Five experts gathered recently to discuss the future of enterprise risk management: Kaplan, the Baker Foundation Professor at Harvard Business School, who with his colleague David Norton developed the balanced scorecard; Mikes, an assistant professor at HBS who studies the evolution of risk management and the role of the chief risk officer; Simons, the Charles M. Williams Professor of Business Administration at HBS; Tufano, the Sylvan C . Coleman Professor of Financial Management at HBS; and Hofmann, the chief risk officer at Koch Industries. The panel was moderated by HBR senior editor David Champion. Among the questions they addressed were: How predictable was the financial meltdown of 2008-2009? Did new tools for assessing risk give a false sense of security? How do the challenges facing industrial companies differ from those facing the financial sector? Is outsourcing an effective risk-management tool? Have capital structures become a bit too efficient in many companies? What makes a good chief risk officer?

In this edited conversation with HBR senior editor David Champion, Merton, a professor at Harvard Business School, casts light on the role of derivatives in the current financial crisis. Merton was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1997 for his part in developing a new method to value derivatives, and after publication of that development, the markets in derivatives exploded: Today, the estimated notional value of derivative contracts exceeds $500 trillion. Merton posits that derivatives themselves cannot be the cause of a financial crisis. They are simply tools that can be used either functionally (to reduce risk) or dysfunctionally (in ways that increase risk without offsetting benefits). He also offers prescriptions for making the financial markets safer.

Most CEOs who specialize in turning around struggling companies focus on costs. But for Fred Hassan, chairman and CEO of Schering-Plough, the primary focus in a turnaround is the top line. Since 2003, when Hassan took the helm at the global pharmaceutical company, he has overseen a remarkable recovery in performance. And consistent with his philosophy, the turnaround started with sales. Considering sales reps as less than crucial to strategy, Hassan cautions, is a big mistake. At Schering-Plough, he has concentrated on motivating and organizing salespeople to create trusting relationships with doctors. "You have to differentiate the salesperson in the customer's mind--just like you differentiate brands," he explains. A doctor may see 60 pharmaceutical reps on a regular basis but actually trust far fewer. To earn a spot in this inner circle, Schering-Plough reps try to turn each customer encounter into an occasion to help doctors provide better care for their patients. Schering-Plough also restructured its sales forces so that reps carry not just one kind of product, as they do in most pharmaceutical companies, but several. Covering a broad range of treatments gives reps more ways to build value-adding relationships with doctors. In this interview, Hassan discusses his success at Schering-Plough and his experiences at other pharmaceutical companies. During his career, he has built a reputation for being in tune with the front lines, as well as for reaching out to the managers who supervise salespeople. He has found that this level of personal attention not only makes reps feel respected, but also gives him valuable strategic insights.

Harvard Business School professor William Sahlman comments on his 1999 HBR article, "The New Economy Is Stronger Than You Think." Despite the market crash, he says, the new economy continues to hold its value.

During his first three years as CEO, Lloyd Byrne transformed Bretplex from an uninspired family-controlled company in the machine tool business into a midsize industrial conglomerate. Sales doubled, market value tripled, the company's management team grew stronger, and the board's makeup was enhanced by the appointment of several glamorous nonexecutive directors. After that strong beginning, however, Bretplex's previously unstoppable growth ground to a halt. The turning point was the company's acquisition of Hazlemere Measures, a British equipment manufacturer. The price of the acquisition had been bid up by an aggressive competitor, and the market believed Bretplex paid too much. Soon, other acquisitions were being examined. Worse, the company began missing its revenue estimates and revised them downward only as reporting dates drew near. More uncertainty emerged when Laura Barrington, the manager of an activist shareholder fund, began asking whether Lloyd had what it would take to lead the company to recovery. Board members Harriet Poole, a CEO herself, and Jefferson Souza, a strategy guru, debate solutions for Bretplex. If the company fires Lloyd, Jefferson says, the market will think the company is serious about getting its house in order, and Barrington and the fund will probably back off. Harriet, distracted by events at her own company, fears that it will be highly disruptive for Bretplex to lose its much-admired leader and, possibly, some of its senior managers. She is inclined to stick with a restructuring plan just approved by the board.

During his first three years as CEO, Lloyd Byrne transformed Bretplex from an uninspired family-controlled company in the machine tool business into a midsize industrial conglomerate. Sales doubled, market value tripled, the company's management team grew stronger, and the board's makeup was enhanced by the appointment of several glamorous nonexecutive directors. After that strong beginning, however, Bretplex's previously unstoppable growth ground to a halt. The turning point was the company's acquisition of Hazlemere Measures, a British equipment manufacturer. The price of the acquisition had been bid up by an aggressive competitor, and the market believed Bretplex paid too much. Soon, other acquisitions were being examined. Worse, the company began missing its revenue estimates and revised them downward only as reporting dates drew near. More uncertainty emerged when Laura Barrington, the manager of an activist shareholder fund, began asking whether Lloyd had what it would take to lead the company to recovery. Board members Harriet Poole, a CEO herself, and Jefferson Souza, a strategy guru, debate solutions for Bretplex. If the company fires Lloyd, Jefferson says, the market will think the company is serious about getting its house in order, and Barrington and the fund will probably back off. Harriet, distracted by events at her own company, fears that it will be highly disruptive for Bretplex to lose its much-admired leader and, possibly, some of its senior managers. She is inclined to stick with a restructuring plan just approved by the board. In R0109A and R0109Z, commentators Norm Augustine, Charles Elson, Richard H. Koppes, and Nell Minow offer advice on this fictional case study.

During his first three years as CEO, Lloyd Byrne transformed Bretplex from an uninspired family-controlled company in the machine tool business into a midsize industrial conglomerate. Sales doubled, market value tripled, the company's management team grew stronger, and the board's makeup was enhanced by the appointment of several glamorous nonexecutive directors. After that strong beginning, however, Bretplex's previously unstoppable growth ground to a halt. The turning point was the company's acquisition of Hazlemere Measures, a British equipment manufacturer. The price of the acquisition had been bid up by an aggressive competitor, and the market believed Bretplex paid too much. Soon, other acquisitions were being examined. Worse, the company began missing its revenue estimates and revised them downward only as reporting dates drew near. More uncertainty emerged when Laura Barrington, the manager of an activist shareholder fund, began asking whether Lloyd had what it would take to lead the company to recovery. Board members Harriet Poole, a CEO herself, and Jefferson Souza, a strategy guru, debate solutions for Bretplex. If the company fires Lloyd, Jefferson says, the market will think the company is serious about getting its house in order, and Barrington and the fund will probably back off. Harriet, distracted by events at her own company, fears that it will be highly disruptive for Bretplex to lose its much-admired leader and, possibly, some of its senior managers. She is inclined to stick with a restructuring plan just approved by the board. In R0109A and R0109Z, commentators Norm Augustine, Charles Elson, Richard H. Koppes, and Nell Minow offer advice on this fictional case study.

In this interview with HBR senior editor David Champion, Mark Levin, the founder and CEO of Millennium Pharmaceuticals, describes his vision of the future of the pharmaceutical industry in the wake of the genetics revolution and new technologies that have altered the economics of drug development. No company, he argues, will create serious long-term value by staying in just one or two stages of the value chain. That's why Millennium, which started out doing basic research into genes and proteins and selling its findings to pharmaceutical giants, has moved downstream--toward the patients who actually use and pay for the drugs. He explains why the research end has become less lucrative than the more mechanical tasks of identifying, testing, and manufacturing molecules. Levin talks about the changes Millennium has undergone since its inception in 1993--from 30 workers to more than 1,000, and from one end of the value chain to the other. He discusses the company's cultural transformations as well as the partnerships and acquisitions that have helped Millennium become involved in every stage of the chain--from gene to patient. Levin's vigorous approach to balancing long-term strategy with short-term tactics offers important lessons to any executive facing an industry upheaval.

Four years ago, Diane Ashton and Sundeep Lal were working together at MIT on a titanium extraction project. Durable and highly heat resistant, titanium is a key constituent of many specialty alloys, but it's also very expensive to produce. So when Diane discovered a solution that isolated titanium efficiently, the partners recognized that the technology would be worth billions to large manufacturers. Sundeep and Diane secured a $20 million investment from a prominent VC and drew up a business plan. Within six months of their discovery, Titrolyte Inc. was born. But Diane and Sundeep soon discovered that what had been a fairly straightforward operation in the confines of an MIT lab was difficult to reproduce on a large scale. In just two years, they had to go back to investors for more money. Sundeep thinks that Titrolyte is ready to go public. Besides, he's concerned that if they don't IPO now, they might miss the bus. But Diane is worried that they're moving too fast. They haven't perfected the technology yet, and Titrolyte's business systems leave a great deal to be desired. Should Titrolyte risk going public now, while the market is still open? Five commentators offer advice in this fictional case study. In R0102A and R0102Z, William Bourne, Tim Draper, Sarah Mavrinac, Neil Jones, and David Perry offer advice on this fictional case study.

Four years ago, Diane Ashton and Sundeep Lal were working together at MIT on a titanium extraction project. Durable and highly heat resistant, titanium is a key constituent of many specialty alloys, but it's also very expensive to produce. So when Diane discovered a solution that isolated titanium efficiently, the partners recognized that the technology would be worth billions to large manufacturers. Sundeep and Diane secured a $20 million investment from a prominent VC and drew up a business plan. Within six months of their discovery, Titrolyte Inc. was born. But Diane and Sundeep soon discovered that what had been a fairly straightforward operation in the confines of an MIT lab was difficult to reproduce on a large scale. In just two years, they had to go back to investors for more money. Sundeep thinks that Titrolyte is ready to go public. Besides, he's concerned that if they don't IPO now, they might miss the bus. But Diane is worried that they're moving too fast. They haven't perfected the technology yet, and Titrolyte's business systems leave a great deal to be desired. Should Titrolyte risk going public now, while the market is still open? In R0102A and R0102Z, William Bourne, Tim Draper, Sarah Mavrinac, Neil Jones, and David Perry offer advice on this fictional case study.

Four years ago, Diane Ashton and Sundeep Lal were working together at MIT on a titanium extraction project. Durable and highly heat resistant, titanium is a key constituent of many specialty alloys, but it's also very expensive to produce. So when Diane discovered a solution that isolated titanium efficiently, the partners recognized that the technology would be worth billions to large manufacturers. Sundeep and Diane secured a $20 million investment from a prominent VC and drew up a business plan. Within six months of their discovery, Titrolyte Inc. was born. But Diane and Sundeep soon discovered that what had been a fairly straightforward operation in the confines of an MIT lab was difficult to reproduce on a large scale. In just two years, they had to go back to investors for more money. Sundeep thinks that Titrolyte is ready to go public. Besides, he's concerned that if they don't IPO now, they might miss the bus. But Diane is worried that they're moving too fast. They haven't perfected the technology yet, and Titrolyte's business systems leave a great deal to be desired. Should Titrolyte risk going public now, while the market is still open? In R0102A and R0102Z, William Bourne, Tim Draper, Sarah Mavrinac, Neil Jones, and David Perry offer advice on this fictional case study.

Entrepreneurs risk having strategically sensitive information leaked to competitors when their VCs discuss new ventures with outside partners. To avoid that problem, many are turning to other sources of financing.

The current high level of venture capital investment is driving enormous innovation in business. About 40% of the growth in the U.S. GDP is coming out of the tech sector, and most of that can be traced to the vibrancy of entrepreneurial initiatives, according to accomplished entrepreneur and venture capitalist Vinod Khosla. But in a wide-ranging interview, Khosla says greed is at a high level, too, and he's concerned about its effect on entrepreneurs and their infant businesses. Today, an entrepreneur with a plan for a new business can get funded within a week. But the entrepreneur doesn't get an honest, painstaking critique. The weaknesses of the plan are often ignored. The result is that great ideas don't reach their full potential. Khosla touches on the qualities required of today's entrepreneurs and the difficulties that established companies face in adapting to the Internet. He also offers some of his secrets for finding and exploiting the biggest new technologies.