The global recorded music industry was undergoing a major transition in 2006. Sales had been declining for a decade, and consumers were buying music in new formats and through different distribution channels. CD sales still accounted for the majority of revenues, but sales of music in digital formats (downloads, videos, ringtones) were growing significantly and accounting for approximately 10% of the industry's revenues in 2006. Many considered digital the future of the music business but the format posed both opportunities and challenges. While it had revitalized the singles market, for instance, digital had also facilitated rampant piracy. The music industry was retaliating, launching lawsuits against illegitimate peer-to-peer operators such as groups caught downloading illegally. Whether this would be enough to stop the trend was a matter of much debate. Meanwhile, the industry continued to consolidate. In 2004, Sony Music and BMG, the third- and fifth-largest record firms at the time, merged to form Sony BMG. Surprisingly, in 2006 the European Union's Court of First Instance annulled the merger--which the European Commission had approved two years earlier--after a group of independent music labels complained about the merger's effect on competition. While Sony and BMG were defending the merger in court, EMI Group plc wondered if its desired takeover of Warner Music Group--which it had been pursuing since 2000--would ever happen. If it did, how much business would the new entity have in the rapidly changing environment? All wondered how the industry would evolve.
Marco Suter, Executive Vice-Chairman, UBS Board of Directors, carefully studied the chart on his desk. It showed the public commitment of major financial institutions to help mitigate global warming. Evidently, UBS lagged behind its competitors. The graph was part of a report that environmental specialists and senior executives at UBS had compiled. It suggested the company adopt a more progressive policy on climate change. Suter thought about the options that the working group had generated. These ranged from stabilizing the company's current carbon emissions to complete carbon neutrality. The UBS Corporate Responsibility Committee would meet early next week. Suter wondered which option he should support.
In the spring of 1977, Goodyear CEO Charles J. Pilliod Jr. was looking at an internal report on government and legal events relevant to the tire industry. Two items caught his attention. First, he noticed that an industry suit to block the government's proposed system to rate tires on tread wear, traction, and temperature resistance had been rebuffed by a U.S. appeals court. Although the court found fault with the government's proposals, the ruling could mean that the tire grading system was close to becoming a reality. Second, Joan Claybrook, a former Nader consumer interest group lobbyist, had just become head of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the agency within the government that was in charge of producing the rating system. Pilliod wondered if the regulatory events might affect Goodyear's ability to maintain its world leadership in the tire industry.
In January 2006, Joe Hogan, head of General Electric (GE) Healthcare Technologies, prepared to step into William Castell's shoes as CEO of GE Healthcare, the world's leading manufacturer of diagnostic imaging equipment. In 2004, former CEO Jeff Immelt acquired Amersham for $10 billion. The acquisition was part of Immelt's GE-wide move to reemphasize research and development. Hogan had run GE Healthcare's predecessor organization, GE Medical Systems (GEMS). A 20-year GE veteran, Hogan witnessed three distinct stages of the subsidiary's development as it evolved from the Global Product Co. (GPC) to the modified GPC and then to GE Healthcare. By 2005, the company had a 34% market share of the worldwide diagnostic imaging equipment business. GE executives designed the acquisitions to catalyze the firm's move from an engineering and physics-based diagnostic company to a life sciences-based health care solutions company that could better meet worldwide health care needs. Hogan wondered: What challenges did GEMS' previous quantum leaps portend for this new step-function change?
From a single, modest club in 1962, Bally Total Fitness had grown to become-in management's words-the "largest and only nationwide commercial operator of fitness centers" in the United States in 2004. Bally had faced its share of challenges, but the last couple of years had proven particularly difficult. Competition in its markets had intensified, Bally's stock price had collapsed, the company had restated earnings to the chagrin of shareholders, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission had begun to investigate Bally's accounting procedures. Under the direction of Paul Toback, CEO since December 2002, Bally had revisited its unique approach to pricing and selling health-club memberships, boosted the accountability of club managers for profitability, launched new efforts to help club members meet weight-loss goals, altered its marketing message, and begun to strengthen its internal control systems. Toback and his team were committed to increasing the number of Bally members and maximizing revenue per member. Would Toback's efforts restore Bally's battered stock price, stave off companies that were rumored to want to buy the company, and enable Bally to remain a major player in the industry?
The entire pharmaceutical industry faced uncertain times in 2005. Many of the industry's most pressing issues-patent expirations, new drug pipeline development, price pressures, regulatory issues, and political pressures-were long standing. Fundamentally new technologies were changing the way drugs were discovered, developed, and tested, allowing smaller, specialized competitors to enter the industry, compete in new ways, and grow to challenge the majors. Some observers were even questioning whether the blockbuster model on which the industry was based could continue. Blockbuster drugs, with sales of more than $1 billion a year, were becoming increasingly difficult and costly to develop. In this context, and with stock prices depressed, the industry majors were reflecting on their strategies.
In 2005, just five years after its formal launch, Beijing-based Red Flag Software was the world's second-largest distributor of the Linux operating system and was expecting its first annual profit. On a unit basis, Red Flag led the world in desktops (PCs) shipped with Linux and was No. 4 in installed servers. On a revenue basis, Red Flag was fourth overall. Within China, Red Flag held just over half of the Linux market and ran key applications for the postal system, large state-owned enterprises, and more than a million PCs. The Chinese government supported Linux as an alternative to Microsoft's Windows operating system to avoid royalty payments to foreign firms and dependence on foreign technology. Even so, Red Flag President Chris Zhao felt the same pressure many start-ups faced: How could Red Flag compete against a giant like Microsoft? And what competitive advantages could Zhao bring to bear against an experienced Linux veteran like Red Hat, a U.S.-based software company that had just announced its plan to invest to capture market share in China? Zhao worried that government support would evaporate if Red Flag performed poorly.
In October 2004, Mark S. Mastrov, CEO of 24 Hour Fitness, reflected on how far his company had come in just over 20 years. From humble beginnings in 1983 in San Leandro, California, 24 Hour Fitness had grown to become the largest privately-owned health-club chain in the world. The company operated 346 clubs in 15 U.S. states and 10 countries, and it employed 16,000, serving 3 million members. Revenues exceeded $1 billion. The challenge ahead for Mastrov was making choices in the face of so many opportunities. Should he focus the business on the domestic market and expand into the many states the company had not entered yet or devote more resources to international expansion? If he decided to expand into the Northeast, how should the company enter against entrenched competitors like Bally Total Fitness? Would a major acquisition make sense, or would it threaten the company's culture? And how should he fund such an acquisition? An IPO had many attractions, but it would expose the company to a whole new set of challenges.