In July 2021, the CEO of AB InBev's European operations and his team strategized to position the company for success post-pandemic. As the world's largest beer company, boasting over 500 brands, revenue of $46 billion, and a workforce of 160,000 in 2020, AB InBev grappled with the repercussions of the pandemic, particularly the adverse effects on on-trade customers like bars and restaurants. Historically a traditional firm in a conventional industry, AB InBev had begun a substantial digital transformation in recent years. This strategic shift was aimed at leveraging data and market insights more effectively. A key component of this transformation was the creation of the Growth Analytics Center (GAC) in India in 2016, a move designed to embed advanced forecasting and analytics into their business model. As the pandemic unfolded, management increasingly relied on the GAC's analytics and forecasts to navigate the evolving crisis. With pandemic restrictions starting to relax in mid-2021, the company began considering substantial investments in the struggling on-trade sector to gain market share. The company considered offering grants in the form of pre-paid discounts to pubs and restaurants that needed capital to reopen after the pandemic. The dilemma was whether to proactively reinvest in the on-trade sector or take a cautious approach. The decision rested on interpreting GAC data and the company's financial outlook.

"The case focuses on strategy and governance issues at SWVL, a tech-enabled mass mobility marketplace. It describes the journey of CEO and Chairman Mostafa Kendil on his journey from founding to the company's listing on Nasdaq. Since its founding in Egypt in 2017, Swvl produced a series of great successes with its innovative solution that promised safe, reliable, and affordable mass commuting trips in markets where such a service was unavailable. In a short time, Swvl was able to raise notable amounts in MENA (Middle East and North Africa) investor funds, expand geographically to neighboring and faraway markets, and become the fastest growing unicorn in the region. Expanding the company's existing regional footprint, Kandil and his team were pursuing their ambition to become the world's number one mass mobility provider. They worked with Queen's Gambit, a SPAC (Special Purpose Acquisition Company), to take the company public on Nasdaq. They established both statutory and advisory boards that would not only guide the company on its growth plans but also showcase its strong compliance agenda-a priority from the outset. Once listed, Swvl would become the second and the youngest MENA-based company to ever go public on Nasdaq. With this, Swvl accepted a challenging responsibility: it would have to position itself among well-established U.S. public companies on one hand and overcome the notorious reputation MENA-based companies had for corporate governance on the other. To emerge successful in global financial markets, Swvl had to ensure that its marketplace design was lean enough to allow the company to grow profitably without compromising customer experience on its rides. Swvl also had to assess its expansion strategy, particularly in terms of how fast and how far it could launch in new markets without mishap.

Karim Beguir and Zohra Slim were the co-founders of InstaDeep, a deep tech startup focusing on artificial intelligence (AI) solutions. Instadeep was one of the few companies globally that were partnering with DeepMind, an AI subsidiary of Google [Alphabet Inc.]. InstaDeep employed DeepMind's reinforcement learning approach in its business solutions. When Beguir and Slim founded the company in 2014, it was a web design company that aimed to build a globally competitive enterprise and create impact by hiring talent in Africa. Beguir, a mathematician by training, figured out that AI could be employed to solve century-long industrial problems such as container packing or route optimization, so the duo shifted the company's focus to AI in 2017. They then had the option to either apply for proprietary IP and monetize their intellectual property rights or to publish the idea as a research article on an open access platform, which would allow all scientists to benefit from it. By 2021, InstaDeep had created two major branded products: DeepPCB, an AI-powered printed circuit board routing system, and DeepChain, an AI-based protein design system to speed time to market for new drugs being developed by scientists. They had two other products in development, and the possibility of developing many more verticals was in the cards. But Beguir and Slim had to decide whether to position InstaDeep as an extremely horizontal AI company that could push innovation in a multitude of verticals, or to focus on just a few. The former would create big impact by fully leveraging the capabilities of the AI team in a wide range of fields. But focusing on a few verticals and managing fewer customers had its advantages, too. What should they do?

Karim Beguir and Zohra Slim were the co-founders of InstaDeep, a deep tech startup focusing on artificial intelligence (AI) solutions. Instadeep was one of the few companies globally that were partnering with DeepMind, an AI subsidiary of Google [Alphabet Inc.]. InstaDeep employed DeepMind's reinforcement learning approach in its business solutions. When Beguir and Slim founded the company in 2014, it was a web design company that aimed to build a globally competitive enterprise and create impact by hiring talent in Africa. Beguir, a mathematician by training, figured out that AI could be employed to solve century-long industrial problems such as container packing or route optimization, so the duo shifted the company's focus to AI in 2017. They then had the option to either apply for proprietary IP and monetize their intellectual property rights or to publish the idea as a research article on an open access platform, which would allow all scientists to benefit from it. By 2021, InstaDeep had created two major branded products: DeepPCB, an AI-powered printed circuit board routing system, and DeepChain, an AI-based protein design system to speed time to market for new drugs being developed by scientists. They had two other products in development, and the possibility of developing many more verticals was in the cards. But Beguir and Slim had to decide whether to position InstaDeep as an extremely horizontal AI company that could push innovation in a multitude of verticals, or to focus on just a few. The former would create big impact by fully leveraging the capabilities of the AI team in a wide range of fields. But focusing on a few verticals and managing fewer customers had its advantages, too. What should they do?

The case opens in May 2018 with Nurtac Ziyal Afridi, chief strategy and growth officer of Yildiz Holding, a Turkish conglomerate, reflecting on the group's diversification journey. In ten years, the group had achieved a remarkable growth through diversification: seven mergers, 33 acquisitions, and 23 divestments. By 2018, it had 164 companies and consolidated revenues of $12 billion. After two notable acquisitions (Godiva, a $850-million deal in 2007, and United Biscuits, a $3.2-billion deal in 2014), Yildiz Holding became one of the world's largest confectionary companies. However, Yildiz Holding's owner, Murat Ulker, wanted it to be the number one or two player globally. To achieve this goal, Afridi started a major restructuring program to focus on the group's core assets. That was not an easy feat. The group companies addressed mass market to luxury customers, and their portfolio of products ranged from confectionary to dairy, beverages, baby food, and olive oil. They had wholesaling operations as well as retailing businesses across a wide reach of geographies. Afridi's decisions in restructuring needed to balance all the various trade-offs. She had to decide how to define core, and accordingly decide which non-core assets to divest. Should she consider protecting only wholesaling businesses and divesting retailing? And what about managing their businesses in different geographies? Would it be a good idea if the group were to manage some geographies directly and leave the management of others to select partners?

Spreadsheet supplement to case 722367.

In July 2021, Sunil Lalvani, founder and CEO of Project Maji, a non-profit social enterprise headquartered in Dubai that had already provided sustainable, clean water solutions to 80,000 people living in rural communities across Ghana and Kenya, was facing an important decision. Traditionally, fees collected from community members covered the operating and maintenance costs of the solar-powered water kiosks, while donations paid the initial capital expenditure and setup costs. Yet Lalvani needed a more scalable financing solution to reach a hefty goal: impacting 1 million lives by 2025. Serving larger, more affluent peri-urban communities was a viable alternative, as the additional revenue could be channeled to rural projects. Thus, Lalvani and his team worked on a pilot for three peri-urban sites and looked to Danone Communities, a venture capital fund that invested in social businesses, to provide a loan. The team mapped out a feasible system, but debated what fees to charge residents. A low price meant that Project Maji would pay off the loan for the first four years, and only then start accumulating funds to support its activities in rural areas. This would delay scaling. Alternatively, a high price, coupled with an offer to establish direct connections in more well-off households, would allow Project Maji to generate excess earned revenue from the get-go, but it would also raise questions of equitability. All of this weighed on Lalvani as he pondered what price point to include in the investment proposal.

The case opens in April 2020 with Sani Åžener, CEO of TAV Airports, a vertically integrated regional airport operator headquartered in Istanbul, Turkey, and his team discussing the pending acquisition of the Almaty International Airport in Kazakhstan. The company had been looking for ways to increase its revenues, which had shrunk by 35% in 2019 after the closing of its flagship airport in Istanbul. The business case for acquiring Almaty International was quite strong: it was an asset acquisition with no maturity, and it came with fuel and cargo operations, functions that were unaffected by the cyclicality of passenger traffic. But the world had changed significantly since TAV made a conditional offer of $415 million, outbidding all other interested parties in November 2019. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the aviation industry had been facing unprecedented challenges, and passenger traffic in Almaty had dropped by around 40%. In the meantime, the seller of Almaty International was undeterred and pressed TAV to close the deal. Åžener and the senior management team were at a critical juncture: they had to move ahead soon or risk missing out on an opportunity that had looked very bright pre-pandemic.

Muhammad Alagil was a second-generation leader in the well-known Alagil Family Group of businesses in Saudi Arabia and co-founder and chairman of its family office, Jarir Company for Commercial Investments (Jarir Investments). The case opens in 2021 with Alagil pondering whether or not to allow family members of the next generations aged 35 and over to spin off their pieces of the trust and set out on their own. This change would have been a massive departure from the state of mind he and his four brothers shared for the past decades: Why would anyone leave and shrink the pie? He was confident that none of the third generation (G3) would leave but he knew there was no guarantee they would stay either. He also knew that, when their time came, a portion of G4 members (the eldest of whom was 12 years old) would likely exercise that right and leave. With the sustainability of the family office in mind, would it be disastrous if some members left? The case discusses whether it was the G2 members' responsibility to entice future generations to stay and, if so, how? If not, should they at least come up with a mechanism to ensure that future generations would survive on their own?

Muhammad Alagil was a second-generation leader in the well-known Alagil Family Group of businesses in Saudi Arabia and co-founder and chairman of its family office, Jarir Company for Commercial Investments (Jarir Investments). The case opens in 2021 with Alagil pondering whether or not to allow family members of the next generations aged 35 and over to spin off their pieces of the trust and set out on their own. This change would have been a massive departure from the state of mind he and his four brothers shared for the past decades: Why would anyone leave and shrink the pie? He was confident that none of the third generation (G3) would leave but he knew there was no guarantee they would stay either. He also knew that, when their time came, a portion of G4 members (the eldest of whom was 12 years old) would likely exercise that right and leave. With the sustainability of the family office in mind, would it be disastrous if some members left? The case discusses whether it was the G2 members' responsibility to entice future generations to stay and, if so, how? If not, should they at least come up with a mechanism to ensure that future generations would survive on their own?

The case opens with Alain Bejjani, CEO of Majid Al Futtaim (MAF) Holding, anticipating on the Group's next phase in the multi-year transformation journey and reflecting on the initiatives he implemented to create the Group's growth-oriented culture. Founded in 1995, MAF Group was a regional conglomerate, operating shopping malls, and retail and leisure establishments across 12 businesses in 15 markets in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. The case describes the series of structural changes that Bejjani undertook since he became the CEO in 2015, how he transitioned the Holding company from a passive investor to a strategic architect model, and assumed ownership of the brand, culture, and talent across the entire organization for all its operating companies: MAF Properties, MAF Retail, and MAF Ventures. The case discusses the steps that the Group undertook-creation of the Leadership Institute, a new performance management system, investments in digital technology and analytics capabilities, and the launch of the School of Great Moments to instill a focus on customer experience. By November 2019, Bejjani recognized that the organization had evolved considerably in the past five years. He wondered about the next steps in scaling and ability to execute strategy. How much more could he push the organization to continue to change?

Jordanian entrepreneur, Nour Al Hassan, founded Tarjama in 2008, tapping into an underserved and high demand need: Arabic translation service. Its lean model comprised of hiring full-time employees, mainly women, who worked from home. It steadily grew over the following decade to become a three-office, 140-employee company. In January 2017, Al Hassan launched a second business, Ureed.com, which encompassed a scalable, competitively priced online model. It was a linguistics marketplace, bringing companies and freelancers together. By October 2018, Ureed.com had significantly grown, having over 14,000 freelancers using the platform. As Al Hassan looked ahead at the ambitious growth plan they had in place, which included geographic expansion, diversifying the language offering, and monetizing Ureed.com's proprietary training and language tools, the main challenge she foresaw was maintaining the quality of the work performed by the freelancers while ensuring they remained motivated and loyal to the platform. Was the company ready for this growth plan or was it too ambitious for a company relying almost exclusively on freelancers? Would the training tools and technology add-ons suffice to sustain quality levels as the number of clients and freelancers grew? How could Al Hassan continue to create loyalty with an ever-growing number of freelancers? What were the other imminent challenges of adding new offices and languages simultaneously with only a small team of full-time employees?

This case illustrates the challenge and opportunities that firms face when developing and executing new business models in high-risk, low-infrastructure, low-trust countries. It features a global logistics group, Agility, that aimed to become the leader in supplying innovative solutions that provide the backbone to growing consumer markets across Africa. Agility's objective was to fill the institutional voids in the warehousing and logistics space that prevented multi-nationals and local firms from successfully operating at a level similar to Western countries and other emerging markets. After proof-of-concept success in Ghana's free zone, Agility faced the challenge of expanding its business model across a diverse continent of 54 countries. Agility Africa's CEO, Geoffrey White, needed to plot the way forward. Should he set a high entry barrier by building several warehouse parks in one of Africa's economic regions? Or, should he expand across the continent with one facility in each of the large and growing countries? If the decision was to pursue regional expansion, should he try to open one park per country-even in small ones-or build satellite developments in secondary cities where Agility already had facilities? He also needed to consider the pace of phasing in each park and the possibility of developing multiple parks in existing locations. With the world's fastest growing middle-class population and an internet revolution poised to spur the growth of consumer products and industrialization, Africa was considered by many as the world's leading and largely untapped, emerging market. White needed to make difficult and nuanced decisions that took account of the continent's many differences, as well as business similarities.

This case follows Kaspi.kz, a private equity (Baring Vostok) co-owned retail bank in Central Asia that evolved into a fintech, payments and e-commerce company. It provides insights into private equity financing, portfolio company management, and initial public offering practices. In particular, the case focuses on (i) the bank's journey from a traditional bank that serviced only corporations to an online platform, and (ii) the timing and process of preparation for an IPO. The management initially concentrated on profitability, but they soon shifted their emphasis to customer experience. The results were rewarding: Kaspi.kz became the number one player in online commerce, online payments, and consumer financing in Kazakhstan. The challenge of the IPO decisions is its timing: communicating the success of the fast transformation of the firm and its potential for further growth, especially in an emerging market like Kazakhstan, was far from trivial. From a business perspective, even a short delay of six months could potentially add millions of dollars to its value. Kaspi.kz's private equity investor was interested in commencing a formal exit via an IPO, but the valuation was an important consideration. The case also provides a unique insight into financial fragility of the retail banking model, and how integration into an e-commerce platform interacts with the retail banking model.

This case describes the evolution of Kazakhstan's rail connectivity strategy post-collapse of the Soviet Union and its now central role in China's Belt and Road Initiative. This meant shifting from a north-south orientation towards east-west, as well as the development of new border-crossing facilities, special economic zones, and a new middle route that crossed the Caspian Sea. Unlike many other BRI initiatives that involved loans from China, Kazakhstan funded the modernization and upgrade by itself. Now the question was how soon demand would grow to fill the waiting capacity, as other bottlenecks on the Trans-Eurasian land route connecting China with Europe were beyond the country's control.

This case focuses on a large Saudi Arabian industrial conglomerate and family business Zamil Group's corporate and the family's governance journey. The 12 sons of the founder led and grew the group successfully after taking over from their father in 1961. The secret to their success was to arrive at all decisions with a consensus, although each had their own approach to dealing with issues. In the mid-1990s, they hired world-class consultants and created manuals and guidelines for governing the business and continuing the growth of the Group's assets. They were the model for running a family business in Saudi Arabia. However, the increasing number of family members in the group-84 third-generation and 162 fourth-generation members and the upcoming fifth generation-created challenges going forward. They wanted to ensure that the governance principles they had created would evolve and develop in line with the changing dynamics. The upcoming generations did not have jobs waiting for them in the family business simply because they were members of the Zamil family, and not all of them were motivated to remain invested in the businesses. The second-generation and senior members of the third-generation wanted to make sure that they balanced the needs of the business and those of individual family members. They sought to put mechanisms in place that would keep the shares of the business in the family so as to avoid diluting the family's ownership as they diversified the asset portfolio, addressed diverse risks, and catered to the consumption goals of the next generation. This might mean that the Group would eventually move from being operators to becoming financial investors.

Building on his father's legacy, Omar Alghanim (MBA 2002) had been working on strengthening a performance-driven culture based on meritocracy in the family business, Alghanim Industries. The task had been particularly challenging because of traditional Middle East practice of relying on relationships and influence to conduct business. Omar's vision attracted and empowered like-minded employees who were rewarded on merit and who delivered on the firm's mission of providing excellent service to its customers. Together, they revamped the company's performance and compensation system and established a well-structured control and compliance mechanism. The next challenge for Omar was to transform the workforce from a mono-culture, male-dominant expat community to a diverse mix of people, cultures, backgrounds, and viewpoints. In particular, he needed to find a way to attract talented women and local Kuwaitis to become part of his organization.

With SAR 14 billion ($3.7 billion) in 2017 revenues, Almarai was Saudi Arabia's largest dairy producer, distributor, and marketer, with a large portfolio of branded dairy products, juices, bakery goods, and infant formula and a sales presence across the Gulf region, Jordan, and Egypt. Almarai employed some 42,000 people across its operations, from its massive dairy farms to its processing plants to its vast sales and distribution operation that reached over 100,000 outlets. Notwithstanding its diverse portfolio, the core of Almarai's business was (1) sales of branded fresh/chilled dairy products, (2) in Saudi Arabia, (3) distributed through the traditional retail channel made up of thousands of small neighborhood shops called bakalas. In October 2018, all three of these focal points were under pressure. Under the economic-restructuring programs of Saudi Arabia's new crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, new taxes and subsidy cuts were squeezing household budgets. Concurrently, changes to other government policies were causing expatriates-who made up about a third of Saudi Arabia's population and were a key consumer of Almarai's dairy products-to leave the country in droves. This case finds Almarai's management team, led by soon-to-retire CEO Georges Schorderet, debating how the company can defend and grow its position in Saudi Arabia while also finding new sources of future growth (e.g., bringing its production model to new markets with fragmented dairy sectors or entering new product categories such as fish or ice cream). The decision of how to move forward will be based on an assessment of Almarai's strengths, how they can be best used to drive future growth, and how relevant they will remain in a market that is changing so dramatically.

Kamil Yazici and Izzet Ozilhan founded and built Anadolu Group Holding; a family business that grew into a multi-billion-dollar regional powerhouse. For 57 years they were equal partners in running the company. They then handed over a leadership role to a next generation family member; Izzet's son Tuncay; who became the CEO and later also chairman. Under Tuncay's leadership; the company was primarily run by professional managers; supplemented by a limited number of second- and third-generation family members in senior executive positions. However; in 2017; when the number of next-generation family members reached 85; Kamil and Tuncay began work on a governance structure they hoped would sustain the company when they left. Under their plan; family members would no longer be allowed to hold general management positions. As a result; Tuncay retired as CEO and other family members with senior executive roles resigned. A holding company was created to bring all the company's subsidiaries under a common structure. And a process was created to allow some members of the two surviving families to hold board seats. Although the stock market reacted positively to the increased transparency brought about by the changes; it remains to be seen whether the new formula will achieve its goal of successfully transitioning the company from a family-managed business to professionally-run company.

This case describes how Robert Fadel, CEO and chairman of ABC, one of Lebanon's leading retail and real estate groups, professionalized the family business. Robert was the second son of the company's founder, Maurice Fadel, who had run it single-handedly. Concerned that the business might be affected by rivalry between his four sons after he died, Maurice set up a trust in 2002 that designated Robert as his successor, and in May of 2009, Maurice revised the trust, granting Robert full control of the board as well. In June 2009, Maurice Fadel passed away, and according to the provisions of the trust, Robert became the chairman and CEO of ABC for a period of five years, with the possibility of extending his term by an additional three years, on condition that he had the support of at least one of his brothers. In his new role, Robert set two main goals for the company. First, he wanted to turn ABC into a professionally managed organization at all levels. Second, he wanted to invest in long-term projects that would expand the business. Actualizing his vision was not an easy task given the family conflicts and Lebanon's economic and political environment. However, Robert achieved both of his goals by the end of his eighth year, in 2017, when he stepped down as ABC's CEO. The dilemmas at that point were whether he should appoint someone from outside the Fadel family as ABC's new CEO, and whether he should step down from the board chairmanship.