Chinese Galanz was the world's largest microwave oven manufacturer in 2013. It had sales of 20 million microwave ovens, group revenues of RMB46 billion (US$7.3 billion) and 46,000 employees. Founded in 1978, it started manufacturing microwaves in 1991. Since then it had grown its business rapidly; in the early 2000s, Galanz had become the largest microwave manufacturer in the global market in terms of units, a position it continued to hold in 2013. In addition, it had become the top seller of electric ovens in the world, and established significant presence in the air conditioning (AC), refrigerator, and dishwasher categories. The case outlines Galanz's impressive achievements in just two decades, describing the reasons for its success: the unique market conditions on both supply and demand side, Galanz's successful OEM model and pricing strategy, and its ability to transform the industry dynamics in the process. However, with increasing pressure of competitive threats, it could no longer rely on its business model to ensure continued growth and profitability. Galanz decided that it needed to move beyond its OEM business to become a consumer brand. The case investigates the way that Galanz is seeking to do this, investing in R&D to stimulate product innovation and changing the organisational design to get closer to its customers. It then looks at Galanz's efforts to diversify into other categories. It also explores some of the global market dynamics at play in various white goods industries.

Despite the rising power of developing economies, few corporations from emerging markets have succeeded in establishing brands in the West. The problem isn't just that they're late to enter the global market; the perception is that they offer poor-quality products, not next-generation ones. Conventional wisdom holds that they'll have to spend huge sums to overcome these obstacles. But some emerging giants, such as the Indian bank ICICI and the maker of the Mexican beer Tecate, are figuring out ways to build global brands on a shoestring. They are learning to outsmart, rather than outspend, their multinational rivals. One powerful strategy they're using: targeting the emigrants who have left their homelands. Regional concentrations of these individuals can provide excellent springboards into developed markets. The key is to target the right segments of emigrants, say the authors. Assimilators, who quickly try to adopt the customs and practices of their new country, are not likely to purchase products made in their homeland. Neither are marginals, who lack economic and educational opportunities and buy mostly functional, affordable products. But two other categories of immigrants hold promise: ethnic affirmers, who cling fervently to their homeland identity, and biculturals, who tend to be affluent and well-educated and move easily back and forth between their home and host countries' cultures. Biculturals are especially attractive; because they're integrated into their local communities, they can influence other consumers and make good conduits to the general population of their host countries.

This case traces the rise of Chinese piano maker Pearl River Piano (PRP) from a factory with dirt floors producing just four pianos a month using crude machinery to the world's largest acoustic piano maker in 2012. PRP's success is compelling: it accounted for over 20 percent of the global piano market by unit volume, with 14 percent growth despite tough industry conditions in 2012. In addition to dominating its domestic market (28 percent market share in China), it exported its pianos to more than 100 countries and regions worldwide. The journey was an extraordinary one: PRP was able to overcome major quality issues in order to carve out market share in a mature industry with huge entry barriers, and dominated by established Western and Japanese players. How did PRP earn the trust of consumers purchasing a fine, expensive, musical instrument for their home? How was PRP able to successfully compete on quality with companies that had been making pianos for centuries, while also building the marketing and leadership expertise needed to grow a global piano brand?

"Aldi" is a word that strikes fear in the hearts of brand managers across Europe. A chain of low-budget retail stores with sales of $73.5 billion in 2008, Aldi invented what is commonly referred to as the hard-discount store, a format that is destroying between a quarter and a half trillion dollars in brand sales annually. Brand executives at major consumer packaged goods companies have mostly been caught off guard by this success. The authors' research identified four key misconceptions that explain why: (1) Hard discounters can succeed only in Europe; (2) they attract only the poor; (3) they offer inferior quality; (4) their success is a recessionary phenomenon. Aldi, Lidl, and other hard discounters keep costs low in part by restricting as much as 90% of their stock to their own private labels. But, as they are beginning to realize, that practice can gain only so much market share. A judicious mix of store labels and manufacturers' brands will win new customers for both. And brand manufacturers that fear sales cannibalization can take several proactive steps: sell unfamiliar sizes at the discounters, offer brands with a small market share, carefully manage the price gap, make shipping boxes attractive, and keep their brands dynamic.