This note briefly describes compensation and incentive issues in one of the major US professional sports leagues, the National Football League (NFL). It first provides some background information on the labor market for players and the salary cap, and then describes incentive issues facing players and their agents.
Akamai's stock price declines dramatically with the NASDAQ in 2000, causing virtually all employee options to go underwater. Ownership and retention incentives are largely destroyed, and employee morale falls sharply. Management weighs the pros and cons of various alternative "solutions" to this problem (including repricing, issuing a new supplemental grant, canceling the underwater options and issuing a delayed regrant, and making a tender offer to exchange underwater options for fewer shares of restricted stock).
This exercise provides an opportunity to gain insight about designing, negotiating, and responding to incentives. The setting is investment management. A class is divided into a certain number of investment firms. Each company has one CEO and begins with four portfolio managers (PMs), who manage their portfolios by choosing from a restricted set of assets. The game takes place over approximately two weeks and is divided into three periods. Each period will last from two to four days. At the end of each period, new funds flow to high-performing portfolios, wheras funds flow out of poorly performing portfolios, simulating contributions from investors. CEOs and PMs negotiate compensation arrangements and PMs may move from one company to another, subject to some costs and rules regarding how much of their portfolio they take with them to their new companies. CEOs try to maximize the value of their companies at the end of the game, whereas PMs attempt to maximize their total compensation during the game.
This case describes compensation and incentive issues in one of the major U.S. professional sports leagues, the National Football League (NFL). It first provides some background information on the labor market for players and the salary cap and then describes incentive issues facing players and their agents.
This case describes the compensation and performance evaluations at an investment management company. The senior management team of Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS) Investment Management was contemplating an introduction of hedge funds at the firm, but many believed that typical hedge fund manager pay (20% of the upside) would harm the MFS culture, which glorified "star performance but not star egos." The case presents the MFS compensation philosophy and plan (including the plan's emphasis on subjective compensation), the types of people it attracted, the resulting culture, and how the senior management team approached the hedge funds question. It includes side discussion on firm-specific human capital.
This case describes the compensation system for portfolio managers at Harvard's portfolio management company, including its formulaic and bonus bank features. Harvard Management Co. President Jack Meyer explains the philosophy behind the incentive pay at his company.