What caused the 1997-98 Asia Crisis: Asian nations' poor economic management, international financial contagion, close "crony" relations between local politicians and capitalists? This case examines how the crisis erupted in Thailand and spread in a chain of events that no one-neither Asian financial authorities nor Western economists-had foreseen. The crisis raises questions about how competently financial institutions such as mutual funds managed their global capital investments. It raises questions about how effective the International Monetary Fund's package of reforms was-and to what extent the IMF acted in the interest of Wall Street rather than developing nations. And the crisis raises questions about the development policies of Asian nations: Did too-close "crony" relations between politicians and owners of major banks or firms pave the way for crisis?
Provides a brief introduction to fiscal policy, including the fiscal multiplier. Uses Ireland's experience in the 1980s to explore the possibility that fiscal contractions--tax rises and expenditure costs--can stimulate economic growth (contrary to conventional Keynesian wisdom) via confidence effects and the establishment of a credible framework for fiscal stability over the medium term. A rewritten version of an earlier note.
Provides an opportunity to analyze the Argentine financial crisis of 2001/2002, which culminated in the abandonment of the convertibility plan introduced by Domingo Cavallo in 1991. Focusses on the role of the financial system.
The Swedish Model--sometimes presented as a third way between savage capitalism and unrealistic socialism--was much lauded in the 1960s. It was viewed as a strategy that addressed social concerns while supporting economic growth. However, the financial and currency crisis of the early 1990s threw the model into doubt and prompted much soul searching and reform among Sweden's establishment. The welfare state introduced in Sweden imposed a high tax burden on individuals and business. By the late 1990s, some concerns were emerging that these costs were acting as a deterrent to doing business in Sweden. In an international market for labor and capital, Sweden was a less attractive home for high-flying MBAs or multinational companies than other countries.
The Netherlands suffered economic crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, despite (or perhaps because of) its access to North Sea gas. In response to mounting inflation and unemployment, a tripartite agreement between employers, unions, and government was reached in 1982. This agreement laid the basis for macroeconomic stabilization in the 1980s. At the same time, a variety of structural reforms were introduced--centered on improving the flexibility of the labor market by increasing part-time work. The results appeared impressive: by the mid-1990s, the Netherlands was enjoying strong economic growth and unemployment rates of below 3%, much lower than its large continental European neighbors. However, many observers doubted the sustainability of this so-called "polder model." Low unemployment had been achieved in part by reducing participation rates. Some doubted whether a declining working population could sustain the Dutch standard of living. At the same time, the Netherlands was not a leader in technological development, and others were concerned whether it could compete effectively in the new global information economy.
Describes the economic stabilization program implemented by the Bolivian government in 1985 to 1986 and its impact on the development process in Bolivia.
The German economy has long been seen as the locomotive of European (and, on occasion, global) growth. Germany appeared to weather the stagflation of the 1970s more successfully than many other economies, and reunification in 1990 appeared to present opportunities for further growth. However, by the time Gerhard Schroeder was elected chancellor in 1998, many saw Germany as the new "sick man of Europe"--a title assigned to Britain during the 1970s. Burdened by the unanticipated high costs of integrating the former East Germany into the Federal Republic and choked by labor market regulations and dormant financial markets, German business was no longer seen as a world-beater. In this context, many argued for fundamental reform of German institutions, although many of these institutions seemed to have served Germany well during most of the post-World War II period.
Describes the evolution of the Mexican economy and its relation to the international capital markets in the period leading up to the Peso crisis of December 1994. Emphasizes the role of "Washington consensus" policies in stimulating the inflows and the inability of the Mexican banking system to intermediate them efficiently.
Discusses the macroeconomic and political situation in the United Kingdom from the end of World War II through 2001. Focuses on the interactions among macroeconomic performance, labor relations, the corporate governance system, and social services. In particular, compares and contrasts the policies (and their implications) adopted by successive government administrations, from the postwar Clement Attlee Labour government to the administration of Conservative Margaret Thatcher and finally to Tony Blair and "New Labour."
Describes the development of Argentina's financial system after the "Tequila Crisis" that came about as a result of the speculative attack on the Mexican peso's peg to the U.S. dollar in December 1994. Although Argentina's banking system was strengthened overall due to changes implemented to address the crisis, most of the country's domestic private banks were either taken over by foreign banks or failed. Focuses on how in the year 2000, in an effort to remain Argentine owned, the last remaining large domestic private bank adopts a share offer considered by some--particularly a vocal member of one of the bank's controlling families--to be unfair to minority shareholders.
Presents four views of U.S. macroeconomic developments in the late 1990s: an HBS professor, the Federal Reserve, the Clinton administration, and President George W. Bush. Develops the implications of the new economy--technological and organizational change--for business and discusses the important issues for the conduct of macroeconomic policy that these phenomena raise.
Describes, in detail, events precipitating crises. Provides both conventional and new explanations of crises. Presents a chronology of crises as the events unfold, and a brief summary of four particular countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand) and their perspective development strategies (18 presented).
Under the direction of President Museveni, much of the world has heaped praise on Uganda for transforming its economy from devastation to growth and managing the ethnic and racial strife that has divided the country in the past. Following a decade of reforms, Uganda is finally reaping some of the benefits brought by economic austerity. Indeed, Uganda presents a textbook case of IMF structural adjustment. President Museveni must now decide the best way in which to govern his country into the next century. Chief challenges include: how to diversify the export base and attract foreign investment; how to manage the burden imposed by external debt; and how to distribute scarce resources (balancing competing demands for investment in human capital, spending on social and economic infrastructure and health services, along with a whole host of other demands).
Describes the evolution of the Mexican economy and its relation with the international capital markets in the period leading up to the Peso crisis of December 1994. Emphasizes the role of "Washington consensus" policies in stimulating the inflows, and the inability of the Mexican banking system to intermediate them efficiently.
Describes the response of the Mexican authorities and the international community to the Mexican Peso crisis of 1994 and the banking, financial, and macroeconomic crisis that followed it.
Describes the evolution of the Mexican economy from 1945 to 1982. Describes the import-substituting industrialization strategy pursued in the aftermath of World War II. Discusses briefly why this failed in the late 1960s and then analyzes the change of strategy toward a state-led development financed by bank-borrowing from abroad that culminated in the debt crisis. A rewritten version of an earlier case.
Describes the response of the Mexican authorities and the international community to the "Third World Debt Crisis" that came to the forefront of global economic concerns in the early 1980s. Focuses on the respective roles of the private sector, governments (Mexican and foreign), and the international community in addressing the crisis.
Provides a brief overview of international bank lending to developing countries in the 1970s and its culmination in the Third-World debt crisis after 1982.
Presents some data showing the magnitude, direction, and composition of capital flows to less developed countries (the so-called emerging markets) in the period 1990-1995. Some potential explanations for these flows are discussed. A number of policy responses to the scale of the flows are offered.