On March 10, 2021, Ralph Mupita the new CEO of MTN Group, Africa largest telecommunications company, presented the group's 2020 annual results and unveiled a new strategy to "drive growth and unlock value." Despite MTN's leadership in most of its markets, the company's share price was trading at 15-year lows putting Mupita under pressure to accelerate a turnaround. The case considers his plans to execute against the new strategy by spinning off MTN's fintech business and creating more shared value in its markets while at the same time building valuable technology platforms and delivering industry-leading connectivity. Could MTN's leadership team achieve all four priorities within five years as promised, or were they trying to do too much too quickly? Did they have the right structure and team in place to do so? Although Mupita was convinced that swift action and dramatic change were needed to succeed, there were skeptics both inside and outside the firm.

In July 2021, Sunil Lalvani, founder and CEO of Project Maji, a non-profit social enterprise headquartered in Dubai that had already provided sustainable, clean water solutions to 80,000 people living in rural communities across Ghana and Kenya, was facing an important decision. Traditionally, fees collected from community members covered the operating and maintenance costs of the solar-powered water kiosks, while donations paid the initial capital expenditure and setup costs. Yet Lalvani needed a more scalable financing solution to reach a hefty goal: impacting 1 million lives by 2025. Serving larger, more affluent peri-urban communities was a viable alternative, as the additional revenue could be channeled to rural projects. Thus, Lalvani and his team worked on a pilot for three peri-urban sites and looked to Danone Communities, a venture capital fund that invested in social businesses, to provide a loan. The team mapped out a feasible system, but debated what fees to charge residents. A low price meant that Project Maji would pay off the loan for the first four years, and only then start accumulating funds to support its activities in rural areas. This would delay scaling. Alternatively, a high price, coupled with an offer to establish direct connections in more well-off households, would allow Project Maji to generate excess earned revenue from the get-go, but it would also raise questions of equitability. All of this weighed on Lalvani as he pondered what price point to include in the investment proposal.

Harambe was a non-profit organization whose mission was to build an ecosystem to identify promising young African entrepreneurs and provide them access to training, markets, capital, and support networks. From 2007 to 2021, Harambe had grown to a network of 367 entrepreneurs, known as "Harambeans". They had collectively raised over $800 million in capital, created more than 3,500 jobs, and claimed three of the six African startup unicorns in 2021. There was mounting pressure for Harambe to evolve to take advantage of its momentum, the changing entrepreneurship landscape in Africa, and increasing investor interest. Given this, Okendo Lewis-Gayle, founder and chairman, pondered the next steps for Harambe to maximize its impact in Africa. He considered three options: scale the current non-profit model, pivot to a for-profit venture capital model, or develop a hybrid model with a non-profit and a for-profit investment arm. Another important question was, "How should Harambe define impact?"

SA Taxi was a vertically integrated business that operated in South Africa's distinctive taxi industry. Despite being plagued by violence, informal structures, unsafe road practices and lack of government support, the taxi industry had grown to become South Africa's most common mode of public transport. SA Taxi was one of the largest companies entirely focused on serving the taxi industry. In addition to vehicle financing services, it offered insurance products, refurbishment services, and retail capabilities. SA Taxi served a mainly black-owned industry whose main participants-taxi owners, drivers, and commuters-had been historically disadvantaged. SA Taxi CEO Terry Kier understood that his company was already creating substantial impact for these constituents through financial inclusion, job creation and skills development but he knew that SA Taxi needed to do more to enhance its sustainability as well as that of the industry. By 2018, following multiple engagements with industry representatives, Kier saw an ownership deal that benefited the industry as SA Taxi's next strategic move. Although there was an alignment among the company's leadership on the need for and purpose of the deal, the transaction itself was far from clear. After consulting with internal and external stakeholders, Kier landed on three deal options. Kier and the company's founders needed to agree on the best path forward.

SA Taxi was a vertically integrated business that operated in South Africa's distinctive taxi industry. Despite being plagued by violence, informal structures, unsafe road practices and lack of government support, the taxi industry had grown to become South Africa's most common mode of public transport. SA Taxi was one of the largest companies entirely focused on serving the taxi industry. In addition to vehicle financing services, it offered insurance products, refurbishment services, and retail capabilities. SA Taxi served a mainly black-owned industry whose main participants-taxi owners, drivers, and commuters-had been historically disadvantaged. SA Taxi CEO Terry Kier understood that his company was already creating substantial impact for these constituents through financial inclusion, job creation and skills development but he knew that SA Taxi needed to do more to enhance its sustainability as well as that of the industry. By 2018, following multiple engagements with industry representatives, Kier saw an ownership deal that benefited the industry as SA Taxi's next strategic move. Although there was an alignment among the company's leadership on the need for and purpose of the deal, the transaction itself was far from clear. After consulting with internal and external stakeholders, Kier landed on three deal options. Kier and the company's founders needed to agree on the best path forward.

Kenyan off-grid-solar pioneer d.light can power entire homes in rural Africa but must now decide how to fund the growth of its asset-heavy business model. Ned Tozun and Sam Goldman founded d.light in 2006 to transform lives through solar solutions enabling access to electricity, the seventh of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for 2030. Originally providing simple portable solar lanterns to people without access to reliable electricity, the enterprise developed solar home systems that included lights, mobile chargers, and an energy-efficient device such as a radio, fan or TV. By 2019, with the success of home systems, d.light had become one of the leading players in the off-grid solar sector, with the world's largest distribution network for off-grid solar products and a projected revenue of over $90 million. Key to d.light's solar home systems was pay-as-you-go (PayGo) plans, a lease-to-own model consisting of a down payment followed by small (<$1.50) daily payments, normally for a period of 12 to 18 months. In 2019, sales from PayGo products were expected to contribute close to 70% of the company's annual revenue. However, PayGo was an asset-heavy model and in the past 18 months, d.light had raised over $90 million, nearly 75% of which was in debt facilities. As the company continued to grow rapidly, its co-founders were deliberating whether they ought to go out and raise capital again. If so, should it be equity or debt? How much and from whom? If not now, when? Alternatively, should they modify the business model to reduce the company's need for so much external funding?

In late 2017, Satrix, one of the largest passive asset management firms in South Africa and a pioneer in the industry since 2000, had to decide its strategy going forward in a market where passive asset management had become increasingly commoditized and competitive. Over the previous three years, as a result of increased competition and changing investor expectations, Satrix had faced increased pressure to reduce its management fees. The total expense ratio (TER) of the Satrix 40, Satrix's flagship ETF, was 38 basis points (bps), more than double that of many of its new competitors. To maintain the company's position in the industry, Satrix's leadership was considering cutting the TER on its flagship ETF by almost 75% from 38 bps to 10 bps. The fee change would dramatically lower Satrix's margins, but the company's leadership was concerned that Satrix couldn't afford to not make the change; nearly 10% of assets the company managed came from the Satrix 40. What should they do?