Following the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in late April 2010, the Obama administration organized a massive response operation to contain the enormous amount of oil spreading across the Gulf of Mexico. Attracting intense public attention and, eventually, widespread criticism, the response adhered to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, a federal law that the crisis would soon reveal was not well understood - or even accepted - by all relevant parties. This two-part case profiles the efforts of senior officials from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as they struggled to coordinate the actions of a myriad of actors, ranging from numerous federal partners (including key members of the Obama White House); the political leadership of the affected Gulf States and sub-state jurisdictions; and the private sector. Case A provides an overview of the disaster and early response; discusses the formation of the National Incident Command (NIC), which had responsibility for directing response activities; and explores the NIC's efforts to coordinate the actions of various federal entities. Case B focuses on the challenges the NIC encountered as it sought to engage with state and local actors - an effort that would grow increasingly complicated as the crisis deepened throughout the spring and summer of 2010. Case number 1982.0
Following the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in late April 2010, the Obama administration organized a massive response operation to contain the enormous amount of oil spreading across the Gulf of Mexico. Attracting intense public attention and, eventually, widespread criticism, the response adhered to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, a federal law that the crisis would soon reveal was not well understood - or even accepted - by all relevant parties. This two-part case profiles the efforts of senior officials from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security as they struggled to coordinate the actions of a myriad of actors, ranging from numerous federal partners (including key members of the Obama White House); the political leadership of the affected Gulf States and sub-state jurisdictions; and the private sector. Case A provides an overview of the disaster and early response; discusses the formation of the National Incident Command (NIC), which had responsibility for directing response activities; and explores the NIC's efforts to coordinate the actions of various federal entities. Case B focuses on the challenges the NIC encountered as it sought to engage with state and local actors - an effort that would grow increasingly complicated as the crisis deepened throughout the spring and summer of 2010. Case number 1981.0
On January 15, 2009, shortly after takeoff from LaGuardia Airport, US Airways Flight 1549 struck a flock of Canada geese. The geese were then sucked into the plane's twin engines, causing total engine failure and the loss of power. Case A of this three-part series recounts how over the following four minutes, Flight 1549's Captain Chesley "Sully" Sullenberger and First Officer Jeffrey Skiles grappled with a variety of extreme challenges. Not only did they have to keep the plane under control, but they also had to quickly decide whether they could make an emergency landing at a nearby airport - or find another alternative to get the plane down safely in one of the most crowded regions in the country. Cases B and C then describe how, after the plane landed in the cold waters of the Hudson River, emergency responders from many agencies and private organizations - converging on the scene without a prior action plan for this type of emergency - scrambled to both rescue passengers and crew and stabilize the aircraft as it began to move downstream. Case Number 1966
As Hurricane Katrina roared towards the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts on August 28, 2005, the public sector-ranging from local law enforcement to the Federal Emergency Management Agency-feverishly prepared for what was expected to be a devastating hit. At the same time, the private sector was undergoing its own exhaustive preparations. At its Bentonville, Arkansas, headquarters, giant retailer Wal-Mart had already launched a comprehensive emergency response that included stocking stores in the storm zone with special merchandise; stationing teams to evaluate stores as soon as the hurricane passed; and gathering representatives of all major functional areas in a centralized emergency operations center in order to find displaced employees, re-open stores, and help stricken communities. After Hurricane Katrina caused catastrophic flooding that overwhelmed the government's response, though, Wal-Mart found itself playing a larger role than it had anticipated. The following chaotic weeks raised important questions about whether the public sector could take full advantage of the retailer's strengths and capabilities, and whether it was ready to accept a larger role for Wal-Mart and other companies in responding to national emergencies. The case should be useful for those interested in emergency preparedness; inter-agency collaborations; public-private partnerships; and organizational behavior. Revised September 2008. HKS Case Number 1876.0
As Hurricane Katrina roared towards the Louisiana and Mississippi coasts on August 28, 2005, the public sector-ranging from local law enforcement to the Federal Emergency Management Agency-feverishly prepared for what was expected to be a devastating hit. At the same time, the private sector was undergoing its own exhaustive preparations. At its Bentonville, Arkansas, headquarters, giant retailer Wal-Mart had already launched a comprehensive emergency response that included stocking stores in the storm zone with special merchandise; stationing teams to evaluate stores as soon as the hurricane passed; and gathering representatives of all major functional areas in a centralized emergency operations center in order to find displaced employees, re-open stores, and help stricken communities. After Hurricane Katrina caused catastrophic flooding that overwhelmed the government's response, though, Wal-Mart found itself playing a larger role than it had anticipated. The following chaotic weeks raised important questions about whether the public sector could take full advantage of the retailer's strengths and capabilities, and whether it was ready to accept a larger role for Wal-Mart and other companies in responding to national emergencies. The case should be useful for those interested in emergency preparedness; inter-agency collaborations; public-private partnerships; and organizational behavior. Revised September 2008. HKS Case Number 1876.1