This was largely achieved through alliances and collaborations with public and private organizations. The case ends when Ascardio's Administrative Technical Council was discussing the organization's options to face the progressive loss of support from key actors, in an increasing complicated economic and political environment. On one hand, Ascardio had the option of modifying its fee system. Crosssubsidies were becoming increasingly difficult to manage and the remuneration of residents required urgent updating. Also, public and private contributions to patients in need of financial support to access Ascardio's cardiological services were declining. On the other hand, Ascardio had the option to use the social capital of Dr. Finizola and his family, as well as the one accumulated by Ascardio, to launch an aggressive fundraising campaign, and seek contributions in volunteering hours from the citizens of the region-well known for the mutual trust and solidarity of its citizens and organizations. Having analyzed both options, students will decide if Ascardio: 1) Should sacrifice universality to ensure financial sustainability and market positioning, while running the risk of losing legitimacy among its stakeholders. 2) Should seek alternatives for mobilizing the region's civil society and different forms of volunteering to secure an inclusive health service, available for all public regardless of their ability to pay, but risking to lose quality of service.

It is May 2007, and Jose Rodriguez has just won the election for mayor of Santa Barbara de Tapirin, a small town located at an oil area in Venezuela's mid-eastern region. Santa Barbara de Tapir'n is the capital of a scarcely populated municipality with abundant fiscal revenues coming largely from transfers made by the national government to communities in oil areas. The town is nevertheless a quiet, isolated place, with little economic activity, high unemployment, and unreliable public services with incomplete coverage. Despite this, in recent years, a large number of low-income immigrants have arrived in town, attracted by the oil economy, (illegally) seizing lands in Santa Barbara's outskirts. Jose Rodriguez wants to turn the town around, leading it out of its economic stagnation and guiding it to a path of greater prosperity and development. To this end, he has asked a team of advisors to help him gain a better understanding of the causes underlying Santa Barbara's stagnation and to formulate impactful solutions. This case describes a complex scenario so that students can explore a town's issues as viewed from the vantage point of a mayor, using standard techniques to analyze public policies. It also provides information that can be used in social investment project elaboration trials.

Supplement to case IE0013. It is May 2007, and Jose Rodriguez has just won the election for mayor of Santa Barbara de Tapirin, a small town located at an oil area in Venezuela's mid-eastern region. Santa Barbara de Tapir'n is the capital of a scarcely populated municipality with abundant fiscal revenues coming largely from transfers made by the national government to communities in oil areas. The town is nevertheless a quiet, isolated place, with little economic activity, high unemployment, and unreliable public services with incomplete coverage. Despite this, in recent years, a large number of low-income immigrants have arrived in town, attracted by the oil economy, (illegally) seizing lands in Santa Barbara's outskirts. Jose Rodriguez wants to turn the town around, leading it out of its economic stagnation and guiding it to a path of greater prosperity and development. To this end, he has asked a team of advisors to help him gain a better understanding of the causes underlying Santa Barbara's stagnation and to formulate impactful solutions. This case describes a complex scenario so that students can explore a town's issues as viewed from the vantage point of a mayor, using standard techniques to analyze public policies. It also provides information that can be used in social investment project elaboration trials.

In 1996, NorPetrol arrived in Venezuela, where it started upstream oil operations. The company engaged in corporate social responsibility initiatives to support its operations, choosing its programs after consulting with local stakeholders. Upon arriving in the Paria Gulf area, Francisca Rios, head of the company's Social Investment and Community Relations Coordinating Unit, met with politicians, community leaders, public officials, and grassroots organizations' representatives to learn about their expectations and issues, and to communicate the company's investment plans and projects with a potential impact on their communities. A stakeholder identified by the company was Asopescar, an association of traditional fishermen. Tensions between fishermen and oil companies were commonplace. The former blamed NorPetrol for the degradation of a mangrove swamp and a significant decrease in production during the fishing season. Francisca Rios did not want to build a relationship with the fishermen based on donations and assistance. Intending empower them, she decided to channel a portion of her social investment budget to turn Asopescar fishermen into entrepreneurs. In 2006, Francisca Rios considered that Asopescar had made great progress as a productive, self-sustaining company. However, a number of problems had arisen in the organization, forcing her to rethink upcoming investments of NorPetrol in the association. Problems included rising unpaid debts of Asopecar members with their own organization, member drop-out, administrative chaos and informality in money handling, and high operating costs.The case raises the challenges facing an oil company to achieve a social license to operate, as well as its attempts to secure sustainable community development processes in its areas of influence. It takes place in April 2006, at which time Francisca Rios, wondered what to do with her initiative to support modernization of the productive model of a group of small-scale fishermen.

Grupo Mazaplan, a Mexican giant, entered the Ecuadorian market by purchasing controlling interest in Supercompra, a large local retailing company. Juan Pedro Zapata, Supercompra's incoming CEO discarded a purchasing model whereby a central company office sourced all produce from national distributors who then made direct deliveries to points of sale, and substituted it with another featuring decentralized company units called "proximity platforms" located in various parts of the country, which bought produce directly from local farmers. The first platform was established in the Andean region, where farmers were smallholders. The case looks at the difficulties faced by companies when trying to develop commercial relations with low-income suppliers through market mechanisms, and elaborates on how Supercompra handled these relationships. It is chronologically situated in March 2006, the moment when Supercompra must decide how to proceed regarding its relationship with its low income suppliers: 1) allow relations with small Pallatanga growers to dwindle away, discontinuing further efforts and resources invested in organizing them, and dedicating efforts entirely to building relationships with local middlemen and larger commercial farmers; 2) continue to work on the relationship with small growers, but reframe it as a social or CSR initiative; or, 3) allocate more efforts and financial resources to building stable and solid business relationships with small producers, which would imply making a major investment, and dedicating additional time and effort organizing and fostering small farmers with the hope of achieving profitable commercial relations with them within a few years.

In order to improve income in rural communities, towards the end of 2001, Proyecto Paria Foundation (FPP) completed a plan to reactivate the cocoa economy. At the center of the plan was CARIOCA, a civil association set up to process and market cocoa, whose partners were five grower associations (50%), FPP (30%), and EMER, a commercial firm (20%). The design was successful from the start: during its first year, CARIOCA exported 100 tons of cocoa. Yet towards the end of 2003 circumstances emerged that not only threatened the operation of CARIOCA, but the very existence of the foundation: leaders of the five grower associations, instigated by local politicians, sought to take over control of CARIOCA. Opens just after these leaders had asked the FPP to leave both the board of directors and the administration of the cocoa processing plant. At that moment, the two protagonists (both leaders of the FPP) faced a dilemma: decide whether to leave CARIOCA or try to recover control of the organization. Additionally, they had to develop a long-term strategy to assure the foundation's operation in the Paria region.