Trichloroethylene, or TCE, was a chemical used by tens of thousands of businesses in the United States. It was an affordable tool for many. Yet, TCE had been associated with important health risks, including cancer and autoimmune disease. TCE potentially posed other risks as well: some researchers argued that low doses of TCE caused deformities in fetal hearts, while others argued that there was not enough science to back up this claim. Over twenty years, a vigorous debate encompassing academic, government and industry voices played out around just how toxic TCE was. The American chemical industry and TCE end-users used lobbying to advocate for their positions. A loose coalition of activists, academics and journalists promoted their own, different, perspectives on TCE. Developments in the TCE story were often communicated to the public through investigative reporting, a field of journalism facing economic crisis. The U.S. government and its Environmental Protection Agency were responsible for assessing TCE's toxicity, leading to secondary policy decisions around how the chemical should be regulated. Yet, by the end of 2020, controversy remained around whether successive governments had been untowardly influenced by special interests in their TCE decision-making. Which stance should the Biden administration take in regards to TCE? More broadly, which broader lessons could be drawn from the TCE case? In particular, should the influence of lobbying on regulations and policies be constrained in any way?

For the first half of 2020, the COVID-19 crisis seemed on the verge of spiraling out of control. The business world struggled to figure out what COVID meant for macroeconomics. Extended restrictions limiting human interaction meant an end to normal economic production, and a resulting global economic crisis. France, Germany and the United States tackled the economic side of the COVID crisis through complex fiscal policy measures, with differing levels of success.

The collapse of central authority in the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a period of revolutionary transformations for the states that emerged in its wake. The leaders of Russia, the USSR's successor, struggled to reestablish central authority while also seeking to avoid further disintegration, establish a democratic polity, and institute a market economy across the next several years. Russia would navigate further economic crisis and a swiftly evolving geopolitical order as it returned to the world stage. The case examines the different governance approaches adopted by Presidents Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, and concludes with a discussion of Russia's strategic challenges and opportunities in 2019. The case focuses on problems of state authority; fiscal capacity; institutionalization of political parties; relations between the federal center and provincial governments; relations between the state and big business; economic policy; international relations; and models of economic development.

Though the shale revolution transformed the U.S. into the largest producer of petroleum products, it was unclear how much success American exporters would find selling liquefied natural gas on the European energy market. Gazprom, the state-controlled Russian energy company, provided Europe with the majority of its natural gas. Many voices discussed European energy needs in terms of security or politics, but buyers and sellers of natural gas in the private sector approached the question from a somewhat different angle. This case, built around unique calculations that model the prices different European customers pay for gas, analyzes the strategic considerations and pricing decisions of Russian and American natural gas suppliers, and pushes students to consider the broader political context of energy in Europe.

Following a contentious presidential race, Donald Trump's 2016 election destabilized America's status quo. Academics, journalists, politicians and the public at large examined why Trump had won. Many Americans, inside and outside the government, asserted that a state-led Russian disinformation campaign had influenced the election's outcome. The leaders of major social media companies, including Twitter and Facebook, also conceded that state actors had gamed their platforms to influence American politics. Trump himself made conflicting statements, while Russian politicians asserted that American elites had rhetorically weaponized the issue of election interference to justify an unwillingness to work with their country internationally. It was hard to parse where reality ended and political rhetoric began. Post-election, the future of U.S.-Russia relations remained unclear, and the United States grappled with how to regulate cyberspace. Analyzing the 2016 election and its aftershocks helps students confront interrelated questions about business regulation, international relations, cultural identity, strategic communications, political will and the Internet. The case encourages students to consider the boundary between narrative and reality and examine subjectivity, objectivity, and power in the public and private sectors.