Kim Markey began as executive director of revenue cycle at Huntington Hospital (HH) in November 2012. Located in Pasadena, California, HH was a 625-bed non-profit regional medical center that was named among the top-performing hospitals in 2012 by U.S. News & World Report. To further HH's focus on high-quality, patient-centered care, Jim Noble, executive VP-COO/CFO, was looking for a change in direction, particularly in the Business Services Office. Accounts Receivable (AR), a key billing metric, could be lower and Noble hired Markey with the mandate to improve performance. Markey's long-term vision involved re-examining the revenue cycle and the hospital's processes to ensure that HH would become a stronger performer. She needed to get her metrics under control as a first step before transforming the departments she oversaw-Admitting, Business Services, Data Services, Medical Records, and Revenue Integrity-into truly patient-focused business centers. The next step would be removing barriers for patients and evolving the mindset of her departments so that HH would become known as "an organization that is going to work with you to help you understand what's going on." This case begins by detailing the environment that Markey found in the Business Services Office when she began. Because morale was low and an atmosphere of tension permeated, Markey was thoughtful and deliberate about her approach and actions as executive director. Huntington Hospital was also deep into preparations for a major software conversion, and from past experience, Markey knew that the implementation would negatively impact AR days. She needed to get the existing processes cleaned up and AR days as efficient as possible to minimize the increase that she knew was coming. To do so, she brought in two consultants.
The B case begins with the consultants' proposal to Kim Markey, executive director of revenue cycle at Huntington Hospital (HH). The proposal is untraditional in that it is focused on more than revenue enhancement-it includes transforming the culture. This case details the steps that the consultants took to engage staff and change culture. It describes how the consultants used Design Thinking, reactions from staff members, and the impacts on Accounts Receivable (AR) days. The case concludes with the evolution of both the culture as well as the organizational structure.
During his second year as a high school teacher in South Carolina, Reid Saaris noticed that a highly academically capable student was not registered for advanced classes. The student was African American and Saaris observed that most African-American students at the school were enrolled in lower-level courses. As Saaris walked down the hallway, he could see "on one side a 12th grade English class playing an all-class game of hangman and half of the kids asleep with their teacher saying, 'Who wants to guess the next letter?' And on the other side, kids debating and discussing interesting literature and ideas about citizenship." He and the student went to the school office where Saaris switched the aspiring young man into advanced-level courses. The following year, Saaris was promoted to running the school's advanced programs. Inspired, he led an initiative to "find all the missing students" from the Advanced Placement (AP) and International Baccalaureate (IB) programs, meeting with every 10th grader at the school. The initiative had a stunning impact. Within one year, the school's AP and IB programs had doubled in size, with the number of African-American students in advanced classes tripling. At the same time, the success rate for all students on the AP and IB exams increased by 20 percent. This case recounts the subsequent path that Saaris followed to take his efforts to a national level. He established Equal Opportunity Schools (EOS) with the aim of closing the access gap to advanced courses for minority and low-income students. The case details the organization's outreach and application process as well as the successes that EOS achieved and the challenges that it faced. It culminates with the announcement of the Lead Higher Initiative for which EOS would dramatically increase the number of schools with which it partnered over the next three years.
Disappointed by how poorly his two favorite football teams were playing against each other on a Thursday night in November 2009, Warren Packard considered the other games he could watch. It was late fall and there were college basketball, college football, and hockey games being played. With all of those different options, Packard thought, "Wouldn't it be nice if somebody could just tap me on the shoulder and say, 'you should be watching this game.'" That thought is what sparked the creation of Thuuz Sports. This case covers the evolution of Packard's idea from side project to Thuuz Sports, a start up with the mission of providing fans with personalized sports entertainment. Thuuz, which assigned every game an excitement rating and alerted users about games they would not want to miss, began as a B2C app. When Packard and his team realized that the biggest pain point was with the companies that saw sports as a way to drive interest, Thuuz pivoted and began prioritizing a B2B2C approach. The case explores how Thuuz approached a number of challenges, including running low on cash, developing a pricing model, and positioning its Automated Highlight Reels. As the only businessperson at the company, Packard was very resource constrained, making prioritization of issues and initiatives even more imperative. Students are asked to evaluate the B2C and B2B2C approaches, identify growth opportunities, and recommend how to pursue those opportunities.
Between 2010 and 2012, SolarCity experienced tremendous growth in an industry that was generally perceived to be struggling. Many other solar start-ups were failing-Solyndra, which had received a $535M loan from the U.S. government, was the highest profile failure, declaring bankruptcy in September, 2011. Lyndon Rive noted, "Investors have been burned so badly from the solar sector. We've faced that stigma while selling our company to investors." Despite that burn, however, SolarCity went forward with an initial public offering (IPO) in December of 2012 at an IPO price of $8.00 per share. By end of the second quarter, 2014, SolarCity operated in 15 states and the District of Columbia and boasted 140,000 customers. It controlled 36 percent of the residential solar market but had never posted a profit-in 2013 it had a net loss of almost $152 million. SolarCity's growth, however, drove the stock price up, hitting a high of $86.14 in February 2014. The company's continued lack of positive accounting earnings, yet impressive stock returns, left analysts and industry observers wondering: Was SolarCity already making money on installations like the Partnership Flip Model or was the company's share price primarily a bet on the future with lower solar installations costs? This case describes SolarCity's business model and summarizes key issues in the solar industry. It looks at tax equity financing, detailing the Partnership Flip Model which SolarCity used for about two thirds of the funds it had raised by 2014. The Partnership Flip Model is represented in an Excel spreadsheet that students manipulate to understand the implications of various factors.
Between 2010 and 2012, SolarCity experienced tremendous growth in an industry that was generally perceived to be struggling. Many other solar start-ups were failing-Solyndra, which had received a $535M loan from the U.S. government, was the highest profile failure, declaring bankruptcy in September, 2011. Lyndon Rive noted, "Investors have been burned so badly from the solar sector. We've faced that stigma while selling our company to investors." Despite that burn, however, SolarCity went forward with an initial public offering (IPO) in December of 2012 at an IPO price of $8.00 per share. By end of the second quarter, 2014, SolarCity operated in 15 states and the District of Columbia and boasted 140,000 customers. It controlled 36 percent of the residential solar market but had never posted a profit-in 2013 it had a net loss of almost $152 million.
This case describes the challenges facing CEO Kent Thiry and DaVita as they being thinking about how to integrate a recent acquisition, Health Care Partners (HCP). DaVita had been primarily a kidney dialysis company with a very strong culture built around teamwork, fun, continuous improvement, accountability, and service. The senior management saw DaVita as "a community first and a company second." HCP was an integrated health care provider with a substantially different workforce from DaVita. The case describes the history of DaVita, its industry, its unique culture, and its success over the previous 15 years. It provides a detailed description of how the culture was developed and managed through the use of a series of processes and events including the careful use of language, symbols, and traditions (the company is a "village," team members are "citizens," the use of slogans such as "one for all and all for one," three musketeer costumes, wide sharing of information, involvement of team members, extensive recognition and reward programs, investment in training and socialization, and even a company song). This culture was a competitive advantage in DaVita's financial success by attracting and retaining staff and patients, maintaining control of costs, and improving clinical outcomes. The new challenge was whether this culture could, or should, be exported to Health Care Partners.
This is a role-play case, intended for use in a leadership development course for MBA students. The case has four roles: two for students playing the co-founders of a startup and two for students/coaches playing the venture capitalists deciding whether or not to provide seed funding. There are two versions of the case, one for students playing the co-founders (L-25CF), and one for those playing the venture capitalists (L-25VC). While both versions of the case contain identical background information for the role-play, L-25CF includes additional information that is available only to the co-founders and L-25VC contains additional information that is available only to the venture capitalists. The role-play objectives stated in the case can be accomplished if the students playing the co-founders successfully identify and address the questions and concerns of those playing the venture capitalists. The co-founders must solicit and grasp the underlining concerns of the venture capitalists, decide how to react and address those concerns, and reassure the venture capitalists that a seed investment is worthwhile. All students have the opportunity to demonstrate active listening, inquiry, and feedback regarding the concerns and proposals to address them. All four individuals in the role play have varying objectives and interests and need to manage the expectations and perceptions of the others in a manner that may be assertive, collaborative, or both.
This is a role-play case, intended for use in a leadership development course for MBA students. The case has four roles: two for students playing the co-founders of a startup and two for students/coaches playing the venture capitalists deciding whether or not to provide seed funding. There are two versions of the case, one for students playing the co-founders (L-25CF), and one for those playing the venture capitalists (L-25VC). While both versions of the case contain identical background information for the role-play, L-25CF includes additional information that is available only to the co-founders and L-25VC contains additional information that is available only to the venture capitalists. The role-play objectives stated in the case can be accomplished if the students playing the co-founders successfully identify and address the questions and concerns of those playing the venture capitalists. The co-founders must solicit and grasp the underlining concerns of the venture capitalists, decide how to react and address those concerns, and reassure the venture capitalists that a seed investment is worthwhile. All students have the opportunity to demonstrate active listening, inquiry, and feedback regarding the concerns and proposals to address them. All four individuals in the role play have varying objectives and interests and need to manage the expectations and perceptions of the others in a manner that may be assertive, collaborative, or both.
Paul Rice knew that Fair Trade could do more, much more. While the model had benefited approximately 10 million people in developing countries, they were a small percentage of the 2 billion people worldwide who lived on less than $2 day. Fair Trade was not charity. It was a certification model that had started around coffee and ensured that money flowed back to the people who grew the coffee, giving them a "Fair Trade" price. As president and CEO of Fair Trade USA (FT USA), the leading third-party certifier of Fair Trade products in the United States, Rice had reason to be proud. Since its founding in 1998, the nonprofit had grown Fair Trade CertifiedTM coffee from 0 to 5 percent of the U.S. coffee market. Fair Trade coffee had made tremendous inroads with large roasters such as Starbucks and Green Mountain as well as mainstream brands like Dunkin' Donuts. Rice, however, was not satisfied with 5 percent of the U.S. coffee market. He wanted to take Fair Trade to scale-widespread adoption in terms of volume, market share, consumer awareness, and impact for farmers. And Rice was confident that he knew how to get there. This case explores FT USA's market based approach and philosophy for increasing the reach and impact of Fair Trade. It reviews the concept of Fair Trade and the three pillars of the "Fair Trade for All" strategy: expand Fair Trade to include certification for large coffee growing estates and independent smaller farmers, invest in cooperatives to make them more competitive, and increase consumer awareness. The case highlights the controversy that ensued from FT USA's 2012 split from the international certifying body and why Rice believes that this was the right decision.
Willow Creek Community Church, located outside of Chicago, IL, was one of the best attended and most influential churches in the United States. It was devoted to attracting seekers, people who were otherwise "unchurched," and helping them along a journey towards conversion and spiritual maturity. Greg Hawkins, executive pastor, wondered, of all the things that the Church did, what really made a difference? If a generous donor gave Willow $100,000 to invest in having the biggest impact on helping parishioners grow into disciples of Christ, would Hawkins and the leadership team truly know what to do with the money? In 2003, Hawkins was about to lead Willow in a strategic planning process. He was introduced to a consumer research expert who had helped an impressive list of large companies understand "what was happening in the hearts and minds of their existing and potential customers." This case explores Willow's decision to bring this type of research to its church and apply rigorous analytical techniques to understanding the needs and motivations of its congregants. It traces how Willow used the startling findings to identify which programs and ministries truly helped people grow spiritually and transform its approach to church.
In July, 1991, Irfan Mustafa, West Asia Area Vice President and Chief Executive Officer of Pepsi Cola Pakistan Incorporated (PCI), faced several dilemmas. First, as part of the 7-Up acquisition, Mustafa had to convince the remaining Pakistani 7-Up bottlers to sell their plants to PCI bottlers and oversee the resulting integration. Second, Pepsi Cola International had shifted focus to its global brands, and since acquiring 7-Up International in 1986, had withdrawn all marketing and technical support for Pepsi's local yet successful Pakistani brand, Teem. In light of the focus on global brands, Mustafa needed to determine the role of each brand in his portfolio (Pepsi, 7-Up, Teem, and Mirinda), with particular focus on 7-Up and Teem. Lastly, in an effort to distinguish 7-Up from Teem, formerly competitors, PCI had developed Cloudy Teem-a milky colored lemon-lime soft drink. Mustafa had to assess whether Cloudy Teem had major growth potential and if so, figure out how to role it out across Pakistan despite resistance from his bottlers. This case explores Mustafa's dilemmas, also touching on urban versus rural marketing and distribution challenges.
Iftekhar Enayetullah and Maqsood Sinha, co-founders of Waste Concern in Bangladesh, had earned an international reputation for their innovative approach to dealing with the vast quantities of waste that threatened to overwhelm the overcrowded city of Dhaka. Having just been recognized by the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship as "outstanding social entrepreneurs," the two were eager to take Waste Concern to the next level. Their ambitions included scaling up their waste processing operations, introducing new technology, and creating a new trading business selling credits for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions under the framework develop by the Kyoto Protocol. Describes Waste Concern's model and details two opportunities to raise capital from large foreign firms that would provide the funds to grow the organization. Enayetullah and Sinha were concerned not only about the financial aspects of the two offers but also about the objectives and philosophies of the two suitors. Enayetullah and Sinha wanted any decision to be consistent with Waste Concern's goal of promoting Kyoto Protocol-related (Clean Development Mechanism) projects throughout Bangladesh and converting waste into a resource to benefit the poor.
In June of 2003, PeopleSoft management announced a merger with J.D. Edwards. Within hours of the announcement, Oracle had launched a hostile takeover attempt of PeopleSoft. Oracle's bid raised enormously difficult questions for the PeopleSoft board, questions about whether PeopleSoft products would continue to be supported and customers became reluctant to buy PeopleSoft software. Managers were therefore faced with a decision about how to respond to the bid and the uncertainty it created. To regain customer and analyst confidence, PeopleSoft's board considered adopting a Customer Assurance Program in which customers would receive a cash payment in the event of a takeover. This promise of a cash payment would not only encourage customers to invest in PeopleSoft products, but also created a liability that might be large enough to derail Oracle's takeover attempt altogether. The board therefore had to consider the implications of a Customer Assurance Program for the welfare of the firm, its customers, and its duties to shareholders faced with a tender offer.
Richard Townsend has recently been elected CEO of Liberty Medical Foundation (LMF), a nonprofit HMO. Due in part to a rapidly changing competitive environment, LMF has faced serious financial problems over the past two years. Confounding the problem are low morale among physicians and staff and declining patient satisfaction. Townsend will present to the board of directors the two strategic choices that he sees for keeping LMF alive. One choice involves LMF regaining its low-cost position that originally attracted so many of its members. LMF's low-cost, high-efficiency positioning has historically been its competitive advantage. Regaining the low-cost position would mean implementing prior authorization requirements, drastically cutting the number of physicians and staff, and copying other cost savings measures that for-profit HMOs use. The other option is to change radically LMF's positioning so that it is the quality and service leader. This option assumes that customers will be willing to pay a premium for excellent service. Either option will require drastic changes to LMF's culture.