Whether your aim is to lose weight, save for retirement or quit smoking, most of us have a clear idea of the long-term goals that we would like to achieve for ourselves. Unfortunately, most of us also fail to implement the requisite course of action to produce these outcomes. Why don't we simply make the decisions necessary to make our goals a reality? The authors argue that Behavioral Economics can provide solutions to problems that predictably arise from individual behavior. Not only does it acknowledge that human behavior is often far from optimal, but it also identifies a variety of decision errors and biases that contribute to departures from optimality. The authors show that many of the same decision errors that produce self-destructive behavior in the first place can actually be used to people's individual and collective benefit.

We care deeply about what other people think of us, and as a result, 'mattering maps' exert a powerful influence on our behavior. In principle, there is a mattering map for each person, each social environment and for society as a whole, and because each person typically belongs to more than one social group--workplace, family, friends-these groups and the mattering maps that apply to them often overlap. Mattering maps may be a source of misery for some, but given the realities of human nature, they cannot be avoided. The authors show that in the end, they enable both the greatest accomplishments of the human race when we compete to outdo one-another in things that are constructive, and our greatest follies when we compete over activities that are wasteful or destructive.

In the last two decades, Behavioral Economics (the importation of ideas from Psychology to Economics) has become a prominent fixture on the intellectual landscape. In turn, it has spawned the field of 'Neuroeconomics', whereby ideas from Neuroscience are imported into Economics. The study of the human brain and nervous system is beginning to allow for direct measurement of thoughts and feelings; and this, in turn, is challenging our understanding of the relation between mind and action, leading to new theoretical constructs and calling old ones into question. The authors describe the findings to date, covering automatic vs. controlled processes and cognitive vs. affective processes, and their general implications for Economics.

On July 30, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addressing corporate accountability. A response to recent financial scandals, the law tightened federal controls over the accounting industry and imposed tough new criminal penalties for fraud. The president proclaimed, "The era of low standards and false profits is over." If only it were that easy. The authors don't think corruption is the main cause of bad audits. Rather, they claim, the problem is unconscious bias. Without knowing it, we all tend to discount facts that contradict the conclusions we want to reach, and we uncritically embrace evidence that supports our positions. The corporate-auditing arena is particularly fertile ground for self-serving biases. Because of the often subjective nature of accounting and the close relationships between accounting firms and their corporate clients, even the most honest and meticulous of auditors can unintentionally massage the numbers in ways that mask a company's true financial status. Solving this problem will require far more aggressive action than the U.S. government has taken thus far. What's needed are practices and regulations that recognize the existence of bias and moderate its effects. True auditor independence will entail fundamental changes to the way the accounting industry operates, including full divestiture of consulting and tax services, rotation of auditing firms, and fixed-term contracts that prohibit client companies from firing their auditors. Less tangibly, auditors must come to appreciate the profound impact of self-serving biases on their judgment.

Proposed changes by the SEC will reduce the accounting profession's conflicts of interest arising from consulting. But auditors can never be truly independent when they are hired and fired by the companies they audit.