The ability of commercial airlines to fly their planes means little without a space in which to land them. In some congested US airports, the times and spots for landing are known as "landing slots" and have been assigned to airlines at the nation's four busiest airports since 1969. For the first decade of this slot system, assignments were made with little controversy by the airline industry committee. Airline deregulation, however, increased demand for slots in the 1980s and vastly increased pressure on the committees apportioning the slots. An idea emerged to resolve competing demands: the FAA could create a market for landing slots and allow demand to set the price and ration the resource. This case tells the story of Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole's deliberations over whether to create a landing slot market. It describes options ranging from auction to "grandfathering," allowing airlines that had based investment decisions on a stockpile of slots to avoid corporate disruption. The case raises issues concerning the appropriateness of a market for allocating resources where concerns other than sheer efficiency are important. It illustrates, too, the difficulties in designing a policy that will allow for transition from one system to another. It has been used in an intermediate microeconomics curriculum to illustrate market operations issues. There is an epilogue for this case. HKS Case Number 781.0.

The ability of commercial airlines to fly their planes means little without a space in which to land them. In some congested US airports, the times and spots for landing are known as "landing slots" and have been assigned to airlines at the nation's four busiest airports since 1969. For the first decade of this slot system, assignments were made with little controversy by the airline industry committee. Airline deregulation, however, increased demand for slots in the 1980s and vastly increased pressure on the committees apportioning the slots. An idea emerged to resolve competing demands: the FAA could create a market for landing slots and allow demand to set the price and ration the resource. This case tells the story of Secretary of Transportation Elizabeth Dole's deliberations over whether to create a landing slot market. It describes options ranging from auction to "grandfathering," allowing airlines that had based investment decisions on a stockpile of slots to avoid corporate disruption. The case raises issues concerning the appropriateness of a market for allocating resources where concerns other than sheer efficiency are important. It illustrates, too, the difficulties in designing a policy that will allow for transition from one system to another. It has been used in an intermediate microeconomics curriculum to illustrate market operations issues. This is the epilogue to case HKS818. HKS Case Number 781.1.

In 1986, Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E), a private utility company serving most of northern and central California, was facing the loss of many of its biggest and best customers. The threat came not from conservation, general economic depression, or competing utilities; rather, customers were beginning to self-generate, or operate their own, small-scale power plants. PG&E estimated that industrial and commercial customers, responsible for 28 percent of sales, would soon find it cheaper to generate power on-site than to pay PG&E rates. The situation perplexed PG&E's regulators, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), which perceived that industrial and commercial rates could be lowered only at the expense of residential customers or the utility's financial health. Moreover, the region's surplus of generating capacity suggested that new power plants would only make a bad situation worse. Indeed, the CPUC was also struggling with an excess supply of third-party generation, which utilities were required to buy under standard contracts set forth by the CPUC. The case is intended to illustrate issues concerning the regulation of a potential natural monopoly, with an emphasis on the understanding of marginal cost. While the case was designed to highlight the dilemmas of regulators, it can also be taught from the utility's perspective. HKS Case Number 713.0.