Many companies realize the value of diversity, equity, and inclusion. But most focus on gender and ethnicity, paying less attention to people with disabilities. Employing people with disabilities is usually seen as a social cause-one best suited to nonprofits or the public sector. That is a mistake-and more important, a missed opportunity. In many industries innovative companies are demonstrating that including people with disabilities can lead to real competitive advantage, in four ways: (1) Disabilities often confer unique talents that make people better at particular jobs. (2) The presence of employees with disabilities elevates the culture of the entire organization, making it more collaborative and boosting productivity. (3) A reputation for inclusiveness enhances a firm's value proposition with customers, who become more willing to build long-term relationships with the company. And (4) being recognized as socially responsible gives a firm an edge in the competition for capital and talent. There is nothing wrong with wanting to do good in the world, but there is also nothing wrong with wanting to do well, and the latter is enough reason to employ people with disabilities.

In April 2011, Dutch multinational Royal Philips, one of the most iconic companies in the country, decided to disrupt itself and transform from a diversified industrial conglomerate to a focused player in Health Technology. The case describes the first decade (2011-2021) of the strategic transformation in terms of refocusing the business portfolio, the new business model and, most of all, the efforts of top management to transform Philips' internal organisation in terms of structure, culture and systems. The first case author was a member of the executive board of Philips during the entire decade, working closely with the CEO, Frans van Houten, to effect the huge transformation. In addition to the author's personal experience as a senior executive with the firm, the case is based on numerous interviews with other members of the executive board, including van Houten.

The case describes the scenario that faced Thijs Thijssen and Brother Isaac, co-CEOs of the Netherlands-based La Trappe Brewery, in 2015 as they considered how to consolidate the success they had had with the business since Thijssen had joined the organisation in 2005 and build on this success for the future. Sales had risen throughout 2013 and 2014 and La Trappe had been exporting its beer to markets outside the Netherlands for a few years, with exports now making up 40% of the company's revenue. This rise in revenue had allowed the brewery to expand capacity and facilities again, and in 2014 they had stopped producing beer under licence for Bavaria, another Netherlands-based brewing company, from whom they received a share of royalties on sales. Thijssen now calculated that the brewery could potentially double the production of La Trappe beers within the existing buildings and facilities. To prepare for the future, Thijssen and Brother Isaac wanted to map out the company's strategy, in a way that could be understood by all employees. One pertinent issue was their use of foreign agents to secure exports. These were sometimes difficult to vet in terms of whether they were using channels and methods consistent with La Trappe's brand and vision; in New Zealand, for example, Thijssen had discovered that the agent had no contacts in bars and restaurants, but instead went directly to retail, a model La Trappe had eschewed in the Netherlands in order to protect brand identity. To sort out these issues and establish a clear path to sustainable growth, Thijssen and Brother Isaac began the process of mapping out a future strategy, with the help of executives from Bavaria. One question in particular vexed Thijssen: he could not figure out why the brewery had grown so rapidly over the last six years, given the challenging economic climate. It seemed very counter-intuitive.

People have a tendency to stick to an existing course of action, no matter how irrational. In the management literature, this is known as an escalation of commitment, and in nearly every academic case study on the demise of a former industry leader, it played a major role. The story of the British music company HMV--whose managing director dismissed downloadable music as "just a fad"--is a classic example. Escalation of commitment is explained by a number of mutually reinforcing biases, among them: the sunk cost fallacy, loss aversion, the illusion of control, the preference for completion, pluralistic ignorance, and personal identification. The authors describe six practices that can help counteract these biases: (1) Set decision rules. (2) Pay attention to voting rules. (3) Protect dissenters. (4) Expressly consider alternatives. (5) Separate advocacy and decision making. (6) Reinforce the anticipation of regret. Overcommitted executives, they write, are prone to ignore signs of their company's imminent collapse. These practices will encourage managers at all levels to make decisions more objectively.

The consumer banking industry is notoriously hard to enter. Customers rarely switch banks (switching costs are high) and there are considerable barriers to entry to new players. Traditionally, banking products can be complex, often accompanied by non-transparent cross-selling practices and hidden fees and commissions that seem designed to extract as much money as possible from customers, rather than serving them in a customer-centric way. The case is set in South Africa, where around the turn of the millennium the banking sector was dominated by four major players who collectively had a market share in excess of 80%. The established players differentiated customers according to income bracket, rather than the value of the service being provided, and tended to overlook those on lower incomes. There was a large 'unbanked' or underserved demographic who lacked almost all access to financial services. The case details how Capitec entered and disrupted the industry by targeting the mass market, including the hitherto unbanked, and by becoming a bank that was open to customers from all income groups and which treated all customers alike. By focusing on three key principles - affordability, accessibility and simplicity - and with a clear customer focus, Capitec was able to stimulate much broader financial inclusion and capitalise on it accordingly, establishing a position in the top four banks and enjoying year-on-year growth in terms of new customers and revenue that far outstripped its competitors.

Eden McCallum is a Management Consulting firm founded by two ex-McKinsey partners. It has offices in London, Amsterdam and Zurich, and is planning further expansion. The company is founded using a distinctive new business model, based on operating a pool of experienced, freelance consultants. Hence, it operates as a double-sided market. Eden McCallum's 15 partners secure client projects and then assemble teams of consultants to work on these projects. They screen consultants extensively before admitting them into their pool. Furthermore, the company provides office space, a team of analysts, and operational assistance (in terms of IT, legal, billing, etcetera). The case stimulates discussion in terms of how the company might grow, whether its value proposition can remain distinctive as it expands, and how it can attract and retain the people in the various markets - independent consultants, partners and staff - needed to make further growth a success. In particular, the case explores business model innovation by creating a novel value proposition for employees, i.e., by giving management consultants more control over their time and lives.

In 2008, a group of five entrepreneurs and executives teamed up to launch an innovative hotel chain into what seemed like a highly competitive industry. Rattan Chadha, the founder of fashion company MEXX and Michael Levie, a hotel industry veteran, teamed up with Hans Meyer, a hotel development specialist, Campagne corporate strategist Klaas van Lookeren, and architect and interior designer Rob Wagemans to launch the new concept. They took a different approach to innovation in the hospitality sector. Instead of trying to invent few features - products and services - with which to attract a broad range of customers, they innovated by removing what they believed to be features that were not attractive to a core consumer target: tech-savvy, mobile travellers. The citizenM case details the differences between this new hotel concept and the typical features offered by luxury and high-to mid-range hotels. Each aspect of the customer-facing experience and behind-the-scenes operating model is discussed and defined. It describes the tight fit between all aspects of citizenM's innovative business model, ranging from the location of their hotels, their construction, the facilities (and absence there-off), staffing, operations, and marketing. The case ends by outlining citizenM's prospects as the leadership team looks to grow their new concept.

No one disputes that firms have to make organizational changes when the business environment demands them. But the idea that a firm might want change for its own sake often provokes skepticism. Why inflict all that pain if you don't have to? That is a dangerous attitude. A company periodically needs to shake itself up, regardless of the competitive landscape. Even if the external environment is not changing in ways that demand a response, the internal environment probably is. The human dynamics within an organization are constantly shifting--and require the organization to change along with them. Over time, informal networks mirror the formal structure, which is how silos develop; restructuring gets people to start forming new networks, making the organization as a whole more creative. It also disrupts all the routines in an organization that collectively stifle innovation and adaptability. Finally, restructuring breaks up the outdated power structures that may be quietly misdirecting a company's resource allocation. All these processes--silo formation, the accretion of deadening routines, and the emergence of corporate baronies--take place all the time. But when everything is going well, you tend not to notice them, just as many seemingly fit people don't realize that their arteries may be dangerously clogged. A simple questionnaire can serve as a kind of cholesterol test for your company, enabling you to see if your regimen needs minor or major adjustments.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Corporate executives typically have strategic explanations for their acquisitions: buying the company in question makes sense geographically or the products are synergistic. However, if you inquire two years later how the company has benefited, managers tend to focus on the "softer" factors with comments like, "They made us rethink our decision-making processes," or "They introduced us to a new approach to product development," or simply "They shook up our culture." Analyzes the acquisitions and performance of a number of large, successful companies. Several of the companies included in the research suffered from rigidity. However, the companies were found to use acquisitions to restore a sense of vitality to their businesses and unleash a subsequent surge in performance. The acquired companies often stimulated the acquiring companies to develop new perspectives and different ways of doing things at critical times, keeping their organizations fresh and vital. Even if the enterprises did not pursue acquisitions for this reason, the process of buying businesses and deciding how to integrate them into their corporate structures enabled acquirers to renew themselves before their products and operating methods became outdated.