The only way to achieve real growth is to develop offerings so innovative that they create new categories or subcategories making competitors irrelevant because they lack a "must have" feature or benefit. The alternative, engaging in "my brand is better than your brand" brand preference competition, virtually never works because of market inertia. This article, based in part on hundreds of case studies, shows how to identify the "must haves" and discusses barriers to competitors such as going beyond functional benefits, finding shared interests with customers, ongoing innovation, superior execution, scaling the concept, becoming an exemplar, and branding the innovation.

A silo is a metaphor for an organizational unit that has its own management team and lacks the motivation or desire to work with or even communicate with other organizational units. Organizations have a collection of silos that include product silos (business units defined by product or service offerings) and country silos (geographic silos defined by countries or regions). Today, communication and brand building involve a variety of fast-changing modalities that do not lend themselves to the silo world. Customers are demanding silo-spanning offerings and services. There is just too much at stake to allow silo interests to inhibit or prevent the effort toward achieving brand and marketing synergies across the organization. Recognizing that autonomous silo organizations are no longer a viable option, there are a host of firms that are developing, expanding, or energizing the corporate Chief Marketing Officer (CMO) position and creating or enhancing the supporting central marketing group. Efforts by a CMO and his or her team to gain credibility, traction, and influence represents a formidable task in the face of silo indifference or resistance. This article examines how silo barriers to the creation of great marketing and marketing organizations can be reduced or eliminated, leading to stronger offerings and brands and effective synergistic marketing strategies and programs.

A corporate brand, which is based on the characteristics of the firm as well as its products, can play a critical role in a company's brand portfolio. It can help differentiate the firm, support internal brand building, facilitate brand management, build credibility, and provide a vehicle for communicating with and maintaining support among broad external constituencies. However, defining and successfully managing the corporate brand requires the firm to address a number of challenges, including maintaining its relevance to the company's strategy, demonstrating its benefits to consumers, and avoiding negative associations or controversies.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. If a brand fails to develop or maintain differentiation, consumers have no basis for choosing it over others. The product's price will then be the determining factor in a decision to purchase. Absent differentiation, says the author, the core of any brand and its associated business--a loyal customer base--cannot be created or sustained. In a time when the competitive terrain for most brands is difficult to brutal, the author describes a new tool that can help companies maintain an advantage: the branded differentiator. A branded differentiator can be a feature, service, program, or ingredient. It must be meaningful to customers; that is, it must be both pertinent and substantial enough to matter when people are purchasing or using the product or service. It must also be actively managed (and, thus, be able to justify the investment of management time) over an extended period--years or even decades--so that it does not become stagnant. Explores the different types of branded differentiators, the pros and cons of developing them internally vs. looking outside for them, and questions about managing these brands-within-brands.

The classic brand manager dealt with simple brand structures in part because he or she was faced with a relatively simple environment and simple business strategies. Today the situation is far different. Brand managers now face market fragmentation, channel dynamics, global realities, and business environments that have drastically changed their task. In addition, there is pressure to leverage brand assets because of the prohibitive cost of creating new brands. This set of challenges has created a new discipline called "brand architecture." A coherent brand architecture can lead to impact, clarity, synergy, and leverage rather than market weakness, confusion, waste, and missed opportunities. Brand architecture is an organizing structure of the brand portfolio that specifies brand roles and the nature of relationships between brands. This article introduces a powerful brand architecture tool, the "brand relationship spectrum." It is intended to help brand architecture strategists employ insight and subtlety to subbrands, endorsed brands, and their alternatives. Subbrands and endorsed brands can play a key role in creating a coherent and effective brand architecture.

As more and more companies begin to see the world as their market, brand builders look with envy upon those businesses that appear to have created global brands--brands whose positioning, advertising strategy, personality, look, and feel are in most respects the same from one country to another. Attracted by such high-profile examples of success, these companies want to globalize their own brands. But that's a risky path to follow, according to David Aaker and Erich Joachimsthaler. Why? Because creating strong global brands takes global brand leadership. It can't be done simply by edict from on high. Specifically, companies must use organizational structures, processes, and cultures to allocate brand-building resources globally, to create global synergies, and to develop a global brand strategy that coordinates and leverages country brand strategies. Aaker and Joachimsthaler offer four prescriptions for companies seeking to achieve global brand leadership. First, companies must stimulate the sharing of insights and best practices across countries--a system in which "it won't work here" attitudes can be overcome. Second, companies should support a common global brand-planning process, one that is consistent across markets and products. Third, they should assign global managerial responsibility for brands in order to create cross-country synergies and to fight local bias. And fourth, they need to execute brilliant brand-building strategies. Before stampeding blindly toward global branding, companies need to think through the systems they have in place. Otherwise, any success they achieve is likely to be random--and that's a fail-safe recipe for mediocrity.

When markets turn hostile, it's no surprise that managers are tempted to extend their brands vertically--that is, to take their brands into a seemingly attractive market above or below their current positions. And for companies chasing growth, the urge to move into booming premium or value segments also can be hard to resist. The draw is indeed strong; and in some instances, a vertical move is not merely justified but actually essential to survival--even for top brands, which have the advantages of economies of scale, brand equity, and retail clout. But beware: leveraging a brand to access upscale or downscale markets is more dangerous than it first appears. Before making a move, then, managers should ascertain whether the rewards will be worth the risks. In general, David Aaker recommends that managers avoid vertical extensions whenever possible. There is an inherent contradiction in the very concept because brand equity is built in large part on image and perceived worth, and a vertical move can easily distort those qualities. Still, certain situations demand vertical extensions, and Aaker examines both the winners and the losers in the game.

Costs, market fragmentation, and new media channels that let customers bypass advertisements seem to be in league against the old ways of marketing. Relying on mass media campaigns to build strong brands may be a thing of the past. Several companies in Europe, making a virtue of necessity, have come up with alternative brand-building approaches and are blazing a trail in the post-mass-media age. In England, Nestle's Buitoni brand grew through programs that taught the English how to cook Italian food. The Body Shop garnered loyalty with its support of environmental and social causes. Cadbury funded a theme park tied to its history in the chocolate business. Haagen-Dazs opened posh ice-cream parlors and got itself featured by name on the menus of fine restaurants. Hugo Boss and Swatch backed athletic or cultural events that became associated with their brands.

Gordon Johnston has taken his elite health-club concept from the germ of an idea to the pinnacle of success. But the most difficult decision in managing his company lies ahead. Gordon must figure out how to lead Transition fitness clubs into the next phase. In each of the 15 years since Transition's flagship club opened in New York City, its sales have doubled. The company boasts fitness trainers handpicked by Olympic medalists, health-conscious cuisine by in-house chefs, huge facilities in prime locations, and reciprocal memberships at other Transition clubs worldwide. But recently, the company's margins have been shrinking. An aging membership could mean problems for future expansion. And new, upscale competitors are challenging Transition's flat-rate pricing policy. Will Gordon have to run fast to stay in one place? Should he change Transition's pricing policy? In 95205 and 95205Z, William Campbell, Robert J. Dolan, Anita K. Hersh, Peter H. Farquhar, David Aaker, and Mary Shelman offer advice on this fictional case study.

Gordon Johnston has taken his elite health-club concept from the germ of an idea to the pinnacle of success. But the most difficult decision in managing his company lies ahead. Gordon must figure out how to lead Transition fitness clubs into the next phase. In each of the 15 years since Transition's flagship club opened in New York City, its sales have doubled. The company boasts fitness trainers handpicked by Olympic medalists, health-conscious cuisine by in-house chefs, huge facilities in prime locations, and reciprocal memberships at other Transition clubs worldwide. But recently, the company's margins have been shrinking. An aging membership could mean problems for future expansion. And new, upscale competitors are challenging Transition's flat-rate pricing policy. Will Gordon have to run fast to stay in one place? Should he change Transition's pricing policy? In 95205 and 95205Z, commentators William Campbell, Robert J. Dolan, Anita K. Hersh, Peter H. Farquhar, David Aaker, and Mary Shelman offer advice on this fictional case study.

Within its first two years, Saturn created one of the strongest automobile brands. This article explains how and why General Motors (GM) was able to accomplish this unique feat. It involved creating a world-class product, developing a team-oriented organization outside the GM fold, selling the company not the car, creating a new retailing strategy and relationship with the customer, and implementing a consistent communication effort. Ironically, Saturn's success raises difficult strategic issues as to its future management and its role in the future of GM.