In September 2008, Robert Steel presided over the sale of Wachovia, a top U.S. bank, less than three months after becoming its CEO. Wachovia's exposure to risky home loans led depositors and creditors to flee the bank on Friday, September 26, after the FDIC seized and sold a smaller bank with similar exposure, whose collapse nonetheless made it the biggest bank failure in U.S. history. Faced with Wachovia's impending bankruptcy, the FDIC intervened again, voting on Monday, September 29 to sell Wachovia's retail bank to Citigroup for $1 a share. Three days later, Wells Fargo offered $7 a share for all of Wachovia. Steel needed to decide whether to honor the terms of the deal and exclusivity agreement already sketched out with Citigroup or to approve a definitive merger agreement with Wells Fargo.

Supplement to case 418055. In September 2008, Robert Steel presided over the sale of Wachovia, a top U.S. bank, less than three months after becoming its CEO. Wachovia's exposure to risky home loans led depositors and creditors to flee the bank on Friday, September 26, after the FDIC seized and sold a smaller bank with similar exposure, whose collapse nonetheless made it the biggest bank failure in U.S. history. Faced with Wachovia's impending bankruptcy, the FDIC intervened again, voting on Monday, September 29 to sell Wachovia's retail bank to Citigroup for $1 a share. Three days later, Wells Fargo offered $7 a share for all of Wachovia. Steel needed to decide whether to honor the terms of the deal and exclusivity agreement already sketched out with Citigroup or to approve a definitive merger agreement with Wells Fargo.

After the contentious firing of an office manager, the leadership at Fresh to Table, a software-as-a-service provider for luxury hotels and restaurants, make an unpleasant discovery. While reviewing the office manager's internal electronic communications, company leaders discover that several key employees, including two that were recently promoted, had been spending substantial time on internal social media channels disparaging other employees, citing days when they skipped work, and referring to other instances of unprofessional behavior. This 5-page case explores issues related to electronic communications, termination and disciplinary procedures, and leadership, culture and values. It can be used in General Management, Organizational Behavior, Human Resource Management, Management Communication, Leadership, and Employee Relations courses. The case also allows students to consider how technology affects organizational interactions and culture.

In 2013, Pinar Abay was appointed as the CEO of ING Bank Turkey. At 34, she was the youngest bank CEO in Turkey's history. Her appointment raised eyebrows because of her youth and because her career at McKinsey had given her no day-to-day bank management experience. ING, however, wanted a younger leader who could relate to Turkey's young and digitally savvy population. Upon her appointment, Abay determined that major changes were required in operations, personnel and culture. She adopted a variety of innovative approaches to making these changes, ranging from non-traditional hires to sitting for hours in call centers to personally answering customer complaints on Twitter. As Turkey's 12th largest bank, however, ING Turkey lacked scale, so Abay and her team considered a number of non-traditional ways to organize distribution and market the bank to promote growth.

This (B) case describes the actions Andre Wyss, President of Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., took in early 2012 to transform the company's General Medicines group and build its speciality medications marketing the selling capabilities in the face of falling revenues and an imminent workforce reduction. Rather than downsize the organization quickly to save costs, Wyss and his team took a different approach. They told the organization's employees that there would be a significant workforce reduction but it would not occur for several months. In the meantime, Wyss asked the employees to help build the new capabilities and put processes in place to support the move into specialty medications. It was a bold decision and defied convention.

Over the course of a tumultuous weekend in April 2010, André Wyss was put in charge of Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation (NPC), the U.S. sales and marketing subsidiary of Novartis Pharma AG. He was brought in at a critical point in the organization's evolution with a mandate to grow the specialty medications business; the skills and capabilities needed to market and sell specialty medications were considerably different than those required for marketing and selling primary care medications, which NPC had been quite successful doing. In 2011, the 5-year revenue projections were revised significantly downward and Wyss needed to cut costs while also building the organization's capabilities quickly in early 2012.

Over and over again, executives make decisions that aren't in their companies' best interests, in response to pressure from Wall Street. Though many believe this happens because firms have a "fiduciary duty" to maximize shareholder returns, U.S. executives do not, as a matter of law, have any such obligation. Yet it's hard for them to resist demands from a quarter that has amassed such a huge and disproportionate share of power. In the past few decades, as legislation that put controls on Wall Street was largely undone, the size and profits of the financial sector grew enormously. That increased its influence, particularly its ability to sway the government by spending billions of dollars on lobbyists and political contributions. Even after the financial crisis, Wall Street was able to slow down and weaken new regulations meant to rein in its risky practices. This "financialization" of the economy has serious downsides: It increases volatility, inhibits growth, and misallocates resources, such as talent and capital, away from wealth creation and toward wealth distribution. It distorts thinking. Restoring the balance of power is critical to the competitiveness and the health of the rest of the economy. Limits on the size and leverage of banks and changes to the tax code could promote better equilibrium--but courage will be needed to put such reforms in place.

In 2007, Cynthia Carroll, the newly-appointed chief executive of mining giant Anglo American, was considering shutting down mines in South Africa for safety reasons, namely worker fatalities. No company had ever done so before. Carroll felt that operating a company whose goal was anything less than "zero harm" (meaning no fatalities or serious injuries) was unacceptable. As the first woman and non-South African to lead the century-old company, many were watching her closely. Should she go so far as to make the unprecedented move of shutting down the mines? What message would that send to the company and to the mining industry? The lives of others, Carroll's reputation, and the company's performance were all on the line.

When Cynthia Carroll, chief executive of Anglo American, ordered the shutdown of the company's Rustenburg, South Africa mines in the summer of 2007, it was just the first of many steps the company would take under her leadership to achieve zero harm. The case describes Carroll's approach to stakeholder relationships (i.e., relationships with the government and unions), how the shutdown was used as a platform to change the culture at Anglo American as a whole, the challenges of sustaining such an endeavor, and Carroll's reflections on her career and leadership. In 2013, Carroll stepped down as chief executive, but her tenure at Anglo American had reverberated through the company, South Africa, and the mining industry.

In 2007, Cynthia Carroll, the newly-appointed chief executive of mining giant Anglo American, ordered the temporary shutdown of Anglo American Platinum's Rustenburg, South Africa mines in response to a spate of deaths at the operations. The case lays out Carroll's requirements of what had to be done before the Rustenburg mines could restart operations, including the implementation of a new safety program for tens of thousands of workers that called on the help of executives from other Anglo American businesses. The shutdown disrupted operations and incurred substantial costs.

Gerry Pasciucco was appointed to lead American International Group's Financial Products (AIGFP) group after the government bailout of AIG in 2008 and charged with the task of shutting down the division while minimizing the government's losses. AIGFP's failed trades had threatened to bring down the entire company, and the government had responded by loaning AIG $182 billion in exchange for 79.9% of the company, because it feared that AIG's failure could trigger the collapse of the entire global financial system. Several months into his tenure, the division paid large retention bonuses to all of its professionals according to a contract negotiated before he joined AIGFP. These bonuses were seen by the public as going to the very people whose mistakes resulted in the need for a bailout in the first place and resulted in an unprecedented storm of public outrage, culminating in a Congressional hearing in which AIG's CEO, Ed Liddy, was repeatedly attacked for making the bonus payments. Liddy responded by asking people who had received the largest payments to return the money to the company. Now Pasciucco has to decide how to lead his team through this crisis while grappling with the larger issues of the justice of the retention payments.

New research on effective leaders shows that the most brilliant ones tend to be people without a great deal of experience. The only trouble is, the same is true of the very worst leaders.