Why do large, successful public companies and their CEOs suddenly weaken? To find out, we studied 45 large European and U.S. stumbles. Our case studies point to some common mistakes, such as undertaking unnecessarily risky growth strategies, treating compliance issues lightly, or poor cost control. These simple mistakes often had complex origins, such as attempts to meet conflicting objectives, weak board governance, or even executives being misled by positive experiences with ambitioius growth investments. We develop a checklist of "Emperor's Clothes" failings to help executives and boards lessen the risk of the worst stumbles.

The huge sums that private equity firms make on their investments evoke admiration and envy. Typically, these returns are attributed to the firms' aggressive use of debt, concentration on cash flow and margins, freedom from public company regulations, and hefty incentives for operating managers. But the fundamental reason for private equity's success is the strategy of buying to sell-one rarely employed by public companies, which, in pursuit of synergies, usually buy to keep. The chief advantage of buying to sell is simple but often overlooked, explain Barber and Goold, directors of the Ashridge Strategic Management Centre. Private equity's sweet spot is acquisitions that have been undermanaged or undervalued, where there's a onetime opportunity to increase a business's value. Once that gain has been realized, private equity firms sell for a maximum return. A corporate acquirer, in contrast, will dilute its return by hanging on to the business after the growth in value tapers off. Public companies that compete in this space can offer investors better returns than private equity firms do. (After all, a public company wouldn't deduct the 30% that funds take out of gross profits.) Corporations have two options: (1) to copy private equity's model, as investment companies Wendel and Eurazeo have done with dramatic success, or (2) to take a flexible approach, holding businesses for as long as they can add value as owners. The latter would give companies an advantage over funds, which must liquidate within a preset time-potentially leaving money on the table. Both options present public companies with challenges, including U.S. capital-gains taxes and a dearth of investment management skills. But the greatest barrier may be public companies' aversion to exiting a healthy business and their inability to see it the way private equity firms do-as the culmination of a successful transformation, not a strategic error.

When people are your most important asset, some standard performance measures and management practices become misleading or irrelevant. This is a danger for any business whose people costs are greater than its capital costs--that is, businesses in most industries. But it is particularly true for what the authors call "people businesses": operations with high employee costs, low capital investment, and limited spending on activities, such as R&D, that are aimed at generating future revenue. If you run a people business--or a company that includes one or more of them--how do you measure its true performance? Avoid the trap of relying on capital-oriented metrics, such as return on assets and return on equity. They won't help much, as they'll tend to mask weak performance or indicate volatility where it doesn't exist. Replace them with financially rigorous, people-oriented metrics--for example, a reformulation of a conventional calculation of economic profit, such as EVA, so that you gauge people, rather than capital, productivity. After you have assessed the business' true performance, you need to enhance it operationally (be aware that relatively small changes in productivity can have a major impact on shareholder returns); reward it appropriately (push performance-related variable compensation schemes down into the organization); and price it advantageously (because economies of scale and experience tend to be less significant in people businesses, price products or services in ways that capture a share of the additional value created for customers).