Toyota Argentina (TASA) and the union representing automotive industry workers in the country had been working together since 2011 to address the challenges faced by Toyota's manufacturing plant in Zárate (Argentina). In 2019, after achieving all the goals set forward in its plan for the "Reborn Plant," Daniel Herrero, TASA's CEO, looked forward to the future.

In 2011, Daniel Herrero, CEO of Toyota Argentina (TASA) since 2010, was about to meet with the Secretary-General of the union representing automotive industry workers in the country. The company produced vehicles in Argentina since 1997 at their plant at Zárate, and, in 2005, Argentina became one of the four countries selected by Toyota Motor Corporation to assemble models using the Innovative Multipurpose Vehicle (IMV) platform. However, Toyota's manufacturing plant in Zárate (Argentina) had been performing poorly compared to similar plants, affecting its competitiveness, and TASA's management held the union responsible for most of the plant's inefficiencies. Anything was possible as a result of the meeting, from shutting down production at TASA and focusing on their distribution business, to complete capitulation to all the union's demands.

Toyota Argentina (TASA) and the union representing automotive industry workers in the country had been working together since 2011 to address the challenges faced by Toyota's manufacturing plant in Zárate (Argentina). The strategy for moving forward was built on an agreement signed by both parties called the "Reborn Plant." In 2015, with slow progress at Zárate plant and the macro-conditions rumbling on, Daniel Herrero, TASA's CEO, reflected on what to do next.

This case is designed to support a lively discussion about the relative merits of shareholder vs. stakeholder perspectives in the context of a company that provides a vital public service that has important environmental implications. The 2007 purchase of TXU, the largest utility in Texas, was the largest leveraged buyout in history. Yet, within seven years TXU was bankrupt. TXU (A) examines the spectacular turnaround of TXU from 2004 through 2007, in which shareholders received a tenfold increase in the share price and the CEO was rewarded with nearly $280 million in compensation in four years. But other stakeholders objected to the company's strategy of aggressive price increases and building new coal-fired power plants. Amidst growing pressure from regulators, elected officials, and consumer groups the board decided to sell the company to the private equity firms KKR and TPG. TXU (B) covers the period after the transaction and the reasons for the buy out's failure, including its enormous financial leverage and a "one-way bet" on natural gas prices that exceeded the exposure of any of the world's largest integrated energy companies.

This case is designed to provide an engrossing overview of stakeholder capitalism through a vigorous discussion of the conflicts that can arise when trying to serve multiple stakeholders. In 2007, Johnson & Johnson's (J&J) subsidiary Janssen has to decide whether or not to launch a new opioid painkiller-the first such launch in 25 years-amidst growing concerns about opioid abuse in the U.S. The (A) case starts with the history of human interaction with opioids, the most effective painkillers known, from the Sumarians through the innovation of controlled release opioids, led by Purdue Pharma's OxyContin. By the time J&J is ready to launch a new opioid, this innovation has led to increased opioid addiction, complicating the launch decision. Benefits to customers are now murky, employees may no longer feel the company is living up to its Credo, and society as a whole may be harmed. The (B) case summarizes the fallout of the opioid crisis, and how J&J's participation in that crisis has affected their brand, and society.

This case is designed to provide an engrossing overview of stakeholder capitalism through a vigorous discussion of the conflicts that can arise when trying to serve multiple stakeholders. In 2007, Johnson & Johnson's (J&J) subsidiary Janssen has to decide whether or not to launch a new opioid painkiller-the first such launch in 25 years-amidst growing concerns about opioid abuse in the U.S. The (A) case starts with the history of human interaction with opioids, the most effective painkillers known, from the Sumarians through the innovation of controlled release opioids, lead by Purdue Pharma's OxyContin. By the time J&J is ready to launch a new opioid, this innovation has lead to increased opioid addiction, complicating the launch decision. Benefits to customers are now murky, employees may no longer feel the company is living up to its Credo, and society as a whole may be harmed. The (B) case summarizes the fallout of the opioid crisis, and how J&J's participation in that crisis has affected their brand, and society.

This case is designed to support a lively discussion about the relative merits of shareholder vs. stakeholder perspectives in the context of a company that provides a vital public service that has important environmental implications. The 2007 purchase of TXU, the largest utility in Texas, was the largest leveraged buyout in history. Yet, within seven years TXU was bankrupt. TXU (A) examines the spectacular turnaround of TXU from 2004 through 2007, in which shareholders received a tenfold increase in the share price and the CEO was rewarded with nearly $280 million in compensation in four years. But other stakeholders objected to the company's strategy of aggressive price increases and building new coal-fired power plants. Amidst growing pressure from regulators, elected officials, and consumer groups the board decided to sell the company to the private equity firms KKR and TPG. TXU (B) covers the period after the transaction and the reasons for the buy out's failure, including its enormous financial leverage and a "one-way bet" on natural gas prices that exceeded the exposure of any of the world's largest integrated energy companies.