Founded in 2014, SuperMonkey is an innovative gym brand that has disrupted the traditional gym membership model with its "pay-per-session, no annual memberships; professional coaches, no sales pitches" approach. Initially, SuperMonkey offered a unique fitness experience through shipping container gym pods before shifting its focus to group classes. SuperMonkey's gyms are lively group class spaces where clients can follow professional instructors, immersed in dynamic lighting and music. This transforms what could be a solitary and monotonous workout into an energetic and social event. By the end of 2022, SuperMonkey had attracted over 500,000 paying users and had opened or was planning nearly 200 stores in first-tier and emerging cities. However, as market competition intensifies, SuperMonkey faces new challenges, particularly regarding its pace of expansion. HILEFIT, a competitor established around the same time, had expanded to 1,300 locations by 2023. SuperMonkey must now carefully consider whether to maintain the quality of its fitness services to ensure customer satisfaction or accelerate the opening of new stores to capture a larger market share. This dilemma poses a significant test of their strategic decision-making skills.
This case examines a universal question: How can a tech startup (such as an AI or big data startup) address the pain points of traditional vertical industries through technological innovation and create value? Some tech startups set ambitious goals, which demand significant and sustained investments in R&D, but fail to plan for commercial development in order to remain viable: when funding runs out, they go bust. Others aim for low-hanging fruit in more easily accessible markets, at the expense of pursuing their original goal; once engaged on this path, it is extremely difficult to change course and build an iconic name. The issue, then, is how tech startups should strike a balance between "aiming too high" and "taking a faster route." The LinkDoc Technology (hereinafter "LinkDoc") case was compiled as one way to find answers to these questions. The case examines how LinkDoc, specializing in big data and serving the vertical healthcare industry, found its own answers to these issues and, more specifically, how it identified and entered its target market segment, and subsequently found a way to commercialize its technology and create a viable business.
COLIN, a producer of garment care products headquartered in Santa Barbara, California, was working with a large U.S. retailer to produce the Bristol, an innovative garment steamer that the retailer wanted to launch for the 2017 U.S. Thanksgiving season. To meet that deadline, COLIN would have one month less than was typically needed to launch a new product. This launch date left COLIN with limited time for research and development, manufacturing, and marketing. Several managers at COLIN met to discuss the project, including how to choose the suppliers, whether to continue with an original equipment manufacturer model or move to an original design manufacturer model, how to ensure the product could be launched on time, and whether to use any of COLIN'S own core technologies. To make their decision, the managers needed to analyze several complicated issues.
COLIN, a producer of garment care products headquartered in Santa Barbara, California, was working with a large U.S. retailer to produce the Bristol, an innovative garment steamer that the retailer wanted to launch for the 2017 U.S. Thanksgiving season. To meet that deadline, COLIN would have one month less than was typically needed to launch a new product. This launch date left COLIN with limited time for research and development, manufacturing, and marketing. Several managers at COLIN met to discuss the project, including how to choose the suppliers, whether to continue with an original equipment manufacturer model or move to an original design manufacturer model, how to ensure the product could be launched on time, and whether to use any of COLIN’S own core technologies. To make their decision, the managers needed to analyze several complicated issues.
SAPMER SA was a Southern Ocean fishing company started by three Réunion Island entrepreneurs with one ship in 1947. The company grew from an entrepreneurial venture to a corporate acquisition, then back to a beloved family business not expected to make much money. But in 2006, SAPMER SA tested the waters with a new tuna venture. The venture was successful, but the company saw a better long-term opportunity in occupying a niche position. SAPMER SA launched a strategic rebirth with a five-year plan to develop a new segment: super-frozen tuna fishing and processing in the Indian Ocean, addressing premium Asian markets in sashimi, tataki, and tuna loins and steak. SAPMER SA’s strategy resulted in strong performance, but in early 2013, when examining the financial records and the terms for purchasing newly acquired ships, the owner could see challenges ahead. To manage the challenges, the owner needs to know the reason for the improvement in return on equity, what potential problems could be identified from a DuPont analysis of the financials, and what bottlenecks to anticipate in the coming years.
BYD Company Limited (BYD) manufactured rechargeable batteries, mobile phone components, and automobiles. In 2008, the company caught the attention of Warren Buffet’s investment group, and their investment in BYD caused BYD’s share price to increase 917.86 per cent over just a year, setting Chinese investors’ expectations high for BYD’s release of A-shares, planned for June 2011. <br><br>BYD’s 2010 annual report showed that the company’s performance had already taken a dip, but its prospectus was optimistic about the market prospects. The first quarter report for 2011, issued the day before the A-shares were to be released, was not as optimistic. BYD’s A-shares fared well on the first day of release, but the company’s net profits declined remarkably, and reports forecasted further decline. However, the company’s 2011 annual report showed a drop in operating profits of just 49.04 per cent year over year—just slightly less than the 50 per cent decline that would have triggered intervention by the securities regulators. <br><br>Was the company making a remarkable recovery? Were BYD’s A-shares still a sound investment, or had the company “managed” its financial statements to protect itself and its securities underwriters?
BYD Company Limited (BYD) manufactured rechargeable batteries, mobile phone components, and automobiles. In 2008, the company caught the attention of Warren Buffet's investment group, and their investment in BYD caused BYD's share price to increase 917.86 per cent over just a year, setting Chinese investors' expectations high for BYD's release of A-shares, planned for June 2011. BYD's 2010 annual report showed that the company's performance had already taken a dip, but its prospectus was optimistic about the market prospects. The first quarter report for 2011, issued the day before the A-shares were to be released, was not as optimistic. BYD's A-shares fared well on the first day of release, but the company's net profits declined remarkably, and reports forecasted further decline. However, the company's 2011 annual report showed a drop in operating profits of just 49.04 per cent year over year-just slightly less than the 50 per cent decline that would have triggered intervention by the securities regulators. Was the company making a remarkable recovery? Were BYD's A-shares still a sound investment, or had the company "managed" its financial statements to protect itself and its securities underwriters?