Jack Lynch, CEO of Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (HMH) since 2017, was leading the company's transformation from a legacy textbook publisher to a digital-first student outcomes provider, which earned subscription revenue from digital products and curriculum. In 2023, HMH acquired NWEA, a leading educational assessment company. Lynch was thrilled to add NWEA's industry-standard tools for measuring student progress to his company's product offering - but aware of the fact that HMH's new business strategy was untested. Would students, educators, and district administrators sign on to Lynch's vision for the future of U.S. education?

The Jobs to Be Done methodology is both a theory and a practical approach for understanding customer behavior and why people make the choices they make. Many practitioners, whether they work for startups or incumbent businesses, find Jobs to Be Done useful because it provides an uncommon solution to a common problem - understanding your customers as you start a new enterprise or losing touch with customers as your business grows. The theory of Jobs to Be Done is taught at Harvard Business School in the course "Building and Sustaining a Successful Enterprise ("BSSE," in HBS shorthand), which was created by the late Professor Clayton Christensen. It is practiced by many alumni of the course, as well as by numerous industry practitioners. Beyond them, there is a wider circle of professionals who are familiar with the theory or curious about it, and who are interested in converting that curiosity into practice. This multimedia toolbox walks through all of the stages of understanding and implementing Jobs to Be Done, including the foundational theory and its benefits to businesses; how to recruit customers, interview them, and analyze results; and feed that analysis into product development and marketing. The toolbox is a collection of original content as well as existing resources aggregated from across the web. To illustrate the theory the authors conducted a Jobs to Be Done research project to understand why our students "hire" Harvard Business School.

In March 2019, Molson Coors CEO Mark Hunter considered a request to pull forward $65 million CAD in anticipated future funding for Truss Beverages, a Toronto-based cannabis beverage company that Molson Coors created in a joint venture with a Canadian cannabis production company. The request was for the construction of a new production facility for cannabis beverages, a new product in an as-yet-nascent market.

Challenges related to managing religion in the workplace are on the rise, as are religious discrimination claims and monetary settlements, in the United States and around the world. This case examines two incidents of alleged religious discrimination that made their way to the US Supreme Court, allowing students to explore the limits on the degree to which business owners and leaders can express their values through their companies' operations and the extent to which companies should provide reasonable accommodation for employee faith practices.

With a young, urbanizing population, abundant natural resources, and a growing middle class, Africa seems to have all the ingredients necessary for huge growth. Nevertheless, a number of multinationals have recently left the continent, discouraged by widespread corruption, a lack of infrastructure and ready talent, and an underdeveloped consumer market. Some innovators, however, have succeeded by building franchises to serve poorer consumer segments; tapping the vast opportunity represented by nonconsumption; internalizing risk to build strong, self-sufficient, low-cost enterprises; and integrating operations to avoid corruption. The difference, the authors believe, lies in the choice between "push" and "pull" investment. MNCs seek growth by "pushing" current products onto emerging middle-class consumers. They retain some large portion of their existing cost structure and operating style, and thus set prices that limit market penetration. The winning strategy diverges from this approach in almost every respect. When innovators develop products that people want to "pull" into their lives, they create markets that serve as a foundation for sustainable growth and prosperity.

Executives should evaluate whether a business model innovation they are considering is consistent with the current priorities of their existing business model. This analysis matters greatly, the authors write, since it drives a whole host of decisions about where the new initiative should be housed, how its performance should be measured, and how the resources and processes at work in the company will either support it or extinguish it. Business models, the authors point out, "by their very nature are designed not to change, and they become less flexible and more resistant to change as they develop over time."Interdependencies between different elements of the business model grow over time, and the business unit develops increasingly ingrained approaches to solving problems. The authors describe the development of a business model across time as a journey whose progress and route are predictable -- although the time that it takes a business model to follow this journey will differ by industry and circumstance. In the authors'view, a business model, which in an established company is typically embodied in a business unit, travels a one-way journey, beginning with the creation of the new business unit and its business model, then shifting to sustaining and growing the business unit, and ultimately moving to wringing efficiency from it. Each stage of the journey supports a specific type of innovation, builds a particular set of interdependencies into the business model, and is responsive to a particular set of performance metrics. The authors argue that this road-map view of business model evolution helps explain why most attempts to alter the course of existing business units fail. Unaware of the interdependencies and rigidities that constrain business units to pursuing their existing journey, managers attempt to compel existing business units to pursue new priorities or attempt to create a new business inside an existing unit.

Tolaram is a Singaporean company that began operations selling textiles in Nigeria in the 1970s. Executives and brothers, Haresh and Sajesh Aswani, however saw an opportunity to create an instant noodle market in the country. In 1988, they began importing Indomie noodles. But in order to truly target the local market, Tolaram decided to build manufacturing and distribution capabilities in Nigeria at time when conventional wisdom advised against it. After a very difficult journey, Tolaram has grown to almost $1 billion in turnover, built and operates 13 manufacturing plants in Nigeria, and runs a 1,000+ plus truck logistics company. This case gives an overview of how Tolaram built Indomie noodles from obscurity to become one of the most recognized brands in Nigeria.

In 2013, a team led by Gopalan Sunderraman, vice president of corporate development at Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd.-one of the companies owned by Godrej Group, a large Indian conglomerate-was preparing to launch an innovative low-cost refrigerator. Developed expressly for the approximately 80% of Indians who lacked access to refrigeration (a market Godrej had never before targeted), the chotuKool represented a technological marvel-a small, inexpensive thermoelectric appliance powered by a rechargeable battery. The case traces chotuKool's development and evolution from an initial product concept inspired by theories of innovation and the strategic vision of Jamshyd Godrej (managing director and chairman at Godrej & Boyce Mfg.) to a promising new line of business that emerged from a process of learning and discovery through market feedback. As the company geared up for the broader rollout of chotuKool, Sunderraman and his team faced some tough questions. What was the proper target and scope for the launch? Which strategy gave them the best chance of success? Could chotuKool really redefine the company and bring refrigeration to hundreds of millions of Indians?

Sixty months after the 2008 recession ended, the economy was still sputtering, producing disappointing growth and job numbers. Corporations seemed stuck: Despite low interest rates, they were sitting on massive piles of cash and failing to invest in new initiatives. In this article, a leading innovation expert and his HBS colleague explore the reasons for this sluggishness. The crux of the problem, they say, is that investments in different types of innovation have different effects on growth but are all evaluated using the same (flawed) metrics. "Performance-improving innovations," which replace old products with better models, and "efficiency innovations," which lower costs, don't produce many jobs. (Indeed, efficiency innovations eliminate them.) "Market-creating innovations," which transform products so radically they create a new class of consumer, do generate jobs for their originators and for the economy. But the assessment metrics that financial markets--and companies--use always show efficiency and performance-improving innovations to be better opportunities. This is the capitalist's dilemma: Doing the right thing for long-term prosperity is the wrong thing for investors, according to the tools that guide investments. Those tools, however, are based on an unexamined assumption: that capital is scarce, and that performance should be assessed by how efficiently companies use it. The truth is, capital is no longer scarce, and our tools need to catch up to that reality.

Consulting's fundamental business model has not changed in more than 100 years: Very smart outsiders go into organizations for a finite period of time and recommend solutions for the most difficult problems confronting their clients. But at traditional strategy-consulting firms, the share of work that is classic strategy has sharply declined over the past 30 years, from 60% or 70% to only about 20%. What accounts for this trend? Disruption is coming for management consulting, the authors say, as it has recently come for law. For many years the professional services were immune to disruption, for two reasons: opacity and agility. Clients find it very difficult to judge a firm's performance in advance, because they are usually hiring it for specialized knowledge and capability that they themselves lack. Price becomes a proxy for quality. And the top consulting (or law) firms have as their primary assets human capital; they aren't hamstrung by substantial resource allocation decisions, giving them remarkable flexibility. Now incumbent firms are seeing their competitive position eroded by technology, alternative staffing models, and other forces. Market research companies and database providers are enabling the democratization of data. The vast turnover at consultancies means armies of experienced strategists are available for hire by former clients, whose increasing sophistication allows them to allocate work instead of relying on one-stop shops as they did in the past. Drawing on the theory of disruption, the authors offer three scenarios for the future of consulting.

An abrupt and lasting drop in revenue growth is a crisis that can strike even the most exemplary organization. The authors' comprehensive analysis of growth in Fortune 100-size companies over the past half century revealed, in fact, that 87% of them had stalled out at least once. The record shows that if management cannot turn a company around within a few years, the odds are that it will never again see healthy top-line growth. Fortunately, the authors (of the Corporate Executive Board) have uncovered and categorized the most common causes of growth stalls. The majority of these standstills are preventable because, according to the authors, they arise from management choices about strategy or organizational design; external factors (e.g., regulatory actions) account for only 13%. Four categories predominate: Premium-position captivity. When a firm's world-class offering has won the most demanding customers in the market, it often fails to respond effectively to new, low-cost competitive challenges or shifts in customer valuation of product features. Innovation management breakdown. Because most large corporations generate sequential product innovations, any systemic inefficiency or dysfunction in the innovation chain can cause extremely serious problems that last for years. Premature core abandonment. Managers may conclude too quickly that a core market is saturated. Or they may incorrectly interpret operational impediments in the core business as evidence that it's time to move into new competitive terrain. Talent bench shortfall. Insufficient capabilities will stop growth dead in its tracks. They also identified a common culprit in detailed case studies of 50 stalled companies--failure to adapt company strategy to changes in the external environment. Two tools can help managers avoid growth stalls: a self-test to diagnose impending stalls and a choice of practices to explicitly identify strategic assumptions and test them for ongoing relevance.