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Daiso Industries Co., Ltd. was the largest 100-yen (or one dollar) shop operator in Japan, with nearly 2,900 stores in Japan and 1,400 stores in 26 other countries. The privately owned company featured nearly 50,000 products, ranging from office supplies to cosmetics and seasonal holiday decorations-most items (98 percent) were priced at 100 yen, with some exceptions. Some 99 percent of Daiso's products were privately branded, but only a small fraction were internally manufactured. As of January 2016, Daiso operated 2,900 stores in Japan and 1,400 stores in 26 other countries. To transform from a truck-based pop-up operation into an extensive global chain of stores that generated $3.5 billion in sales for the fiscal year ending March 2016, Daiso made three major strategic decisions. The case study takes students through these decisions, and includes an in-depth look at the point-of-sale (POS) technology that helped Daiso create a highly efficient delivery and restocking system, as well as streamline the treasure hunt or discovery retail model-a store where people shopped for the sheer fun of discovering surprise items.

China Telecom was a major provider of telecommunication services in China. It was organized into three layers―Corporate HQ, Provincial companies, and city branches. Zhejiang Corporation, one of China Telecom's 31 provincial companies, adopted enterprise software to combat rising competition from wireless providers to its fixed line phone services. This case explores how Zhejiang Corp. centralized its database and key transactions to analyze data, create semi-customized promotions, and reach out into non-telephone services. Then, in May 2008, the Chinese government restructured the telecommunications industry, turning China Telecom into a national carrier and removing previous restrictions on its ability to provide mobile phone services. Now that China Telecom could offer full-blown mobile service, it had to develop a new strategy to market its portfolio of products.

Tamago-ya is a family-owned business located in Tokyo, Japan. The company has captured a unique position in the market of selling pre-packaged lunch boxes to business professionals by maintaining high quality and reliable delivery. In order for Tamago-ya to guarantee such a high level of customer service, it has created an operational culture wherein those who deliver orders also engage in judging customer demand and feedback, those who supply food materials must be able to respond to variation in demand on a daily basis, and those who plan the production and distribution schedule must forecast and adjust on a real-time basis. Tamago-ya competes with convenience stores, which offer less variety in their menu options throughout the month, can stock-out on popular choices, and tend to have long lines during the lunchtime rush. However, Tamago-ya is faced with many challenges--including demand forecasting, supply planning, and long-term strategic planning.

With 26 casinos in 13 U.S. states and $4.5 billion in revenue in 2003, Harrah's Entertainment Inc. was one of the leading brand names in the casino entertainment industry. Bill Harrah, the founder of Harrah's, was passionate about getting to know his customers and had instilled a deeply rooted commitment to customer satisfaction into Harrah's corporate philosophy. In 2003, Harrah's was focused on building loyalty and value with its target customers through a unique combination of great service, excellent products, unsurpassed distribution, operational excellence, and technology leadership. Through innovative customer relationship management strategies, effective management of its service supply chain, and sizable investments in enabling information technology, the company was at the forefront in attracting, serving, and retaining its customers.

Founded in 1987, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) was the world's first pure foundry, focused solely on the manufacturing of semiconductors. Operating in the cyclical semiconductor market, the company managed to grow rapidly and to become the world's 8th largest semiconductor manufacturer with more than a 50% market share in the foundry business. In the company's early days, TSMC management focused on manufacturing excellence and technology leadership. As competition in the sector intensified in the late 1990s, the company began to focus on customer service to differentiate itself further from companies like UMC, its next-door neighbor and closest competitor, and the rapidly growing Chinese foundries. The company invested heavily in the development of innovative, value-added services and proprietary information systems that would facilitate better communication and improve customer service, putting in place eCommerce applications such as eFoundry and Enterprise Supply Chain Management suites. TSMC management believed that customers, typically U.S.-based integrated circuit design houses facing high financial stakes, rapid technological innovations, short product life cycles, and intensive competition, would choose a foundry business partner based on quality, trustworthiness, and reputation, as opposed to price only. Could superior customer service make an impact in a capital-intensive, process- and quality- oriented industry such as the semiconductor industry, or would TSMC have to compete on price? Explores these issues, as well as other factors affecting TSMC's strategic path as it moves forward in the mid-2000s.

New Vine Logistics was founded in 2001 by Katie Schumacher, a member of the failed Wineshoppers.com start-up operational team. Ms. Schumacher believed that Wineshopper's approach to inventory management, logistics, and general operational challenges rampant in the U.S. wine industry had value and managed to get funding to resuscitate Wineshopper's assets. The case provides background of the U.S. wine industry, including consumption figures, consumer demographics, and general industry trends, and explains the regulatory environment governing the U.S. wine industry. It then discusses New Vine Logistic's competencies and value propositions to its various customers, suppliers, wholesalers, distributors and retailer of wine.

In addition to its world-class supply and demand chain management practices, Toyota Motor Co. Ltd excels in managing its service chain. The service chain, which the company views as key to its long-term success, is responsible for providing products in the form of service parts for maintenance and repair, and services in the form of improving the value that a customer derives from a vehicle. Service chain management is based on establishing strong links with customers, both through the dealer channel and directly. Describes the network that Toyota has created to provide reliable supply of service parts to dealers in an efficient manner and how the company proactively helps dealers improve their service offerings to customers. Also discusses how Toyota uses advanced technologies, such as e-commerce and telematics, to build strong relationships directly with the vehicle owners. Focuses on Toyota's operations in Japan and the United States.

The Toyota demand chain is efficient, flexible, customer oriented, and product specific. Studies how Toyota uses its advanced distribution channels, inventory management, planning methodologies, and production capabilities to create and manage its demand chain, with a particular focus on the Japanese and the North American markets. Uses the Toyota Prius and the Scion product lines to illustrate how Toyota adjusts its demand chain to fit a particular product and its target customers, utilizing as much as possible from its existing manufacturing and distribution infrastructure.

OnStar, a provider of in-vehicle safety, security, and information services called "telematics," was founded in 1995 as a collaborative venture among General Motors (GM), EDS, and Hughes Electronics Corp. Safety and security services, including roadside assistance, emergency help after a crash, remote diagnostics, and stolen vehicle tracking, were the cornerstones of OnStar's offering. In addition, OnStar provided its customers with a 24-hour connection to convenience services such as navigation and route guidance, vehicle location assistance, and personal concierge services. To generate more revenues, OnStar expanded its offering to luxury vehicles of other auto manufacturers. Looking back, Chet Huber, OnStar president, was quite satisfied with the company's achievements since it was founded: OnStar's subscriber base had grown to more than 2 million and the company was routinely recognized as the leading telematics provider in the world. OnStar was also delivering benefits to its parent company, GM. By maintaining one-to-one relationships with customers, OnStar helped GM sell more cars and trucks, strengthen customer loyalty, and improve operational efficiency. Although revenues for the world market of in-car telematics terminals were expected to reach $20 billion by 2010, competition in the market was intensifying. Richard Wagoner, GM's CEO, and Huber needed to explore a number of strategic and operational questions around the future of OnStar: How would OnStar create ongoing value to GM? How should OnStar position itself to gain high acceptance and subscription renewal rates? What further strategic partnerships should OnStar form to maintain its leadership? How should GM leverage the continuous stream of vehicle and customer data it received from OnStar?

Provides an overview of some current issues in logistics: the rise of third party logistics, substitution of information flows for physical flows, the economics of logistics, and international logistics.

Addresses demand forecasting and globalization at Tong Yang's Cement Corp.

Describes Seven-Eleven Japan's logistics and information systems and how they support its retail strategy. Seven-Eleven Japan tracks hourly sales trends for individual items and replenishes and changes its assortment of products throughout the day to match its offering with customer demands.

Deals with the logistics and incentives at Tong Yang Cement Corp.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Tremendous variability in orders along the supply chain can plague companies trying to eliminate excess inventory, forecast product demand, and simply make their supply chain more efficient. What causes the bullwhip effect that distorts information as it is transmitted up the chain? The authors identify four major causes: Demand forecast updating, order batching, price fluctuation, and rationing and shortage gaming. The authors suggest several ways in which companies can counteract the bullwhip effect. First, avoid multiple demand forecast updates. Companies can make demand data from downstream available upstream. Or they can bypass the downstream site by selling directly to the consumer. Also, they can improve operational efficiency to reduce highly variable demand and long resupply lead times. Second, break order batches. Companies can use electronic data interchange to reduce the cost of placing orders and place orders more frequently. And they can ship assortments of products in a truckload to counter high transportation costs or use third-party logistics companies to handle shipping. Third, stabilize prices. Manufacturers can reduce the frequency and level of wholesale price discounting to prevent customers from stockpiling. They can also use activity-based costing systems to recognize when companies are buying in bulk. Finally, eliminate gaming in shortage situations. In shortages, suppliers can allocate product based on past sales records rather than on orders, so customers don't exaggerate their orders. They can also eliminate their generous return policies, making it less likely for retailers to cancel orders.