In early April 2012, Michelle Dipp, MD, Ph.D, CEO and co-founder of OvaScience, had just received a buyout offer from PG Ventures, a private equity firm interested in acquiring the innovative fertility treatments company. The company's first promising fertility treatment, AUGMENT (Autologous Germ-line Mitochondrial Energy Transfer), had the potential to improve egg quality, increase the success of IVF cycles, and decrease the incidence of multiple births (i.e., twins, triplets). OvaScience had been in operation since 2011, and AUGMENT had not yet reached the market. Dipp and her partners had high hopes for the success of AUGMENT and the impact the underlying technology could have on millions of infertility cases around the world. How fast might Dipp and her team grow OvaScience? Would they have the resources? Dipp considered the best way to build out OvaScience's business model and whether AUGMENT's potential outweighed the PG Ventures offer.
The compromise between capital preservation and growth has always been central to the performance of the Harvard endowment. Setting an institutional structure for effectively governing this compromise became especially important when the Harvard Management Company began operating in July of 1974. HMCs investments in venture capital, which began within a decade, created tensions around risk-return tradeoffs. HMC grappled with issues surrounding short term versus long term investment payoffs, the proportion of the portfolio that should be allocated to venture capital and the most appropriate investment form - direct investing in entrepreneurial startups, later stage businesses, or outsourcing this function and investing in funds. Such decisions would matter from the perspective of generations of students and faculty who depended on HMC maximizing returns and getting the balance of the Harvard portfolio right.
Don Valentine participated in the beginnings of two significant milestones: the birth of the silicon chip and the development of the venture capital industry. From humble beginnings, Valentine became a legendary salesman at Fairchild Semiconductor and National Semiconductor, before founding Sequoia Capital in 1972. Valentine was comfortable making high-risk bets on unknown entrepreneurs in markets where he saw great potential. Unlike other venture capitalists of the time that focused on finding outstanding entrepreneurs or groundbreaking technology, Valentine took a different approach. He focused predominantly on the size of the potential market.
NEA was established in 1977 and it subsequently morphed into one of the largest venture capital firms in the world. Despite its size and significance, some other firms established during the same era such as Kleiner-Perkins and Sequoia (both were established in 1972), are arguably better-known. No venture firm, however, can parallel NEA in terms of its scale and its commitment to organizational and operational innovation. From early on the founders predicted that NEA would grow in size and significance, but the challenges associated with achieving these goals were formidable. How could NEA scale and generate favorable returns from a large capital base for its Limited Partners (LPs)? How could General Partners (GPs) be integrated and incentivized? How could the bi-coastal structure be sustained over the long run?
In 1965 William Elfers left Georges Doriot's American Research and Development Corporation to found Greylock, his own venture capital firm. Over the ensuing three decades followed a series of eight Greylock partnerships, during which time Elfers never lost a general partner or saw a colleague leave to start his own venture capital firm. Furthermore, each of the investors in Greylock's first fund participated in all succeeding partnerships. Elfers was among the first to pioneer the limited partnership structure of the modern venture capital firm with Greylock being organized as a series of limited partnerships, each of which pooled the investment capital that its general partners and limited partners committed for finite lifetimes. Greylock was established against a long historical tradition of New England financial innovation going back to at least the nineteenth century. In essence Elfers helped to create a new organizational approach to venture capital through mechanisms that deeply reflected New England's financial investment culture.
Arthur Rock was known as one of the country's first venture capitalists and was instrumental in launching major Silicon Valley firms, such as Fairchild Semiconductor, Intel Corporation, Apple Computer, Inc., Scientific Data Systems and Teledyne Incorporated. He was the first venture capitalist to be featured on the cover of Time magazine. Rock was adamant that his success was due to luck and being in the right place at the right time. Others argued differently, emphasizing in particular his unique style of investing and his focus on selecting the right people. Was this a case of luck or a classic example of the principle: back the right people?
Genentech is a rare success story in the biotechnology industry. Hundreds of billions of dollars of venture capital have been invested without the expected transformational effects. Established in 1976, Genentech was to develop the new science of recombinant DNA into viable therapeutic products with mass market appeal, something that most scientists agreed was at least a decade away. The founders, Herbert Boyer and Robert Swanson had limited financial resources, so they turned to Tom Perkins, the co-founder of Kleiner-Perkins, for venture funding. Genentech developed through an effective union between scientific and venture investment mindsets. In 1980 an IPO valued Genentech at $300 million. In 2009 it was fully acquired by the Swiss-based healthcare company, Roche, for $47 billion. Roche had held a majority stake in the company since 1990.
The growth of companies that facilitate the sales of unregistered stock, such as that granted to employees of successful but long-private companies, has raised a number of questions among regulators, investors, and company founders. This brief vignette sketches out some of the benefits and drawbacks of alternative methods of liquidity.
Bill Strickland, CEO of Manchester Bidwell Corporation, must decide the best way to replicate his innovative, award-winning approach to curing poverty. Manchester Bidwell's approach, which provides both adult job-training tuned to fill the needs of local industries and after-school art instruction for at-risk youth, has proven highly effective over the 40 years Strickland has operated it. He wants to replicate this strategy across 100 or 200 cities, but progress has been slow. Is the current intensive approach correct, or should he change it? What would be at risk? How can he best provide his "cure for poverty" to the greatest number of communities?
Creative Capital provides grants to individual artists using a venture capital model-the money comes with guidance and governance. Artists receive money as milestones are reached and also receive guidance on managing their lives and business to increase their sustainability. But as Ruby Lerner, CEO of Creative Capital, looks to the organization's next decade, how can she ensure the sustainability of this high-touch, uniquely individual model?
In December 2008, Thomas G. Tsao, acting CEO of Digital Media Group (DMG), a venture-backed provider of technology and media used primarily in subways, must decide how to structure the company's bid for the advertising concession in Shanghai's 13 existing and planned subway lines. This is complicated by the fact that he is also a general partner in Gobi Partners, one of DMG's largest investors. The company is bidding against its largest competitor, which also investigated acquiring DMG a few months before. DMG has very little cash, and the publicly traded competitor knows it. How does Tom structure the bid? How does he get the money for it? How does he manage the company, given its inability to attract a CEO and his firm's need to have an exit? Lastly, how does he manage his responsibilities - to his firm, his limited partners, his coinvestors, and the company?
Thomas G. Tsao, founding general partner of Gobi Partners, an early stage venture capital firm in China, must decide how to manage his firm's largest investment after the departure of the CEO. Tom has temporarily stepped in as CEO, but finding a replacement with the necessary technical and language skills is difficult. Moreover, the company is facing significant challenges in winning business and restructuring its own operations. Should Tom stay on as CEO? Revisit one of the candidates who had withdrawn? Try harder to sell the company? At what price? The case provides an opportunity to discuss the issue of active investment management in an emerging market from the perspectives of the many stakeholders involved.
These three vignettes present various issues around the strategy and management of a private equity firm. In one, a senior partner must decide how to manage an over-extended colleague and how to reduce the risk of the firm's portfolio; in the second, a limited partner must decide how to respond to tensions between general partners in a fund, and in the third, the general partners must decide whether to invest in an intriguing opportunity that lies outside the firm's carefully developed investment strategy.
Two entrepreneurs have just been told by their venture capital backer to prepare a list of possible cuts to help them weather the 2008-2009 economic downturn. The impact on each firm is very different: one is a later-stage company with revenues in excess of $100 million; the other a pre-revenue company trying to raise its first institutional round. The entrepreneurs must consider their options and the impact on their companies' growth and, perhaps, survival.
Facing the downturn in late 2008, the partners in a West-Coast venture capital firm are trying to decide how to manage their portfolio companies and whether to make new investments. Not only must they consider the particulars of each company individually, but they must also think about how to manage the entire firm's portfolio.
These three short vignettes depict investment professionals considering difficult financings for companies in their portfolios. For one reason or another, each company has under-performed expectations. Should the protagonist recommend that the firm participate or not, or should he try to revise it? Can the firm exercise any influence, and are the potential gains worth the time and effort that will be required?
In a series of vignettes, Nigella Hardy-Smyth of an international development agency that invests partners in emerging markets private equity firms must decide how to handle various situations that arise. As a member of the Limited Partner Advisory Board of each of the five firms, she must contend with a fund manager with an indistinct mandate, a manager who wants to exceed the concentration limit in an investment, tension between a star investor and her other partners, a founding partner who wants to fire the rest of his senior team, and a limited partner seeking preferential treatment that might benefit his fund to the detriment of the other limited partners. The process of discussing these helps the class explore the nuanced role of a limited partner in a private equity firm.
This note explores the limited partner advisory boards. Based on interviews with seven experienced limited partners who serve on a number of different advisory boards, it presents the roles of the advisory board, the ways it can influence the general partner, and the reasons for limited partners to serve on them. It also contrasts the findings of this survey with a paper on the performance differential between university endowments and other institutional investors and hypothesizes the reasons behind it.
Steven Schwarzman, Chairman of the Blackstone Group, has just learned that an investment group associated with the government of China wants to buy the majority of Blackstone's leveraged IPO. As he considers how to respond to this offer, Schwarzman reviews the firm's proposed structure as a public entity and assesses how he might retain the delicate balance among stakeholders while still maintaining liquidity in the market.