This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Just a few decades ago, organizations could stay the course with one strategy for a period of years. The idea that a new vision would be needed, perhaps with some frequency, would have been treated with mild amusement, if not outright derision. But competitive realities have forced executives to rethink what their companies are doing, and how they are doing it, over time. Automakers see profitability and market share evaporating. Media companies face the hostile world of disruptive technology. Financial institutions discover that a one-country focus is a path to extinction. In such conditions, bold visions are called for -- and will be called for again, probably sooner than any executive would like. The problem is the gap between inspiration and implementation. CEOs often get off to a rousing start, energizing top managers by presenting a bold new vision at a lavish off-site meeting. The excitement, however, often dies down within a few months, and the vision blurs into an indistinct image. Eventually, it fades from sight completely, and the organization returns to its previous ways. To find out why this gap between inspiration and implementation is so common, the authors conducted research on about 40 global companies. In this article, they explain several common reasons for the derailment of bold visions such as failure to focus, failure to engage the workforce and neglecting the skills and talents of the organization. They go on to offer a five-stage framework that executives can use to ensure that their visions become more than just pipe dreams. Examples of companies that have successfully followed this path -- including Deutsche Bank, the BBC, Nissan, Mattel and Starbucks -- are drawn on both to illustrate the challenges and to provide guidance to those who want to turn bold visions into reality.
Despite the great sums of money companies dedicate to talent management systems, many still struggle to fill key positions--limiting their potential for growth in the process. Virtually all the human resource executives in the authors' 2005 survey of 40 companies around the world said that their pipeline of high-potential employees was insufficient to fill strategic management roles. The survey revealed two primary reasons for this. First, the formal procedures for identifying and developing next-generation leaders have fallen out of sync with what companies need to grow or expand into new markets. To save money, for example, some firms have eliminated positions that would expose high-potential employees to a broad range of problems, thus sacrificing future development opportunities that would far outweigh any initial savings from the job cuts. Second, HR executives often have trouble keeping top leaders' attention on talent issues, despite those leaders' vigorous assertions that obtaining and keeping the best people is a major priority. If passion for that objective doesn't start at the top and infuse the culture, say the authors, talent management can easily deteriorate into the management of bureaucratic routines. Yet there are companies that can face the future with confidence. These firms don't just manage talent, they build talent factories. The authors describe the experiences of two such corporations--consumer products icon Procter & Gamble and financial services giant HSBC Group--that figured out how to develop and retain key employees and fill positions quickly to meet evolving business needs. Though each company approached talent management from a different direction, they both maintained a twin focus on functionality (rigorous talent processes that support strategic and cultural objectives) and vitality (management's emotional commitment, which is reflected in daily actions).
Edward Bennett has done wonders at Astar Enterprises. In the 15 years he's been CEO, the company has more than tripled in size through product line extension and disciplined acquisitions and is now distributing its cleaning, personal hygiene, and skin care products nationwide. But Astar's chief executive is 64 years old, and while all his attention is taken up with a new strategy to expand into international markets, board members are becoming increasingly worried about the issue of succession. Bennett wants none of it, arguing that if he were to die suddenly, his second in command, Tom Terrell, could take over. Besides, after much prodding, Bennett, former vice-chairman Vincent Dalton, and longtime HR head Gail Thompson have already come up with a list of four possibilities. "When will these guys back off?" Bennett complains to Thompson. "I've told them who the candidates are. Why do we need to talk about it?" Thompson knows, however, that the board chairman, Tom Calloway, considers Terrell a nonstarter without the requisite skills to take over in anything more than an interim capacity. As for the other three candidates, only one is even known to the board, and none has any significant international experience. Calloway is well aware of how critical Bennett is to Astar. But he's equally certain that the board risks failing in its fiduciary responsibilities if it doesn't create a viable succession plan. What should Calloway and the board do if Bennett refuses to cooperate? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0609A and R0609Z are John W. Rowe, the executive chairman of Aetna; Edward Reilly, the president and CEO of the American Management Association; Jay A. Conger, a professor at Claremont McKenna College and London Business School; Douglas A. Ready, a visiting professor at London Business School; and Michael Jordan, the CEO of EDS.
Edward Bennett has done wonders at Astar Enterprises. In the 15 years he's been CEO, the company has more than tripled in size through product line extension and disciplined acquisitions and is now distributing its cleaning, personal hygiene, and skin care products nationwide. But Astar's chief executive is 64 years old, and while all his attention is taken up with a new strategy to expand into international markets, board members are becoming increasingly worried about the issue of succession. Bennett wants none of it, arguing that if he were to die suddenly, his second in command, Tom Terrell, could take over. Besides, after much prodding, Bennett, former vice-chairman Vincent Dalton, and longtime HR head Gail Thompson have already come up with a list of four possibilities. "When will these guys back off?" Bennett complains to Thompson. "I've told them who the candidates are. Why do we need to talk about it?" Thompson knows, however, that the board chairman, Tom Calloway, considers Terrell a nonstarter without the requisite skills to take over in anything more than an interim capacity. As for the other three candidates, only one is even known to the board, and none has any significant international experience. Calloway is well aware of how critical Bennett is to Astar. But he's equally certain that the board risks failing in its fiduciary responsibilities if it doesn't create a viable succession plan. What should Calloway and the board do if Bennett refuses to cooperate? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0609A and R0609Z are John W. Rowe, the executive chairman of Aetna; Edward Reilly, the president and CEO of the American Management Association; Jay A. Conger, a professor at Claremont McKenna College and London Business School; Douglas A. Ready, a visiting professor at London Business School; and Michael Jordan, the CEO of EDS.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. In recent years, leaders at such high-profile companies as Xerox, Procter & Gamble, Lucent, Coca-Cola, and Mattel have flamed out early in their tenures. Why did such promising and previously successful individuals fail so quickly in the CEO role? And why is such failure happening today with relatively high frequency? The individuals in charge bear some of the responsibility, of course. But the authors' research also uncovers other major forces at play. First is the impact of the predecessor CEO's actions on his or her successor's performance. Although outgoing CEOs do not intend to contribute to the failure of their successors, their personal needs and actions can lay the groundwork for derailment. A second force is often the succession process itself. The outgoing CEO may be responsible, having failed to prepare a successor adequately; and the board is also often guilty of lack of oversight. Third, new CEOs often have narrow expertise and are unable to set a proper context as leaders. The authors explore these issues and offer advice to outgoing CEOs, directors, and incoming leaders that may help them avoid the troubles that some companies have faced in making a leadership transition.
Why do so many newly minted leaders fail so spectacularly? Part of the problem is that in many companies, succession planning is little more than creating a list of high-potential employees and the slots they might fill. It's a mechanical process that's too narrow and hidebound to uncover and correct skill gaps that can derail promising young executives. And it's completely divorced from organizational efforts to transform managers into leaders. Some companies, however, do succeed in building a steady, reliable pipeline of leadership talent by marrying succession planning with leadership development. Eli Lilly, Dow Chemical, Bank of America, and Sonoco Products have created long-term processes for managing the talent roster throughout their organizations--a process Conger and Fulmer call succession management. Drawing on the experiences of these best-practice organizations, the authors outline five rules for establishing a healthy succession management system: Focus on opportunities for development, identify linchpin positions, make the system transparent, measure progress regularly, and be flexible.
This article defines and explains the four essential elements of persuasion. Business today is largely run by teams and populated by authority-averse baby boomers and Generation Xers. That makes persuasion more important than ever as a managerial tool. But contrary to popular belief, author Jay Conger (director of the University of Southern California's Marshall Business School's Leadership Institute) asserts, persuasion is not the same as selling an idea or convincing opponents to see things your way. It is instead a process of learning from others and negotiating a shared solution. To that end, persuasion consists of these essential elements: establishing credibility, framing to find common ground, providing vivid evidence, and connecting emotionally. Credibility grows, the author says, out of two sources: expertise and relationships. The former is a function of product or process knowledge and the latter a history of listening to and working in the best interest of others. But even if a persuader's credibility is high, his position must make sense--even more, it must appeal--to the audience. Therefore, a persuader must frame his position to illuminate its benefits to everyone who will feel its impact. Persuasion then becomes a matter of presenting evidence--but not just ordinary charts and spreadsheets. The author says the most effective persuaders use vivid--even over-the-top--stories, metaphors, and examples to make their positions come alive. Finally, good persuaders have the ability to accurately sense and respond to their audience's emotional state. Sometimes, that means they have to suppress their own emotions; at other times, they must intensify them. Persuasion can be a force for enormous good in an organization, but people must understand it for what it is: an often painstaking process that requires insight, planning, and compromise.
Rare is the company that does not periodically review the performance of its staff, business units, and suppliers. But rare, as well, is the company that does such a review of one of its most important contributors--its board of directors. Done properly, appraisals can help boards become more effective by clarifying individual and collective responsibilities. They can help improve the working relationship between a company's board and its senior management. They can help ensure a healthy balance of power between the board and the CEO. And, once in place, an appraisal process is difficult to dismantle, making it harder for a new CEO to dominate a board or avoid being held accountable for poor performance. The authors, Jay Conger, David Finegold, and Edward E. Lawler, III, all of the Leadership Institute at the University of Southern California's School of Business Administration in Los Angeles, have drawn on the strengths of several different approaches to synthesize a best-practice process that is both rigorous and comprehensive.
Describes the events surrounding Bain & Co.'s financial and organizational struggles between 1988 and 1991. Focuses on the role of Orit Gadiesh, then vice chairman of Bain & Co., in leading the effort to restructure the company and restore company pride.