Established in 2007, by early 2014 SoundCloud already boasted the second largest number of active music listeners among all streaming services and was recognized as the go-to platform for new artists. Yet, its founders Alexander Ljung and Eric Wahlforss were questioning whether the firm should continue to focus on serving as a lab for emerging musical artists. They were wondering if the firm should instead enter the booming mainstream music-streaming market.
This case follows Enfoca, Peru's largest local private equity firm and its portfolio company Maestro, a leading player in Peru's hardware retail market. Peru's GDP growth between 2008 and 2014 was the highest of any Latin American country. Growth of Peruvian middle class led to a wide array of investment opportunities, particularly in industries such as housing, construction, and home improvement. While the post-recession years were very good for Maestro, due to the market's small size, Enfoca could not escape some of the longstanding specificities of the Peruvian private capital market, namely, limited exit and new investment opportunities. As Enfoca faced an aging fund, its leadership team began considering alternatives to the traditional private equity fund model. This case presents an example of a local private equity firm operating in a small emerging market with relatively low market capitalization. It also evaluates the costs and benefits of the traditional finite-life fund structure and introduces the concept of a secondary transaction as a means to transition fund shares between existing and new limited partners while maintaining the original fund investments.
Julie Rice and Elizabeth Cutler founded SoulCycle, an indoor cycling studio chain, in 2006 as more than a health club; they wanted it to become a lifestyle brand that would "empower riders in an immersive fitness experience." By early 2015, SoulCycle had grown to 38 studios in seven metropolitan areas. In March 2015, Equinox, a luxury fitness company that had financed SoulCycle's expansion in 2011, approached the co-founders with an offer to buy them out for $90 million each. It was an attractive offer but it would also likely circumscribe their responsibilities. Rice and Cutler had to decide whether to accept the Equinox offer as a prelude to smaller roles at the firm (even potential exit), or continue investing time, energy, and financial resources in growing the business.
This case focuses on the Blackstone credit arm, GSO Capital as it evaluated a proposal for an equity investment into the distressed company, Crosstex Energy L.P., an integrated midstream energy company, that was hit hard by declining natural gas prices during the 2008 global financial crisis. At the time, Crosstex was burdened by significant bank debt in the form of a secured revolving credit line. After some initial restructuring, Crosstex was forced to stop quarterly dividend payments as part of a new covenant structure. In order to resume dividend payments, Crosstex needed to reduce its leverage ratio in accordance with its existing covenants. As part of the steps undertaken toward recovery, Crosstex management decided to find a preferred equity investor, ahead of a larger plan to raise up to $700 million in market debt. This case provides a setting for discussing a so-called "rescue financing" transaction which is a strategy within "direct lending" segment of the private debt space. It can also be used as a vehicle for discussing three core debt alternatives: (i) bank debt; (ii) public bonds, and (iii) private debt
In 2005, Berkshire Partners, a Boston-based private equity firm specializing in growth equity, was one year into their ownership of Amscan, the market leader of designed, manufactured, and distributed decorated party goods and accessories. However, Amscan's primary customer, party retail store Party City, was making aggressive moves to backwards integrate and cut into Amscan's profit pool. Even if Party City failed at its attempt, it could cause significant damage to the business, and subsequently hurt Amscan's top line. The Berkshire team needed to figure out a path forward. Should they try to invest in or buy Party City to thwart efforts that would potentially erode both businesses? If they did, should Party City remain a standalone company or should it be merged with Amscan? Would Party City even come to the negotiating table? These questions, plus additional complications with investments from overlapping funds left the Berkshire team in a difficult situation.