The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a federally funded research institution within NASA, the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, has played a large role in many space and planetary explorations, particularly to the planet Mars. As a project-based organization, JPL has many opportunities to learn between successive missions, but there are many cultural, structural and incentive-based challenges to the development and exchange of experience-based knowledge. The main case decision point focuses on one such challenge in particular: how to instill in junior engineers the practice-based experience of their seniors. Jennifer Trosper, project manager for the Mars 2020 mission, is trying to decide whether or not to seek funding for a hands-on training program building miniature, educational versions of a Mars surface vehicle. However, the cases address a number of other managerial decisions, such as determining the balance between innovation and replication of prior solutions, given that Trosper has been charged with re-using engineering designs from prior projects, but for an expanded mission. The cases also explore generic knowledge-transfer issues faced by JPL's Chief Knowledge Officer, David Oberhettinger, such as the role of documentation, uses of formal "lessons learned," and how best to use the scarce time of the most valuable JPL engineers.
At the conclusion of the (A) case, Jennifer Trosper needed to decide whether or not to throw her support behind the training and outreach represented by the ROV-E program to build small rovers like the ones used on the surface of Mars by NASA JPL. The (B) case describes her decision and provides further information on her subsequent efforts made after the initial decision.
Almost every organization has people it can't do without--specialists with "deep smarts," who are the go-to experts on critical issues. But because their knowledge is experienced-based, it's often instinctive and unarticulated, and never gets passed on. Capturing it is a challenge for both the organization and for colleagues who wish to become in-house authorities themselves. This article offers a methodical system for acquiring deep smarts from an expert. It involves observing that person extensively to understand what makes him successful, practicing the behaviors he exhibits on your own, partnering with him to solve problems, and ultimately taking responsibility for some of his tasks. Describing the experiences of one executive as she takes this journey with a mentor, the authors show how you too can gain the wisdom that will make you indispensable to your firm.
Bella Healthcare India was originally established in Bangalore as a low-cost manufacturing facility for a U.S.-based cardiology equipment developer. Under country manager Joseph Cherian it evolved considerably, developing its own research and development capabilities. Strengthened by investment in technical training and a shift in culture and mindset, the India team developed and launched its first successful product in 2005 under the guidance of Cherian and American Jeremy Manning, the Bella India director of R&D. Their success led them to a joint product development venture with the parent company, but organizational, technical, and cultural issues resulted in its cancellation. After this disappointing failure, is Bella India ready to lead a new product development project? If so, is the new project proposed by Cherian the right one to recover with?
Professor Gupta faces three major problems in teaching cases: 1) his students, accustomed to lectures, don't know how to conduct a case discussion; 2) the students are using the Internet to discover the outcome of managerial dilemmas posed in the case; 3) he wants to share the theory he learned as a doctoral student, but can't figure out the appropriate way to integrate theory into the case-based discussion. He seeks advice, particularly about the students' use of the Internet.
Professor Gupta has imposed two new policies on his class, midway through the term: 1) No use of Internet to locate additional information on the company in the case; 2) an increase in the percentage of grades attributed to class participation. He meets with rebellion from the class members.
A relatively inexperienced professor struggles with managing a case discussion in a class based on numeric analysis. The class is lethargic and time is tight; she considers both a number of possible reasons for their disinterest and different teaching strategies to stimulate discussion and learning.
A professor teaching a case discussion based on numeric analysis is pleased that a student finally "cracks" the case-but the numbers differ from her own. The instructor has to decide how to handle the discrepancy.
In 1998, the CEO of Whirlpool Corp. decides to change the company's strategy significantly to escape an increasingly unattractive "stalemate" in the appliance industry. The change he proposes involves a fundamental shift in the company's focus--from manufacturing to branding--and requires the development of altogether new organizational capabilities. Examines the full range of adjustments that the CEO must lead his management team to make throughout all the functions of Whirlpool. Distinguishes itself from other cases on strategic change by examining the challenge of change in a company that is not in crisis (yet).
When a person sizes up a complex situation and rapidly comes to a decision that proves to be not just good but brilliant, you think, "That was smart." After you watch him do this a few times, you realize you're in the presence of something special. It's not raw brainpower, though that helps. It's not emotional intelligence either, though that, too, is often involved. It's deep smarts. Deep smarts are not philosophical--they're not wisdom in that sense, but they're as close to wisdom as business gets. You see them in the manager who understands when and how to move into a new international market, the executive who knows just what kind of talk to give when her organization is in crisis, the technician who can track a product failure back to an interaction between independently produced elements. These are people whose knowledge would be hard to purchase on the open market. Their insight is based on know-how more than on know-what; it comprises a system view as well as expertise in individual areas. Because deep smarts are experienced based and often context specific, they can't be produced overnight or readily imported into an organization. It takes years for an individual to develop them. They can be taught, however, with the right techniques. Drawing on their forthcoming book Deep Smarts, Dorothy Leonard and Walter Swap say the best way to transfer such expertise to novices--and, on a larger scale, to make individual knowledge institutional--isn't through PowerPoint slides, a Web site of best practices, online training, project reports, or lectures. Rather, the sage needs to teach the neophyte individually how to draw wisdom from experience. Companies have to be willing to dedicate time and effort to such extensive training, but the investment more than pays for itself.
The CEO of Best Buy, a hugely successful retailing company, has hired consulting firm Strategos to imbue the company with an improved innovative capability. The six-month program of experimental learning yields new business ideas and also trains Best Buy employees as innovation coaches. However, this kind of learning is expensive and time consuming. The case details the learning journey as experienced by Best Buy employees and raises the question of when such development programs are appropriate. Focuses on the learning process and stimulates debate about how people and organizations learn in general, as well as how an innovation capability can be fostered.
The CEO of a two-year-old start-up must now decide whether to become a technology provider or a service agency. In a time of enormous uncertainty about the viability of various business models for Internet-delivered services and products, Collabrys has survived the burst Internet bubble by partnering with brand-name large companies and by responding to market feedback. This case traces the company from its earliest days and its original value proposition to a point at which the two very different future strategies appear feasible. Originally funded by venture capital, the company has changed key personnel, experimented with different distribution and partnering schemes, developed some sophisticated intellectual property, and raised a second round of funding.
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) faces a serious loss of knowledge--both because of the "faster, better, cheaper" mandate for Mars missions and from the retirement of key personnel. An extensive knowledge management system for NASA/JPL includes formal knowledge-capture mechanisms such as Web pages and digitized manuals and such informal ones as storytelling. The former are much easier to get funded and to implement than the latter, but chief knowledge architect Jeanne Holm is concerned that technology cannot solve some of the most difficult issues she faces. This case focuses more on managing the tacit knowledge held in the heads of scientists and experienced project managers than on the information technology that Holm has put in place. The switch from expensive but infrequent Mars missions to 2 missions every 26 months propelled a number of junior managers into positions of responsibility and decision making for which they had inadequate experience. In the face of increasingly tight budgets, Holm must decide what kinds of knowledge management initiatives to back--and how to encourage the cultural change that is needed in the organization.