Sequoia Capital, a venture capital firm founded in 1972, quickly grew to become one of the most storied venture capital firms in the world. Fueled by a strong culture, Sequoia's investment track record included the names of some of the largest global successes. However, times were changing. The venture capital industry at large was facing several challenges. Additionally, Sequoia had made some major decisions to restructure the firm. In a market environment in which investors in venture capital were increasingly cautious, Sequoia seemed to be making several changes to their core identity as a firm. What would all of this mean for the future of Sequoia, and would the firm still be able to maintain their historical dominance in spite of several headwinds?
How do venture capital and private equity funds actually work? This Technical Note covers the "when, who, and how" details: "When": fund length, extensions, and when investors can no longer initiate new investments. "Who": who is in the General Partner entity, the importance of the firm's Management Company (the owners of the firm), how fees and carried interest flows work, and the Limited Partners' Advisory Committee. "How": key person clauses, invested capital vs, committed capital, what happens when an investor defaults on its commitment, how multiples are calculated (MOIC vs. TVPI), the difference between realized and unrealized gains/losses, how fund distributions work, and the difference between distributed and residual value.
Entrepreneurs often struggle with the question of whether to found solo or alongside one or more cofounders. This case is comprised of three vignettes detailing common founding scenarios: the first-time technical founder; the serial commercial founder; and the MBA co-founders who are friends first. Coupled with robust research, this case offers students the opportunity to break down the roles, responsibilities, relationships, and resources of a founding team and determine when and why they should found alone or seek a cofounder.
After taking over from their parents, Sebastian Maxwell and Alexandra Ito, CEO and COO of Minnesota-based outdoor adventure brand Tenkara, must decide how they want to resource and grow this formerly family-run business. After outdoor activities exploded during the COVID pandemic, Tenkara boasted a growth curve that could put them on a VC-backed path. But is that the right choice for these founders and this business? And if so, which of two Series A term sheets should they accept?
During a challenging fundraising environment, the DexAI founders received two term sheets with nearly identical economic terms but very different legal ones. The entrepreneurs had to navigate: representations and warranties (their personal guarantees that the company's intellectual property was free and clear and that its financial statements were accurate), investor control terms (protective provisions, Board of Directors composition, and matters that required investor approval), and how their founders' stock was treated (a buyback right that effectively vested their stock and how that might change upon a company sale/merger/IPO, the termination of a founder, or a founder's resignation for "good reason"). The case also explores a possible intellectual property violation with one founder's prior employer.
Venture capital is a cyclical, ever-changing industry, as seen in recent years. The late 2010s and early 2020s witnessed record amounts of capital flowing into the sector, high valuations, and new types of investors entering the market. Innovations in the seed stage, such as rolling funds and SPVs, enabled more individuals to enter the industry. At the later stages, firms were becoming multi-stage investors, and aggressive hedge funds had entered the space. Then, in 2022, the macroeconomic environment created challenges, fundraising declined, and few venture-backed IPOs occurred. As of 2023, it was unclear where the VC industry was heading next. This note covers these recent events and the industry's increased focus on diversity and ESG.
With the rapid growth of venture capital ("VC") in recent decades, we might wonder: who succeeds at VC and why? This is a complicated question, as many factors come into play. VC partnerships are comprised of individual investors with varying backgrounds, experiences, and skillsets. VC firms also feature a wide range of investment philosophies, goals, history, and resource sets. Finally, external factors such as geography and culture seem to be correlated with VC activity. This note summarizes some VC research at the individual, firm-wide, and national levels.
Why do some entrepreneurs succeed and others do not? Are there personality traits that lead someone to become an entrepreneur? Although many questions still remain, there has been significant research on the "entrepreneurial personality." This note provides an overview of the most frequently studied entrepreneurial traits, including a set of "Big 5" traits, a need for achievement, locus of control, innovativeness, and risk tolerance. Where data exist, we chronicle what is correlated with a desire to be an entrepreneur and what is associated with actual success as an entrepreneur.
Every Harvard Business School first-year student enrolls in "The Entrepreneurial Manager," a course that focuses on leadership in entrepreneurial settings. This document outlines the course's goals and approach.
A SAFE ("Simple Agreement for Future Equity") is a security increasingly used in seed financings. Not equity or debt, SAFEs allow founders to "get capital now and sell equity later." This Technical Note covers: 1. What is a SAFE and why use one?, 2. The key concepts involved when calculating a SAFE's future ownership in a start-up, 3. Calculating a "fully-diluted" capitalization table with multiple SAFEs, and 4. Some not-so-safe wrinkles to the security.
In December 2021, Han Kim, Anthony Lee, and Ho Nam reflected on how far they had come since 2012. This B case provides an update on Altos Ventures' decision-making and performance since the events presented in the A case.
In late June of 2022, Sonja Perkins, co-founder of Broadway Angels, contemplated the group's future. She and her co-founders, Jennifer Fonstad, and Magdalena Yesil, started the group to gather together the most successful and powerful women in venture capital and technology with the mission to build a powerful network, showcase top female talent, inspire more women to enter VC and entrepreneurship, and make great investments. Overall, she was pleased with their progress toward their mission but still felt that gender equity in VC was slow to happen. She considered several different ways the group could expand its impact.
In December 2012, Altos Ventures General Partners Han Kim, Anthony Lee, and Ho Nam met to discuss the future of the firm. Altos had already adjusted its strategy multiple times. It began as a U.S.-focused venture capital investor whose first two funds were backed by a sole limited partner, a South Korean financial conglomerate. In late 2001, the partners made their first transformative decision, raising a fund from traditional institutional LPs to focus on bootstrapped technology companies. In 2008, Altos again refined its strategy, this time to fund similar capital-efficient companies but with more "explosive growth" potential. Now, in 2012, the firm was running out of capital and did not have the realized track record to raise another traditional institutional fund. They considered two options: raise a South Korea-focused VC fund or offer more co-investment opportunities to LPs through a "mini" fund. What should Altos do to stay afloat?
In June 2020, Jeremy Blank prepared for a meeting with his fellow partners at York Capital to discuss an investment he had championed in Enovix, a company developing a state-of-the-art, silicon-based battery. Early-stage technology companies, like Enovix, were not typical investments for York, but Blank had convinced his partners to invest. However, the partnership wanted to be "one and done" without reinvesting in future rounds. By 2020, Enovix had made great progress but not as quickly as forecasted. The company had set out to raise more money and received a term sheet from a well-known publicly-traded company. Blank saw this as an exciting opportunity for Enovix, but he was disappointed to see that it would require York to invest more capital and forego a key protective feature. How should Blank approach this meeting with his partners, and what should he recommend?
In June 2022, 3G Capital Co-Managing Partners Alex Behring and Daniel Schwartz were in a partners' meeting. On the agenda were three potential investments. Code named "Alpha," "Bravo," and "Charlie" (real target companies that have been disguised), they were the finalists amongst hundreds that the team had screened. Unlike other private equity firms, 3G did not build a portfolio: each of its funds had only one investment. This model had worked extremely well for some investments, with successes like Restaurant Brands International, but it had also faced some challenges. Each investment decision was crucial to the future of the firm. What should their next investment be?
When and how much risk to take? In October 2020, Ken Sweder, CEO of Individual FoodService ("IFS"), contemplated this question as he evaluated a proposal to acquire Brady Industries, a distributor of janitorial and sanitation products. Sweder and his private equity partners at Kelso & Company had been working hard to grow IFS, and now they had a unique opportunity to make a transformative acquisition. The deal had great potential and risks; it was unclear if this was the right time to make such a large, complex acquisition amid disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic. Sweder needed to decide if he should recommend the transaction and, if so, how to set the right value creation plan for the combined company.
How should a venture capital firm divide compensation and decision rights between its founders and its next-generation partners? Platinum Capital faced this decision in July 2020. Platinum's younger partners had just requested a piece of the firm's highly lucrative Management Company from Platinum's founders. The founders felt they were owed compensation for the risk and "lean" years they had faced when founding the firm. Yet, the high-performing new partners had other career opportunities and wanted to be "real" partners in the business. Should the founders grant the next generation access to the management company? If so, how should the firm's decision rights work in this new scenario?
Founder Collective ("FC") launched in 2009 with a clear mission: to be the most aligned fund for founders at the seed stage. In keeping with its mission, FC maintained smaller fund sizes and was not a lifecycle investor. By November of 2021, the seed market had become more competitive, and FC had successfully picked several Unicorn and even Decacorn investments, causing some LPs to wonder about the opportunity costs of FC's "no pro rata" view. Managing Partners David Frankel, Eric Paley, and Micah Rosenbloom wondered if the seed investing sector had changed too much and if they should evolve their strategy. They contemplated three potential paths forward: start investing their pro rata in later rounds, raise an opportunity fund, or continue their current strategy.
Keith Bender, Principal at Pear Venture Capital, is working over the weekend to prepare for a Monday morning investment meeting. He has three startup pitch decks in front of him, and he must choose one to recommend at the meeting. He finds that each company has its strengths and weaknesses, but each has a notable advantage. The first company has a particularly compelling product, the second company is in a strong market, and the final company has a highly experienced team. Which pitch deck should Bender recommend?