Reggae music has swept the world. From its origins in Jamaica, it can now be heard in clubs and bars from Senegal to Samoa. It has also influenced music from other countries, such as American rap. In the late 1990s, annual sales of reggae recordings were estimated to be $1.2 billion, of which Jamaican musicians, producers, and songwriters earned about $300 million, plus another $50 million from live performances and ancillary product sales. Describes the evolution of Jamaican musical forms, the development of the country's music industry, and the industry's structure in the early 21st century; introduces the concept of industrial clusters--localized groups of firms that grow around a single industry and include all the necessary supporting companies required by the industry; and asks how industrial clusters provide benefits to participants, how they can be grown, and how a developing country can build an industry.

Describes events associated with Vladimiro Montesinos, Peru's intelligence chief and advisor to President Fujimori, his network, and interventions in affairs of the Newmont Mining Corp. Newmont, a U.S. company established in 1921, proclaimed its corporate values to be "behaving with integrity, working loyally, inspiring trust, telling the truth, caring for our colleagues and cooperating with our community." Yet, on February 26, 1998, Lawrence T. Kurlander, a vice president of Newmont, met with Vladimiro Montesinos Torres in Montesinos' office at the Servicio de Intelligencia Nacional (the national intelligence service) to seek his help in getting a resolution favorable to Newmont in a quarrel with the French company Bureau de Recherches Geologiques et Minieres (BRGM) over their shared ownership of the Yanacocha mine. The mine was the richest gold mine in Latin America and one of the biggest in the world. BRGM wanted to sell part of its 25% share in Yanacocha to Normandy Ltd., an Australian mining company. Newmont sued to block the sale and to gain control of the mine for itself. The dispute had made its way to the Supreme Court of Peru. Montesinos secretly taped his conversation with Kurlander, as was his habit, and the tapes provide a rare inside view of how business gets done where the rule of law is subordinated to political influence.

Competition is present, explicitly or implicitly, in many business negotiations. Rarely in buyer-seller negotiations are the bargainers stuck with each other, usually they have an alternative trading partner to whom they can turn. The terms of agreement that are negotiated are shaped by the fact that the alternatives exist. The ability to exploit competition among potential trading partners is a major source of bargaining power. Competition within a negotiation works much like competition in a formal auction. The case describes the bidding for television rights.

By the mid-1990s, a few years into Vietnam's tentative market-oriented reforms, Vietnam's newborn private sector was at a crucial point. The government had gradually loosened its communist-era prohibitions on market activities, but had left in place most of the machinery of the old planned economy and had done little to build the institutions needed to underpin a market-oriented economy. Interestingly, facing impediments such as the lack of commercial law and contracts, entrepreneurship flourished. The protagonists in the case, owner-managers of three relatively young firms, discuss their initial success in such an unreceptive setting.

Gazprom, the Russian natural-gas production and distribution firm that, by some measures is the largest energy company in the world, and has been very cheaply valued ever since its privatization. Reasons for this include the general uncertainty prevailing in Russian equity markets and the alleged corruption in the company, including serious asset-stripping by management. Hermitage Capital Management, a Russia-focused hedge fund run by William Browder, began investing in Gazprom in 1998, hoping that shrewd activism would increase its performance as well as its share price. This case looks at Gazprom's halting efforts at reform and discusses issues Browder must consider in deciding how to proceed.

In the fall of 1999, Mike Moore, director-general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), anticipated that the WTO's talks in Seattle in December 1999 would focus on improving living standards around the world, bettering the environment, providing more resources for health and education, strengthening the global economy, and reducing the risk of future instability and crisis. He characterized the WTO as seeking to advance a new approach to international cooperation based on rules, not power-rules, to help manage the powerful forces of globalization to everyone's benefit, the weak as well as the strong. Instead, the Seattle meeting was sidelined by waves of protests as widely disparate groups voiced strong opposition to the WTO and, more generally, to free trade. Protests focused on the perceived impact of trade on the environment, jobs, human rights, and the balance of power between large economic powers and developing countries. Additionally, the dispute resolution policies of the WTO were placed in the spotlight. The protests gained very widespread exposure and put the WTO representatives on the defensive. As the protests intensified, President Clinton objected to the violent methods used by some protestors but expressed sympathy with their desire to have more openness and accountability for the WTO. After two days of protests, vandalism, and police enforced curfews, the meetings were suspended. This case describes the history of the WTO, the protests at the Seattle talks, the role of the Internet in mobilizing protesters, the WTO's dispute resolution processes, and the implications of the failed talks for the WTO and its opponents.

The U.S. energy company AES is in the process of entering the Nigerian market through acquisition of a controlling equity interest in a 270-megawatt power generator project. AES has a unique mode of organization and operation that emphasizes integrity, empowerment, and social responsibility. The Nigerian environment is very different in many dimensions (high levels of corruption, low infrastructure availability, different work ethic, and highly charged politics) from the origins of AES in North America. How does AES juggle its core values and company culture in entering this new environment? How can AES be successful in this environment and remain committed to its core values?