Fully half of all joint ventures are a failure. That's worrying, given that partnerships and alliances are central to many companies' business models. The reasons are not mysterious: the partners have divergent strategies; the goals set for the venture are ambiguous; partnership agreements quickly become obsolete; and middle managers don't have clear strategic principles to work from. The problems can be remedied if companies switch their focus from operations and contractual obligations to strategy and commitment. This article describes how Solvay Pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceutical services firm Quintiles used the balanced scorecard and strategy maps to help them define strategic goals, create a governance structure, develop metrics, and align the two groups. The new approach yielded impressive results: The alliance reduced cycle time for clinical studies by approximately 40%, an achievement that brings new products to market much faster and leads to tremendous cost reductions.
"What best practice challenges the conventional wisdom about what to do in a downturn?" We put that question to our team of management bloggers at harvardbusiness.org. This article provides an edited selection of their provocative responses.
Companies have always found it hard to balance pressing operational concerns with long-term strategic priorities. The tension is critical: World-class processes won't lead to success without the right strategic direction, and the best strategy in the world will get nowhere without strong operations to execute it. In this article, Kaplan, of Harvard Business School, and Norton, founder and director of the Palladium Group, explain how to effectively manage both strategy and operations by linking them tightly in a closed-loop management system. The system comprises five stages, beginning with strategy development, which springs from a company's mission, vision, and value statements, and from an analysis of its strengths, weaknesses, and competitive environment. In the next stage, managers translate the strategy into objectives and initiatives with strategy maps, which organize objectives by themes, and balanced scorecards, which link objectives to performance metrics. Stage three involves creating an operational plan to accomplish the objectives and initiatives; it includes targeting process improvements and preparing sales, resource, and capacity plans and dynamic budgets. Managers then put plans into action, monitoring their effectiveness in stage four. They review operational, environmental, and competitive data; assess progress; and identify barriers to execution. In the final stage, they test the strategy, analyzing cost, profitability, and correlations between strategy and performance. If their underlying assumptions appear faulty, they update the strategy, beginning another loop. The authors present not only a comprehensive blueprint for successful strategy execution but also a managerial tool kit, illustrated with examples from HSBC Rail, Cigna Property and Casualty, and Store 24. The kit incorporates leading management experts' frameworks, outlining where they fit into the management cycle.
The balanced scorecard revolutionized conventional thinking about performance metrics. When Robert Kaplan and David Norton first introduced the concept in 1992, companies were busy transforming themselves to compete in the world of information; their ability to exploit intangible assets was becoming more decisive than their ability to manage physical assets. The scorecard allowed companies to track financial results while monitoring progress in building the capabilities needed for growth. The tool was not intended to be a replacement for financial measures but rather a complement--and that's just how most companies treated it. Some companies went a step further, however, and discovered the scorecard's value as the cornerstone of a new strategic management system. In this article from 1996, the authors describe how the balanced scorecard can address a serious deficiency in traditional management systems: the inability to link a company's long-term strategy with its short-term financial goals. The scorecard lets managers introduce four new processes that help companies make that important link. The first process--translating the vision--helps managers build a consensus concerning a company's strategy and express it in terms that can guide action at the local level. The second--communicating and linking--calls for communicating a strategy at all levels of the organization and linking it with unit and individual goals. The third--business planning--enables companies to integrate their business plans with their financial plans. The fourth--feedback and learning--gives companies the capacity for strategic learning, which consists of gathering feedback, testing the hypotheses on which a strategy is based, and making necessary adjustments.
Health insurer IFA and grocery chain ShopSense have formed an intriguing partnership, but it threatens to test customers' tolerance for sharing personal information. For years, IFA's regional manager for West Coast operations, Laura Brickman, had been championing the use of customer analytics--drawing conclusions about consumer behaviors based on patterns found in collected data. She came away from a meeting with the grocer's analytics chief, Steve Worthington, convinced that ShopSense's customer loyalty card data could be meaningful. In a pilot test, Laura bought ten years' worth of data from the grocer and found some compelling correlations between purchases of unhealthy products and medical claims. Now she has to sell her company's senior team on buying more information. Her bosses have some concerns, however. If IFA came up with proprietary health findings, would the company have to share what it learned? Meanwhile, Steve is busy trying to work out details of the sale with executives at ShopSense. Many have expressed support, but COO Alan Atkins isn't so sure: If customers found out that the store was selling their data, they might stop using their cards, and the company would lose access to vital information. Though CEO Donna Greer agrees, she knows that if things go well, it could mean easy money. How can the two companies use the customer data responsibly? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0705A and R0705Z are George L. Jones, the CEO of Borders Group; Katherine N. Lemon, an associate professor of marketing at Boston College; David Norton, the senior vice president of relationship marketing for Harrah's Entertainment; and Michael B. McCallister, the president and CEO of Humana.
Health insurer IFA and grocery chain ShopSense have formed an intriguing partnership, but it threatens to test customers' tolerance for sharing personal information. For years, IFA's regional manager for West Coast operations, Laura Brickman, had been championing the use of customer analytics--drawing conclusions about consumer behaviors based on patterns found in collected data. She came away from a meeting with the grocer's analytics chief, Steve Worthington, convinced that ShopSense's customer loyalty card data could be meaningful. In a pilot test, Laura bought ten years' worth of data from the grocer and found some compelling correlations between purchases of unhealthy products and medical claims. Now she has to sell her company's senior team on buying more information. Her bosses have some concerns, however. If IFA came up with proprietary health findings, would the company have to share what it learned? Meanwhile, Steve is busy trying to work out details of the sale with executives at ShopSense. Many have expressed support, but COO Alan Atkins isn't so sure: If customers found out that the store was selling their data, they might stop using their cards, and the company would lose access to vital information. Though CEO Donna Greer agrees, she knows that if things go well, it could mean easy money. How can the two companies use the customer data responsibly? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0705A and R0705Z are George L. Jones, the CEO of Borders Group; Katherine N. Lemon, an associate professor of marketing at Boston College; David Norton, the senior vice president of relationship marketing for Harrah's Entertainment; and Michael B. McCallister, the president and CEO of Humana.
Throughout most of modern business history, corporations have attempted to unlock value by matching their structures to their strategies: Centralization by function. Decentralization by product category or geographic region. Matrix organizations that attempt both at once. Virtual organizations. Networked organizations. Velcro organizations. But none of these approaches has worked very well. Restructuring churn is expensive, and new structures often create new organizational problems that are as troublesome as the ones they try to solve. It takes time for employees to adapt to them, they create legacy systems that refuse to die, and a great deal of tacit knowledge gets lost in the process. Given the costs and difficulties involved in finding structural ways to unlock value, it's fair to raise the question: Is structural change the right tool for the job? The answer is usually no, Kaplan and Norton contend. It's far less disruptive to choose an organizational design that works without major conflicts and then design a customized strategic system to align that structure to the strategy. A management system based on the Balanced Scorecard framework is the best way to align strategy and structure, the authors suggest. Managers can use the tools of the framework to drive their unit's performance: strategy maps to define and communicate the company's value proposition and the scorecard to implement and monitor the strategy. In this article, the originators of the Balanced Scorecard describe how two hugely different organizations--DuPont and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police--used corporate scorecards and strategy maps organized around strategic themes to realize the enormous value that their portfolios of assets, people, and skills represented. As a result, they did not have to endure a painful series of changes that simply replaced one rigid structure with another.
There is a disconnect in most companies between strategy formulation and strategy execution. On average, 95% of a company's employees are unaware of, or do not understand, its strategy. If employees are unaware of the strategy, they surely cannot help the organization implement it effectively. It doesn't have to be like this. For the past 15 years, the authors have studied companies that achieved performance breakthroughs by adopting the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) and its associated tools to help them better communicate strategy to their employees and to guide and monitor the execution of that strategy. Some companies, of course, have achieved better, longer lasting improvements than others. The organizations that have managed to sustain their strategic focus have typically established a new corporate-level unit to oversee all activities related to strategy: an office of strategy management (OSM). The OSM, in effect, acts as the CEO's chief of staff. It coordinates an array of tasks: communicating corporate strategy; ensuring that enterprise-level plans are translated into the plans of the various units and departments; executing strategic initiatives to deliver on the grand design; aligning employees' plans for competency development with strategic objectives; and testing and adapting the strategy to stay abreast of the competition. The OSM does not do all the work, but it facilitates the processes so that strategy is executed in an integrated fashion across the enterprise. Although the companies that Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton studied use the BSC as the framework for their strategy management systems, the authors say the lessons of the OSM are applicable even to companies that do not use it.
Executives know that a company's measurement systems strongly affect employee behaviors. But the traditional financial performance measures that worked for the industrial era are out of sync with the skills organizations are trying to master. Frustrated by these inadequacies, some manÂagers have abandoned financial measures like return on equity and earnings per share. "Make operational improvements, and the numbers will follow," the argument goes. But managers want a balanced presentation of measures that will allow them to view the company from several perspectives at once. In this classic article from 1992, authors Robert Kaplan and David Norton propose an innovative solution. During a yearlong research project with 12 companies at the leading edge of performance management, the authors developed a "balanced scorecard," a new performance measurement system that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive view of their business. The balanced scorecard includes financial measures that tell the results of actions already taken. And it complements those financial measures with three sets of operational measures related to customer satisfaction, internal processes, and the organization's ability to learn and improve-the activities that drive future financial performance. The balanced scorecard helps managers look at their businesses from four essential perspectives and answer some important questions. First, How do customers see us? Second, What must we excel at? Third, Can we continue to improve and create value? And fourth, How do we appear to shareholders? By looking at all of these parameters, managers can determine whether improvements in one area have come at the expense of another. Armed with that knowledge, the authors say, executives can glean a complete picture of where the company stands-and where it's headed.
Measuring the value of intangible assets such as company culture, knowledge management systems, and employees' skills is the holy grail of accounting. Executives know that these intangibles, being hard to imitate, are powerful sources of sustainable competitive advantage. If managers could measure them, they could manage the company's competitive position more easily and accurately. In this article, the creators of the Balanced Scorecard draw on its tools and framework--in particular, a tool called the strategy map--to present a step-by-step way to determine "strategic readiness," which refers to the alignment of an organization's human, information, and organization capital with its strategy. In the method the authors describe, the firm identifies the processes most critical to creating and delivering its value proposition and determines the human, information, and organization capital the processes require.
If you were a military general on the march, you'd want your troops to have plenty of maps--detailed information about the mission they were on, the roads they would travel, the campaigns they would undertake, and the weapons at their disposal. The same holds true in business: a workforce needs clear and detailed information to execute a business strategy successfully. Authors Robert Kaplan and David Norton, cocreators of the balanced scorecard, have adapted that seminal tool to create strategy maps. Strategy maps let an organization describe and illustrate--in clear and general language--its objectives, initiatives, targets markets, performance measures, and the links between all the pieces of its strategy. Using Mobil North American Marketing and Refining Company as an example, Kaplan and Norton walk through the creation of a strategy map and its four distinct regions--financial, customer, internal process, and learning and growth--which correspond to the four perspectives of the balanced scorecard. The authors show how the Mobil division used the map to transform itself from a centrally controlled manufacturer of commodity products to a decentralized, customer-driven organization.
The Balanced Scorecard was developed to measure both current operating performance and the drivers of future performance. Many managers believe they are using a Balanced Scorecard when they supplement traditional financial measures with generic, non-financial measures about customers, processes, and employees. But the best Balanced Scorecards are more than ad hoc collections of financial and non-financial measures. The objectives and measures on a Balanced Scorecard should be derived from the business unit's strategy. A scorecard should contain outcome measures and the performance drivers of those outcomes, linked together in cause-and-effect relationships.
In an earlier, groundbreaking article, Balanced Scorecard -- Measures That Drive Performance, the authors proposed a new measurement system that provided managers with a comprehensive framework to translate a company's strategic objectives into a coherent set of performance measures. Now the authors show how several companies are putting the balanced scorecard to work. Effective measurement, the authors point out, must be an integral part of the management process. Much more than a measurement exercise, the balanced scorecard is a management system that can motivate breakthrough improvements in such critical areas as product, process, customer, and market development. Several examples--Rockwater, Apple Computer, and Advanced Micro Devices--illustrate how the scorecard combines measurement and management in different companies. From the experiences of these companies and others, the authors have found that the balanced scorecard is most successful when it is used to drive the process of change.