David Langstaff, the CEO of Veridian, a defense company, struggles with the decision of selling the company. Langstaff has concerned himself with inculcalating his organization with the values necessary for superior achievement over the long term. But as a fiduciary, he had to come up with a single value to monetize the reputation the company had built. Langstaff wondered what was best for the firm and its customers and what his other options were. He also was concerned with how the prospect of selling the firm would square with Veridian's commitment to its constituencies and values-based leadership.

Describes the start-up, growth, organizational design, and operations over the first 10 years of a professional services firm. Focuses on the creative use of organizational purpose and values as an integral part of strategy and alignment of organizational activities.

In March 2005, Mark Schneider, CEO of Fresenius, is considering the group's strategic and organizational future. The highly decentralized 7 billion euro German health care group is active in three different business units, with the largest, FMC AG, listed separately from the parent Fresenius AG and representing the lion's share of the company's revenue and profit. A decentralized approach had let the group units grow independently over the years, and Fresenius took pride in its adaptive, entrepreneurial spirit. Schneider, however, wonders whether the decentralized approach will allow the group to continue to grow in a coordinated and cost-conscious fashion. How should he combine the company's entrepreneurial and profit-oriented culture with any latent synergies in the existing organization? Although Fresenius looks healthy at the moment, Schneider knows that the company's future is tied to improved sales and profitability.

Describes the start-up, growth, organizational design, and operations over the first 10 years of a professional services firm. Focuses on the creative use of organizational purpose and values as an integral part of strategy and alignment of organizational activities.

As Bruce Taub, founder of Fernwood, strolled past some of New York City's finest galleries, he pondered the unique challenges that Fernwood faced. Where others had seen the inefficiency of imperfect markets, Taub saw an opportunity to revolutionize the very nature of how Americans related to the fine art market. As its chairman and founder, Taub had built Fernwood to serve as a vehicle for his vision: to democratize investment in art such that "even my secretary could someday own (shares of art) in her 401(k)." As Taub walked through the doors at Christies, he knew that in the near future, he was going to decide the path that would initially guide Fernwood toward investors. He also knew that at least in the short-term, he needed the support of the art community, and he wondered what else he could or should do to win that support.

In the fall of 1999, Mike Moore, director-general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), anticipated that the WTO's talks in Seattle in December 1999 would focus on improving living standards around the world, bettering the environment, providing more resources for health and education, strengthening the global economy, and reducing the risk of future instability and crisis. He characterized the WTO as seeking to advance a new approach to international cooperation based on rules, not power-rules, to help manage the powerful forces of globalization to everyone's benefit, the weak as well as the strong. Instead, the Seattle meeting was sidelined by waves of protests as widely disparate groups voiced strong opposition to the WTO and, more generally, to free trade. Protests focused on the perceived impact of trade on the environment, jobs, human rights, and the balance of power between large economic powers and developing countries. Additionally, the dispute resolution policies of the WTO were placed in the spotlight. The protests gained very widespread exposure and put the WTO representatives on the defensive. As the protests intensified, President Clinton objected to the violent methods used by some protestors but expressed sympathy with their desire to have more openness and accountability for the WTO. After two days of protests, vandalism, and police enforced curfews, the meetings were suspended. This case describes the history of the WTO, the protests at the Seattle talks, the role of the Internet in mobilizing protesters, the WTO's dispute resolution processes, and the implications of the failed talks for the WTO and its opponents.

In 2000, Samsung Electronics was the world's largest manufacturer of semiconductor memory chips. Its main line of business was the manufacture of DRAM chips, but worldwide demand had plummeted. Moreover, Intel, the world's largest producer of microprocessors, had formed an alliance with Rambus, a memory design company, to develop a new super-high-speed DRAM design that would represent a new industry standard. Senior management at Samsung faced fundamental strategic issues: Should it continue to invest in the high-risk DRAM business alone, and could Samsung be a market leader by itself? Should it be steadfast in its opposition to the alternative standard, which represented new opportunities? If it adopted the Rambus design, how many resources should be devoted to the manufacture of Rambus chips? Diversification out of the volatile memory business was a key strategic issue and represented one possible means for reducing Samsung's vulnerability to industrywide downturns, but Samsung's past efforts to expand its nonmemory business had met with only limited success. This case provides the background to the issues Samsung faced as it debated how to meet these challenges while remaining a leading player in the semiconductor industry.

In January 1994, Danie Niemandt, general manager for South African Breweries operations in Tanzania, must determine how his company should respond to the entry of a new competitor in its market--East African Breweries. South African Breweries has executed a successful turnaround of the brewery operations in Tanzania. East African Breweries is backed by Guinness plc, one of the world's largest beer brewers, and Guinness has committed itself to investing the resources necessary to build a leading presence in the Tanzanian market. The challenge facing South African Breweries in Tanzania illustrates the challenge the company faces in many of its international markets. The company has built its international strategy around its operational expertise, but must now adjust to the entrance of well-funded global beer competitors in several of its international markets. Intended for use in a course on international business and strategy.

In 1997, Novo Nordisk was one of two leading firms globally in the diabetes-care industry, dominating the business outside the United States but struggling to win market share there. It was formed in 1989 from a merger of two Danish firms that had previously competed fiercely. In the early 1990s, communications difficulties between its American operations and headquarters in Denmark led to its failing to adapt to changing U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations. It was forced to withdraw the product it had made for the U.S. market and to inform its customers there that they would have to obtain their needed medicine from its main competitor. This case describes the company's organizational responses to this crisis. These centered on a reaffirmation of values; a definition of a new "Novo Nordisk Way of Management (NNWoM)," embodying a list of "Fundamentals"; and the creation of a group of facilitators whose role was to ensure that units adhered to the NNWoM.

On Monday, November 16, 1998, the day before Daimler-Benz would officially merge with Chrysler, Dr. Kurt Lauk, head of Daimler-Benz' commercial vehicles division (CVD) reflected on the organizational changes he had directed over the course of the previous two years to make CVD more competitive in an era of industry-wide globalization. To unite an extremely decentralized organizational structure at Daimler, Lauk initiated a worldwide reorganization and the integration of the company's manufacturing operations. He encouraged individual units within CVD to look for collaborative opportunities that would enable the division to realize global scale economies. Although Lauk promoted a global perspective within CVD, he believed that the business units could compete effectively only if they were allowed considerable autonomy to respond to their own unique market conditions. Lauk was proud of the achievements resulting from these directives. However, pressing concerns overshadowed his satisfaction. Although the CVD was profitable overall, its Power Train Unit continued to lose money. In addition, Lauk was concerned about Daimler's progress in building adequate distribution channels in the Asian region. Finally, Lauk considered the impact of the merger with Chrysler on CVD and the general uncertainty concerning how a more centralized organization would affect the CVD.

During the 1990s, CEMEX went from being a purely domestic producer of cement and ready mix in Mexico to the third largest firm in the rapidly globalizing cement industry, with operations in North and South America, Western Europe, and Southeast Asia, as well as a large trading operation. CEMEX's first moves to internationalize itself, by exporting to the United States, fell afoul of an antidumping ruling. It then began a series of acquisitions, first in Spain and then in Central and South America. This case describes the acquisitions and the process of post-merger acquisition. It raises the issue of whether the economic crisis in Southeast Asia presents opportunities for further expansion. Can be used to examine the logic and process of internationalization in a commodity business and the selection of markets to enter. Can also be used to examine the basis for globalization of what many would think of as a very local business. Finally, it presents an opportunity to examine the logic of global competitive moves, as CEMEX's entry into Spain, which was intended explicitly to counter a European rival's aggressive expansion in Mexico.

In 1992-93, British Petroleum plc, Britain's fourth-largest of the great international integrated oil companies, faced a major crisis. The company was experiencing its first losses in its eighty-year history, while morale was battered by downsizing and organizational upheaval.

In the 1990s, many international brewers sought to enter the Chinese beer market, using a variety of strategies that differed in geographic and market segment choices, the use of alliances, importing versus local production, acquisitions versus greenfield site development, marketing mix, and more. This case describes the Chinese beer market and industry and the strategies adopted by several leading participants. Can be used to examine alternative strategies for entering emerging country, consumer goods markets. Can also be used to examine how standard "five-forces" industry and competitor analysis must be adapted to deal with emerging economies with ill-functioning markets, poor infrastructure, highly changeable government policies, and weak legal systems.

British Petroleum (BP) had very profitable years in 1996 and l997. However, CEO John Browne knew that BP could not rest on its laurels. In Browne's view, the company's ability to compete was based on the extent to which it could foster learning across units.