In March 2015, consulting firm MacPhie & Company was at a crossroads. Founded in 2004 in Toronto, Ontario, the company offered consulting services related to strategy development, marketing and communications, reputation management, and branding. MacPhie & Company maintained an entrepreneurial culture that fostered innovation and continual learning, while ensuring that all client projects followed the MacPhie Way.” Although MacPhie & Company had been financially successful over the years, it had struggled with growth, so the company’s founder set a goal of growing MacPhie & Company to at least 20 consultants by 2020. He knew that in order to do that, he would need to consider all facets of the business: revenue generation to support a larger model; ensuring consistent profit margins; appropriate client mix; the services that were offered; teachable methodologies and consulting processes; effective organizational structure and human resources; geographic locations; and the employment of awareness-building efforts. After more than a decade, it was time to be bold and push MacPhie & Company to the next level. With the goal set, the challenge was how to get to the desired level of growth and then to sustain that level of growth once it had been reached.
In most free-market economies, restrictions exist to curb the activity of cartels — groups of otherwise independent businesses that collaborate to lessen or prevent competition. Between 1990 and 2008, the total known affected sales of cartel activity topped US$16 trillion. Although government bodies have committed substantial resources to battling illegal corporate activity, it still happens and many corporations reoffend after being sanctioned for crimes. The authors have conducted research using a database of all known international cartels between 1970 and 2008. They suggest four courses of action to curb cartel activity: 1) Remunerative practices should be designed with a better understanding of the environmental drivers of illegal activity. Compensation should focus on solid strategic behaviours rather than rewarding short-term performance. 2) More independent boards are associated, somewhat counter-intuitively, with more illegal activity. Thus, the call for more independent boards needs to take into account the tendency of independent boards to structure CEO compensation to be more output-based, which often leads CEOs to focus only on short-term financial metrics. 3) Regulators should introduce harsher financial penalties in order to incent “means-based” organizational behaviour and punish “ends-based” activity. 4) Organizations should be made to have a legal requirement to protect society.
In May 2008, the board of directors of BCE Inc., one of Canada’s leading integrated communications companies, was dealing with the fallout of a Quebec Court of Appeal decision. The court had ruled to disallow a $50 billion privatization deal as, according to the court, the process was flawed and did not consider the debenture (bond) holders of Bell Canada (a wholly owned subsidiary of BCE). The court had ruled that the board had allowed a deal in which benefits accrued only to the shareholders (a 40 per cent increase in value since the firm was in play) at the expense of the bondholders, who were dealt an 18 per cent decrease in value over the same period. In deciding whether or not to launch a last-ditch appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, management and the board needed to determine who were the key stakeholders involved in the decision to take the firm private, what their interests were, and how those interests should guide the board.