This is part of a case series. The case describes the turnaround of the Belgian bank KBC under the leadership of Johan Thijs in the period 2009-2016. The case is made up of three parts - A, B and C. KBC (A) describes the situation in July 2009 when Johan This was promoted to Managing Director (MD) of the Belgian subsidiary, by far the biggest and most important unit within KBC Group. The timing is a bad one for the bank - it had just been rescued through a multibillion euro bailout by the Belgian government and the bank is on the verge of bankruptcy. Morale is at an all-time low, employees feel betrayed and are demotivated and the euro crisis is about to hit the European banking sector just when banks throughout Europe are trying to respond to the financial crisis of 2008. Johan Thijs inherits a total mess in Belgium and the case describes the facts he faces and asks the question: 'What should he do in the Belgian Unit?' At the same time to becoming MD of Belgium, he becomes member of the Group's Executive Committee (ExCo) and the case also raises the question: 'What can Thijs do as a member of the ExCo to prevent the bankruptcy of KBC Group?'
Supplement to case LBS109. This is part of a case series. The case describes the turnaround of the Belgian bank KBC under the leadership of Johan Thijs in the period 2009-2016. The case is made up of three parts - A, B and C. KBC (A) describes the situation in July 2009 when Johan This was promoted to Managing Director (MD) of the Belgian subsidiary, by far the biggest and most important unit within KBC Group. The timing is a bad one for the bank - it had just been rescued through a multibillion euro bailout by the Belgian government and the bank is on the verge of bankruptcy. Morale is at an all-time low, employees feel betrayed and are demotivated and the euro crisis is about to hit the European banking sector just when banks throughout Europe are trying to respond to the financial crisis of 2008. Johan Thijs inherits a total mess in Belgium and the case describes the facts he faces and asks the question: 'What should he do in the Belgian Unit?' At the same time to becoming MD of Belgium, he becomes member of the Group's Executive Committee (ExCo) and the case also raises the question: 'What can Thijs do as a member of the ExCo to prevent the bankruptcy of KBC Group?'
Supplement to case LBS109. This is part of a case series. The case describes the turnaround of the Belgian bank KBC under the leadership of Johan Thijs in the period 2009-2016. The case is made up of three parts - A, B and C. KBC (A) describes the situation in July 2009 when Johan This was promoted to Managing Director (MD) of the Belgian subsidiary, by far the biggest and most important unit within KBC Group. The timing is a bad one for the bank - it had just been rescued through a multibillion euro bailout by the Belgian government and the bank is on the verge of bankruptcy. Morale is at an all-time low, employees feel betrayed and are demotivated and the euro crisis is about to hit the European banking sector just when banks throughout Europe are trying to respond to the financial crisis of 2008. Johan Thijs inherits a total mess in Belgium and the case describes the facts he faces and asks the question: 'What should he do in the Belgian Unit?' At the same time to becoming MD of Belgium, he becomes member of the Group's Executive Committee (ExCo) and the case also raises the question: 'What can Thijs do as a member of the ExCo to prevent the bankruptcy of KBC Group?'
UEFA is considering how best to use the new technologies of the social era to improve fans' experience with football in Europe. The case describes the key challenges facing UEFA and raises the issue of how to introduce change in a successful organisation.
This is part of a case series. As the Alps disappeared into the darkness through NayaMed's window, the General Manager Aarnav Sendutta considered how to grow his fledgling unit. It was February 2014, and NayaMed, a unit of medical device giant, Medtronic, was just over two years old. It was formed to distribute Medtronic's economy range of heart pacemakers and defibrillators, with regional sales and online technical support. Aarnav was facing two key issues. The first was the perception from Medtronic sales reps that NayaMed would cannibalise their offering. The second issue was how to grow the unit, which currently operated from its Lausanne base in Switzerland, targeting only Italy, Germany and Sweden. The business had grown but was still very small, generating US $4 million in its second year of existence. Aarnav's passion for the NayaMed business was clear, the justification for NayaMed made good business sense, but attempts to grow it were being constrained by organisational issues within the parent company, Medtronic. What could they do?
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Established companies in industries as diverse as airlines, media, and banking have seen their markets invaded by new disruptive business models. The newcomers succeed not only by stealing customers from the established firms but also by attracting new customers into the market. As a result, established companies need to decide how to keep their existing customers while taking advantage of the new ones. One options is to use existing business models to cater for both markets. Another is to develop a new business model specifically for the new market. This is not an easy decision because entering a new market can be risky. But if a firm decides to do so, it must decide on what business model to adopt and then make sure that the new business model co-exists peacefully next to its existing business model. Based on research into 65 companies that chose to enter markets created by disruptive business models (including Nestlä, Edward Jones, Waitrose, Reuters, and Tesco), the authors say that established firms should develop new business models that are different from their existing business models and different from the business model of the disruptor. However, designing these business models is not only difficult in its own right but also raises the challenge of how to operate two different and conflicting business models in the same company. The authors argue that the usual prescription of creating a separate unit to house the new business model is not enough. The company needs to achieve a delicate balance: establishing enough separation between the two business models to avoid conflicts, but not so much to take advantage of synergies between the two. To achieve this balance, the company needs to create an ambidextrous organizational environment.
This case is set in 2008 and examines the challenges facing Amit Mehra, Managing Director of Reuters Market Light (RML), a newly formed unit within Thomson Reuters, as he tries to grow the business amid organisational and market upheaval. RML represented a creative venture by Thomson Reuters to leverage its competences and make money at the bottom of the pyramid. Specifically, RML was set up in 2007 to offer customised, localised and personalised weather forecasts, crop prices and local agricultural news via short message service text messages on mobile telephones to rural Indian farmers. To do so, it had to develop an appropriate business model that allowed it to make money in rural India. The case is therefore a perfect vehicle to discuss three interrelated themes: (1) corporate entrepreneurship - how big established companies can grow new ventures next to the established core; (2) playing two games at the same time - how established companies can compete with dual business models; and (3) scaling up a new business - how to grow a new business while protecting it from rival attacks and internal politics.
This is the second of a three-case series. The (B) case describes the introduction of the new machine (called Nescafe Dolce Gusto) in October 2006, and compares its strategic positioning (and business model) relative to Nespresso. It examines the questions: (1) is the Nescafe Dolce Gusto strategic position substantially different from the Nespresso and Nescafe strategic positions? Has Nestle succeeded in entering the mass market with the new machine or is it simply crowding out Nespresso? and (2) was the choice of brand name appropriate?
Supplement to case LBS134. This is the second of a three-case series. The (B) case describes the introduction of the new machine (called Nescafe Dolce Gusto) in October 2006, and compares its strategic positioning (and business model) relative to Nespresso. It examines the questions: (1) is the Nescafe Dolce Gusto strategic position substantially different from the Nespresso and Nescafe strategic positions? Has Nestle succeeded in entering the mass market with the new machine or is it simply crowding out Nespresso? and (2) was the choice of brand name appropriate?
Supplement to case LBS134. This is the second of a three-case series. The (B) case describes the introduction of the new machine (called Nescafe Dolce Gusto) in October 2006, and compares its strategic positioning (and business model) relative to Nespresso. It examines the questions: (1) is the Nescafe Dolce Gusto strategic position substantially different from the Nespresso and Nescafe strategic positions? Has Nestle succeeded in entering the mass market with the new machine or is it simply crowding out Nespresso? and (2) was the choice of brand name appropriate?
Logitech International was a leading maker of mice and other devices for controlling computers, including PC cameras. In 1998, the new CEO learned that the Quickcam business unit of Connectix was for sale, an offer the founders had rejected because the technology was not as good as Logitech's internally developed Web camera, and purchasing an inferior product was not seen as an advantage. The CEO thought that reassessing this acquisition was a good way to examine Logitech's business and organizational model, and the strategic opportunities facing the company. Logitech was an OEM-focused and engineering-dominated company, with power centered in the business units, which developed the technology and developed the retail strategy for the products, and it faced serious competition in the branded retail market. The new CEO wondered whether the brand recognition associated with the QuickCam could be used to Logitech's advantage. The case details for discussion the strategic significance that the rights to an established brand would have on the market position and organizational structure of Logitech.