Jim Hargrove, the marketing director of $820 million Neptune Gourmet Seafood, is having a bad week. Neptune is the most upmarket player in the $20 billion industry, and the company is doing everything it can to preserve its premium image among customers. But Neptune's recent investment in state-of-the-art freezer trawlers, along with new fishing regulations, is resulting in catches that are bigger than ever. Though demand is at an all-time high, the company is saddled with excess inventory--and there's no relief in sight. Neptune's sales head, Rita Sanchez, has come up with two strategies that Hargrove feels would destroy the company's premium image: cut prices or launch a new mass-market brand. Not many executives in the company are in favor of cutting prices, but it's clear that Sanchez is gaining ground in her bid to launch a low-priced brand. Reputation worries aside, Hargrove fears that an inexpensive brand would cannibalize the company's premium line and antagonize the powerful association of seafood processors. How can he get others to see the danger, too? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0504A and R0504Z are Dan Schulman, the CEO of Virgin Mobile USA, a wireless voice and data services provider; Dipak C. Jain, a professor of marketing and the dean of the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University; Oscar de la Renta, chairman, and Alexander L. Bolen, CEO, of Oscar de la Renta Ltd., the New York-based luxury goods manufacturer; and Thomas T. Nagle, the chairman of the Strategic Pricing Group, a Massachusetts-based management consultancy that specializes in pricing.

Jim Hargrove, the marketing director of $820 million Neptune Gourmet Seafood, is having a bad week. Neptune is the most upmarket player in the $20 billion industry, and the company is doing everything it can to preserve its premium image among customers. But Neptune's recent investment in state-of-the-art freezer trawlers, along with new fishing regulations, is resulting in catches that are bigger than ever. Though demand is at an all-time high, the company is saddled with excess inventory--and there's no relief in sight. Neptune's sales head, Rita Sanchez, has come up with two strategies that Hargrove feels would destroy the company's premium image: cut prices or launch a new mass-market brand. Not many executives in the company are in favor of cutting prices, but it's clear that Sanchez is gaining ground in her bid to launch a low-priced brand. Reputation worries aside, Hargrove fears that an inexpensive brand would cannibalize the company's premium line and antagonize the powerful association of seafood processors. How can he get others to see the danger, too? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0504A and R0504Z are Dan Schulman, the CEO of Virgin Mobile USA, a wireless voice and data services provider; Dipak C. Jain, a professor of marketing and the dean of the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University; Oscar de la Renta, chairman, and Alexander L. Bolen, CEO, of Oscar de la Renta Ltd., the New York-based luxury goods manufacturer; and Thomas T. Nagle, the chairman of the Strategic Pricing Group, a Massachusetts-based management consultancy that specializes in pricing.

Jim Hargrove, the marketing director of $820 million Neptune Gourmet Seafood, is having a bad week. Neptune is the most upmarket player in the $20 billion industry, and the company is doing everything it can to preserve its premium image among customers. But Neptune's recent investment in state-of-the-art freezer trawlers, along with new fishing regulations, is resulting in catches that are bigger than ever. Though demand is at an all-time high, the company is saddled with excess inventory--and there's no relief in sight. Neptune's sales head, Rita Sanchez, has come up with two strategies that Hargrove feels would destroy the company's premium image: cut prices or launch a new mass-market brand. Not many executives in the company are in favor of cutting prices, but it's clear that Sanchez is gaining ground in her bid to launch a low-priced brand. Reputation worries aside, Hargrove fears that an inexpensive brand would cannibalize the company's premium line and antagonize the powerful association of seafood processors. How can he get others to see the danger, too? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0504A and R0504Z are Dan Schulman, the CEO of Virgin Mobile USA, a wireless voice and data services provider; Dipak C. Jain, a professor of marketing and the dean of the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University; Oscar de la Renta, chairman, and Alexander L. Bolen, CEO, of Oscar de la Renta Ltd., the New York-based luxury goods manufacturer; and Thomas T. Nagle, the chairman of the Strategic Pricing Group, a Massachusetts-based management consultancy that specializes in pricing.

Karen Barton, Zendal Pharmaceuticals' senior vice-president of human resources, was livid when COO Dave Palmer slashed her executive education budget by 75%. Without funding, there could be no in-house leadership development program, which was to be the first step toward a full-blown Zendal University. Palmer was not against bold initiatives, but sales were down 26%, and there was that $300 million debt Zendal took on when it acquired Premier Pharmaceuticals. As a result, Barton's budget wasn't the only one being cut. Palmer added that it wasn't clear what the return on investment of her proposed program--or any of her current ones for that matter--would be. Barton's analysis had been woefully short on quantitative benefits. Figuring ROI for people isn't the same as calculating the payback from a machine, Barton complained to friend and ally Carlos Freitas, head of the medical devices division. But Freitas disagreed: "If you want dollars, you have to show how you fit in with [management's] plans. You must be willing to fight for resources with the rest of us." She knew Freitas was right. She needed to make the case that doubling her budget was a smart move even in tough times. The question was, How? In R0305A and R0305Z, four commentators--Susan Burnett, an HR executive at Hewlett-Packard; Mike Morrison, dean of the University of Toyota; Noel M. Tichy, professor at the University of Michigan Business School; and David Owens, vice-president of Bausch & Lomb's corporate university--offer advice in this fictional case study.

Karen Barton, Zendal Pharmaceuticals' senior vice-president of human resources, was livid when COO Dave Palmer slashed her executive education budget by 75%. Without funding, there could be no in-house leadership development program, which was to be the first step toward a full-blown Zendal University. Palmer was not against bold initiatives, but sales were down 26%, and there was that $300 million debt Zendal took on when it acquired Premier Pharmaceuticals. As a result, Barton's budget wasn't the only one being cut. Palmer added that it wasn't clear what the return on investment of her proposed program--or any of her current ones for that matter--would be. Barton's analysis had been woefully short on quantitative benefits. Figuring ROI for people isn't the same as calculating the payback from a machine, Barton complained to friend and ally Carlos Freitas, head of the medical devices division. But Freitas disagreed: "If you want dollars, you have to show how you fit in with [management's] plans. You must be willing to fight for resources with the rest of us." She knew Freitas was right. She needed to make the case that doubling her budget was a smart move even in tough times. The question was, How? In R0305A and R0305Z, four commentators--Susan Burnett, an HR executive at Hewlett-Packard; Mike Morrison, dean of the University of Toyota; Noel M. Tichy, professor at the University of Michigan Business School; and David Owens, vice-president of Bausch & Lomb's corporate university--offer advice on this fictional case study.

Karen Barton, Zendal Pharmaceuticals' senior vice-president of human resources, was livid when COO Dave Palmer slashed her executive education budget by 75%. Without funding, there could be no in-house leadership development program, which was to be the first step toward a full-blown Zendal University. Palmer was not against bold initiatives, but sales were down 26%, and there was that $300 million debt Zendal took on when it acquired Premier Pharmaceuticals. As a result, Barton's budget wasn't the only one being cut. Palmer added that it wasn't clear what the return on investment of her proposed program--or any of her current ones for that matter--would be. Barton's analysis had been woefully short on quantitative benefits. Figuring ROI for people isn't the same as calculating the payback from a machine, Barton complained to friend and ally Carlos Freitas, head of the medical devices division. But Freitas disagreed: "If you want dollars, you have to show how you fit in with [management's] plans. You must be willing to fight for resources with the rest of us." She knew Freitas was right. She needed to make the case that doubling her budget was a smart move even in tough times. The question was, How? In R0305A and R0305Z, four commentators--Susan Burnett, an HR executive at Hewlett-Packard; Mike Morrison, dean of the University of Toyota; Noel M. Tichy, professor at the University of Michigan Business School; and David Owens, vice-president of Bausch & Lomb's corporate university--offer advice on this fictional case study.

Jared Gordan, the president of the Industrial Products Division for Compunext, is a first-rate manager. In just three years, he's turned around a flagging division and increased sales and profits by 50%--a dramatic shift from five years earlier, when analysts were suggesting that the company sell the division. But that's not all. In addition to being a turnaround expert, Jared has shown a special aptitude for recruiting and developing talent. Many executives have noticed this faculty, and--unfortunately for Jared--those running Compunext's biggest, most glamorous divisions are poaching his best managers. In fact, Industrial Products has just been raided for the tenth time in two years, and Jared is spitting mad. This time, the Telecommunications Division has wooed--and won--Stan Simpson, Industrial Products' VP of sales. Jared, right or wrong, confronts Hank Dodge, president of Telecommunications, for not coming to him before offering Stan the job. Still furious, Jared then meets with Sue Patel, Compunext's VP of human resources, to discuss what can be done to avoid future raids. Does Jared have good reason to be angry? What lies at the root of the problem, and how can Jared solve it? In R0203A and R0203Z, Peter Browning, Frank Morgan, Hubert Saint-Onge, and Charles H. King weigh in on this fictional case study.

Jared Gordan, the president of the Industrial Products Division for Compunext, is a first-rate manager. In just three years, he's turned around a flagging division and increased sales and profits by 50%--a dramatic shift from five years earlier, when analysts were suggesting that the company sell the division. But that's not all. In addition to being a turnaround expert, Jared has shown a special aptitude for recruiting and developing talent. Many executives have noticed this faculty, and--unfortunately for Jared--those running Compunext's biggest, most glamorous divisions are poaching his best managers. In fact, Industrial Products has just been raided for the tenth time in two years, and Jared is spitting mad. This time, the Telecommunications Division has wooed--and won--Stan Simpson, Industrial Products' VP of sales. Jared, right or wrong, confronts Hank Dodge, president of Telecommunications, for not coming to him before offering Stan the job. Still furious, Jared then meets with Sue Patel, Compunext's VP of human resources, to discuss what can be done to avoid future raids. Does Jared have good reason to be angry? What lies at the root of the problem, and how can Jared solve it? In R0203A and R0203Z, Peter Browning, Frank Morgan, Hubert Saint-Onge, and Charles H. King weigh in on this fictional case study.

Jared Gordan, the president of the Industrial Products Division for Compunext, is a first-rate manager. In just three years, he's turned around a flagging division and increased sales and profits by 50%--a dramatic shift from five years earlier, when analysts were suggesting that the company sell the division. But that's not all. In addition to being a turnaround expert, Jared has shown a special aptitude for recruiting and developing talent. Many executives have noticed this faculty, and--unfortunately for Jared--those running Compunext's biggest, most glamorous divisions are poaching his best managers. In fact, Industrial Products has just been raided for the tenth time in two years, and Jared is spitting mad. This time, the Telecommunications Division has wooed--and won--Stan Simpson, Industrial Products' VP of sales. Jared, right or wrong, confronts Hank Dodge, president of Telecommunications, for not coming to him before offering Stan the job. Still furious, Jared then meets with Sue Patel, Compunext's VP of human resources, to discuss what can be done to avoid future raids. Does Jared have good reason to be angry? What lies at the root of the problem, and how can Jared solve it? In R0203A and R0203X, Peter Browning, Frank Morgan, Hubert Saint-Onge, and Charles H. King weigh in on this fictional case study.

This fictitious case study by Idalene F. Kesner, the Frank P. Popoff Professor at Indiana University, and Sally Fowler, assistant professor at Victoria University, explores the issues that arise when the wires get crossed between a team of consultants and their key client. The client is the CEO of a newly-merged company; the consultants have been hired to help knit together the two former companies' policies and cultures. Unfortunately, the client's impression of the current status of the new company and the consultants' assessment of the situation facing them are vastly different. In 97605 and 97605Z, John Rau, Charles Fombrum, Robert H. Schaffer, and David H. Maister advise the consultants and the client about their options, offer their perspectives on what makes a good client/consultant relationship, and discuss the difficulties that face newly merged companies.

This fictitious case study by Idalene F. Kesner, the Frank P. Popoff Professor at Indiana University, and Sally Fowler, assistant professor at Victoria University, explores the issues that arise when the wires get crossed between a team of consultants and their key client. The client is the CEO of a newly-merged company; the consultants have been hired to help knit together the two former companies' policies and cultures. Unfortunately, the client's impression of the current status of the new company and the consultants' assessment of the situation facing them are vastly different. In 97605 and 97605Z, John Rau, Charles Fombrum, Robert H. Schaffer, and David H. Maister advise the consultants and the client about their options, offer their perspectives on what makes a good client/consultant relationship, and discuss the difficulties that face newly merged companies.

This fictitious case study by Idalene F. Kesner, the Frank P. Popoff Professor at Indiana University, and Sally Fowler, assistant professor at Victoria University, explores the issues that arise when the wires get crossed between a team of consultants and their key client. The client is the CEO of a newly-merged company; the consultants have been hired to help knit together the two former companies' policies and cultures. Unfortunately, the client's impression of the current status of the new company and the consultants' assessment of the situation facing them are vastly different. In 97605 and 97605Z, John Rau, Charles Fombrum, Robert H. Schaffer, and David H. Maister advise the consultants and the client about their options, offer their perspectives on what makes a good client/consultant relationship, and discuss the difficulties that face newly merged companies.

The news that one of the company's senior managers is leaving comes as a complete surprise to Paul Simmonds, CEO of Kinsington Textiles, Inc. (KTI). Ned Carpenter, KTI's vice president of operations for three years, writes in his resignation letter that he is leaving for a better opportunity. Simmonds soon learns that Carpenter's new job is at Daltex, one of KTI's main rivals in the intensely competitive carpet industry. In this fictitious case study, Simmonds, along with the company's counsel and vice president of human resources, must figure out how much and what sort of damage control they need. Five experts offer advice about communicating with KTI's employees, the media, and Carpenter himself, and about protecting the company's confidential information. In 97111 and 97111Z, Kenneth L. Coleman, Stephen A. Greyser, Hal Burlingame, Rob Galford, and Gregory S. Rubin offer advice about communicating with KTI's employees, the media, and Carpenter himself, and about protecting the company's confidential information.

The news that one of the company's senior managers is leaving comes as a complete surprise to Paul Simmonds, CEO of Kinsington Textiles, Inc. (KTI). Ned Carpenter, KTI's vice president of operations for three years, writes in his resignation letter that he is leaving for a better opportunity. Simmonds soon learns that Carpenter's new job is at Daltex, one of KTI's main rivals in the intensely competitive carpet industry. In this fictitious case study, Simmonds, along with the company's counsel and vice president of human resources, must figure out how much and what sort of damage control they need. In 97111 and 97111Z, Kenneth L. Coleman, Stephen A. Greyser, Hal Burlingame, Rob Galford, and Gregory S. Rubin offer advice about communicating with KTI's employees, the media, and Carpenter himself, and about protecting the company's confidential information.

The news that one of the company's senior managers is leaving comes as a complete surprise to Paul Simmonds, CEO of Kinsington Textiles, Inc. (KTI). Ned Carpenter, KTI's vice president of operations for three years, writes in his resignation letter that he is leaving for a better opportunity. Simmonds soon learns that Carpenter's new job is at Daltex, one of KTI's main rivals in the intensely competitive carpet industry. In this fictitious case study, Simmonds, along with the company's counsel and vice president of human resources, must figure out how much and what sort of damage control they need. In 97111 and 97111Z, Kenneth L. Coleman, Stephen A. Greyser, Hal Burlingame, Rob Galford, and Gregory S. Rubin offer advice about communicating with KTI's employees, the media, and Carpenter himself, and about protecting the company's confidential information.

Many academics and public relations specialists have suggested that, when responding to crises, executives should make full and immediate disclosures about the circumstances surrounding the event. Corporate legal advisors, on the other hand, often caution their clients against unnecessary public statements. This article examines the pros and cons of a full disclosure policy and the circumstances in which it should or should not be used. In some instances, what you don't say can hurt you. For example, nondisclosure might lead journalists--hard pressed by deadlines--to seek other sources, many of which might have a vested interest in making the company appear in the worst light. But in other situations, what you do say can hurt you. Cases are cited in which organizations revealed information that shocked constituents, and such news became a separate and more damaging crisis in itself. The point is, we have scant knowledge about firms that managed crises successfully by withholding information; we see only those cases in which crises were played out in the media, so we have a distorted view of how crises should be handled. Disclosure is rarely an all-or-nothing choice; the decision-maker's goal should be that of finding the appropriate amount and pace of reporting to the public.