells and modules in 2011. However, by 2013, the company was facing financial distress and the threat of bankruptcy. Many factors, including the fluctuating cost of silicon, difficulty finding a stable silicon supplier, the 2008 economic downturn, an uncooperative management team, and the subsequent decline in the solar energy market had caused major problems for STP. How could the CEO turn this company around and avoid bankruptcy?
In 2013, Suntech Power Holdings Co., Ltd. (STP) was facing the threat of bankruptcy. The chief executive officer (CEO), who had founded the company in China in 2001, was aware of the complexity and challenges of an emerging global industry (solar energy) and economy (China). Fears of energy shortages had fuelled the growth rate for the global solar energy industry, and governments in many countries had introduced subsidies for solar energy initiatives. Consequently, the company had grown from a technology start-up to the leading global producer of photovoltaic solar cells and modules in 2011. However, by 2013, the company was facing financial distress and the threat of bankruptcy. Many factors, including the fluctuating cost of silicon, difficulty finding a stable silicon supplier, the 2008 economic downturn, an uncooperative management team, and the subsequent decline in the solar energy market had caused major problems for STP. How could the CEO turn this company around and avoid bankruptcy?
In 2012, Li-Ning Co. Ltd. (LNCL) was the third-largest sportswear company in China in terms of revenue, after international brands Nike and Adidas. Following its highly successful founding in 1990 by China’s Olympic champion and company namesake, Li Ning, the firm attempted to formalize its organizational structure and establish a professionally managed organization, while dealing with the rise of well-established international sportswear brands in China like Nike and Adidas. By 2013, however, the company’s performance had started to decline. LNCL found itself caught in a tough spot, with profit margins falling as the company was squeezed between international and local sportswear brands. Furthermore, its aggressive past expansion had resulted in heavy expenditures in market promotion, large unsold inventories, and low operational efficiency. What should the new leadership team do to turn around the company’s performance?
In 2013, ShangGong Group — a Chinese sewing machine manufacturer — had successfully acquired three German manufacturing companies that were more technologically advanced than it was. The aim of these acquisitions was to help ShangGong catch up to other multinational players in the international market. While the CEO had learned a few lessons from the first acquisition, the strategic and operational challenges were different this time. He needed to act decisively while dealing with the companies’ many stakeholders in Europe and China. One of his goals was to strengthen ShangGong’s market position in China using both its German and domestic brands. Beyond the recent acquisitions in Germany, how could he solidify ShangGong’s leadership in China and eventually challenge the Japanese companies who were leading the global market?