In December 2019, Scoot, the low-cost carrier (LCC) launched by Singapore Airlines Limited in 2011, had successfully established itself in the Asian market, having flown over 65 million passengers to 68 destinations with a fleet of 48 aircraft. Scoot accounted for 14 percent of seat capacity in Singapore, and 43 percent of LCC capacity out of the country. In 2016, SIA fully acquired and integrated the local LCC Tigerair into Scoot. Scoot's growth, along with the integration of Tigerair, enabled SIA to compete for price-sensitive leisure travelers on short- and medium-haul routes, particularly within Asia, and premium passengers on medium- and long-haul routes. Scoot had been essential to building network connectivity within Asia and allowing SIA to compete effectively with competitors entering the market. Reflecting on Scoot's evolution from 2011 to 2019, Goh Choon Phong, CEO of Singapore Airlines Limited felt that the SIA Group had succeeded in fulfilling its strategic intent of being invested and a market leader in both the full-service and low-cost markets. He contemplated the opportunities and challenges ahead for SIA. Because Scoot operated many places where the full-service airline did not fly, Goh thought that SIA could gain tremendously by making connections between flights by Singapore Airlines, Scoot, and SilkAir-the airline's short-to-medium haul premium subsidiary-as seamless as possible. But there were challenges as well, since Scoot provided different service levels and had been established and run with a high level of autonomy. Goh explained, "There are different expectations between the full service and the LCC if there are any delays. But when you are connecting the two of them, how do you manage the expectations? These are all things that we are still learning. But we are determined, and we think it can be resolved. We are just right at the front of the learning curve."
In early 2014, Sanjay Swamy and Valerie Rozycki Wagoner, respectively chairman and CEO of ZipDial, were discussing the possibility of extending the company's operations to Indonesia and the Philippines, two key markets in Southeast Asia. Having successfully rolled out ZipDial solutions in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka - from their primary market in India - they planned to accelerate expansion into selected markets in the region. Through its proprietary technology platform, ZipDial enabled brands in emerging markets to create, track and manage mobile marketing campaigns, engaging hundreds of millions of consumers who were otherwise unconnected. Building on its user database, the company created engagement opportunities based on user profiles that marketers could leverage to deliver targeted advertising messages. Although poised to take advantage of the continued growth in mobile adoption, the company faced a number of challenges. At a time when India's mobile technology landscape had started to consolidate and new competitors had entered the mobile advertising market, the need to find new sources of financing to support its operations and expansion plans was becoming more pressing. The case traces the evolution of ZipDial since its inception in 2010 as India's first mobile marketing and analytics company. It offers an overview of the latest developments and current strategy, including its approach to bridging the offline-online world through innovative marketing solutions and partnerships with social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter.
Coppersea, a craft distillery in the Hudson Valley of New York, had developed a range of whiskies using "heritage distilling" techniques (a term they coined), whereby local, raw materials were combined using a process modeled after 19th century distilling. Founded in 2011, the distillery was the consequence of intense conversations between Angus MacDonald, a master distiller who had learned distilling in his teens from his uncle, and Michael Kinstlick, a businessman who foresaw the burgeoning of the craft distillery movement. After nearly a decade in the business, Kinstlick hoped to grow production volumes by three to four times existing levels-which were still below 10,000 9-liter cases annually-using Coppersea's current production technologies. Kinstlick knew that growth beyond those levels would require a more significant set up and investment. Given the trends affecting craft distillers, an evolving consumer base, and new potential avenues of distribution, including international expansion, the path forward would be challenging. Students take on Kinstlick's challenge and grapple with keeping a balance between sustainable growth and adhering to Coppersea's founding principles and heritage methods. Kinstlick described his perspective: "We realize our heritage approach would keep our production volumes somewhat limited as we grow-but we think it's important to retain that distinction of character in the spirits themselves and we don't think we can capture that using the same kinds of methods other distillers are using, even other craft distillers.
In 2009, Caterpillar shipped its first D7E tractor, an "electric drive" machine in which electric motors moved the tracks and blade, using electricity from a generator powered by a diesel engine. In an industry where new products provided performance gains of just a few percent, the D7E moved 10 percent more material per hour, using 10-30 percent less fuel that its predecessor. It was also easier to operate, had 40 percent fewer moving parts, and a far lower lifetime operating cost. When the project was originally approved in 2003, the D7E was intended to prove out the electric drive concept for tractors. The D7E was chosen for this role in part because it was a relatively low-volume machine, and provided less risk for the new technology. If successful, electric drive was expected to be adopted by other products in Caterpillar's tractor product line. However, by the end of 2013, this had not yet happened, nor had the company announced plans to do so. This case describes the D7E project from its conception, including the organizational and technical challenges it faced, and how the project team overcame these challenges. It raises questions about why the technology had not been rapidly adapted to other Caterpillar tractors.
D.light is one of the leading manufacturers of solar powered lighting technology specifically designed for use by the world's poorest, bottom of the pyramid customers. Having sold over 7 million lights since 2007, the company has been relatively successful. However, sales to the very poorest customers have failed to reach penetration levels desired by management, and the company is currently struggling with an array of marketing techniques and strategies specifically targeting this historically difficult customer segment
Mobius Motors manufactures and sells low-cost cars in the Kenyan market. The company strives to make the cars such that they are affordable, yet still perform well on Africa's generally poor road networks. The company has attracted a lot of attention from development and venture financiers, and has ambitious plans to expand throughout the African continent. However, Mobius's fleet of vehicle is still currently very small, and the company faces many strategic challenges on both the demand and the supply side of the business.
Based in Nairobi, Kenya, EcoPost manufactures construction posts out of the thousands of tons of plastic waste produced daily by the city. The posts, which are manufactured using second-hand industrial equipment, are frequently used to build fences, park benches, and other objects. Because lumber is very scarce in Kenya, and subject to theft and termite damage, the posts sell very well, and the company has trouble keeping up with demand. The company's directors are seeking financing to purchase new equipment and scale and diversify their production. However, they face many obstacles overcoming skepticism from investors, largely because of their relatively poor financial record keeping.
Peter Löscher became CEO of Siemens in July, 2007. It was one of the most turbulent times in the company's history as the company was reeling from a compliance scandal involving hundreds of millions of Euros in suspected bribes, and had to pay billions of Euros in fines and fees to clear its name. Further, the company's operating groups were underperforming their peers in terms of profitability, and had been for some time. Adding to the challenges, Löscher was the first outsider to run Siemens since the company's founding in 1847. After his arrival, Löscher moved quickly to assess the organization, a global, multi-line technology and engineering firm with over 475,000 employees and over €66,487 million of revenue and €3,345 million of net income. Klaus Kleinfeld, the previous CEO, had improved company performance, driven the company to become more globally focused, and sold off underperforming and non-core assets. However, his tenure was cut short by the bribery scandal. When Löscher arrived, he felt the company was overly complex, individuals lacked accountability and significant tension existed between headquarters and the regions. Löscher took advantage of the crisis to reorganize the company from 10 operating groups to 3 sectors, introduce regional clusters to enable smaller markets to focus on sales, establish the "right of way" of the global business, simplify financial reporting, and enhance the sales effort to market verticals. In addition to the changes that Löscher made to the company structure, he transformed employees' attitudes and renewed the entrepreneurial and innovative spirit among managers in the organization.
Peter Löscher became CEO of Siemens in July, 2007. It was one of the most turbulent times in the company's history as the company was reeling from a compliance scandal involving hundreds of millions of Euros in suspected bribes, and had to pay billions of Euros in fines and fees to clear its name. Further, the company's operating groups were underperforming their peers in terms of profitability, and had been for some time. Adding to the challenges, Löscher was the first outsider to run Siemens since the company's founding in 1847. After his arrival, Löscher moved quickly to assess the organization, a global, multi-line technology and engineering firm with over 475,000 employees and over €66,487 million of revenue and €3,345 million of net income. Klaus Kleinfeld, the previous CEO, had improved company performance, driven the company to become more globally focused, and sold off underperforming and non-core assets. However, his tenure was cut short by the bribery scandal. When Löscher arrived, he felt the company was overly complex, individuals lacked accountability and significant tension existed between headquarters and the regions. Löscher took advantage of the crisis to reorganize the company from 10 operating groups to 3 sectors, introduce regional clusters to enable smaller markets to focus on sales, establish the "right of way" of the global business, simplify financial reporting, and enhance the sales effort to market verticals. In addition to the changes that Löscher made to the company structure, he transformed employees' attitudes and renewed the entrepreneurial and innovative spirit among managers in the organization.
Many people are skeptical of the idea that organizational cultures exert any real effects on individual and organizational behavior. One reason for this suspicion is that people often use the word "culture" as a catch-all category for "the way things are done" in a firm. But "the way things are done" can often be discussed in much more concrete terms by focusing on specific aspects of the formal organization, such as the structure of the incentive plans in place, the formal grouping and linking principles encoded in the formal organizational structure, and the established routines and operating procedures in the firm. This note examines organizational culture, focusing on the effects of strong cultures and how such cultures are created and maintained.