In January 2015, when incoming Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker chose Linda Spears as his new Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, he was looking for a reformer. Following the grizzly death of a child under DCF protection in 2014, Spears, a former front-line child welfare worker who had gone on to serve as vice president of a Washington D.C.-based child welfare think tank, was hired to review the case and assess what had gone wrong in the DCF system. Spears concluded that the blame did not lie with individual staff workers, but with a host of systemic problems, some the product of recession-era budget cuts. She recommended dozens of reforms. Impressed by Spears' assessment of the agency, Baker recruited her to come to Massachusetts, head the child welfare agency, and implement her proposed reforms-and he promised to give her his backing. No sooner had she arrived than three disturbing new cases-two child fatalities and one near-fatality-dealt another body blow to public confidence in the DCF. At this point, the Governor decided the DCF needed more than reform-it needed an emergency intervention and a very fast turnaround. He sent his Chief of Staff and "fix-it specialist," Steve Kadish, to collaborate with Spears in righting the state's child protection ship as quickly as possible, with a high-octane all-hands-on-deck staffing-and-reform effort, using a popular project management tool called Agile/Scrum. For Spears and her team, the attention from on-high was both a source of pressure and a rare opportunity to bypass some of the usual impediments to rapid change in state government. She decided to lean in, and that meant figuring out how to make effective use of Agile/Scrum-initially created to speed product development in the competitive technology sector-in a very different environment: an agency of social workers working with complex family struggles and kids in need of protection and services. HKS 2251.0.

Board Chair Nanne Boonstra was about to learn the details of a scaling strategy proposal for Mothers of Rotterdam, a fledgling social service program that helped the city's disadvantaged pregnant women. Boonstra's employer, a venture philanthropy foundation that was funding the program, was interested in whether it was feasible to scale the pilot program throughout Rotterdam. Other stakeholders hoped the program might be replicated elsewhere in the Netherlands or even within other European countries. Boonstra knew that some stakeholders were concerned about scaling too early-before research determined if the program was effective and for whom. He hoped that the consulting firm hired to design the scaling strategy would be able to answer the board's many questions about how best to move forward. How do you turn an innovative start-up program into a structured professional program without losing the passion and energy that comes from its founders? How do you go from a start-up to a more structured, formalized organization? Is the program's inventor the right person to scale the program? How long does a program need to run to determine whether it is effective? Is it necessary/advisable to scale the program in Rotterdam first, and focus on replicating the program in other cities afterwards or can this happen in parallel? Is there a risk of other cities trying to copy the program without guidance from the Rotterdam staff and "not getting it right"? The case goes on to unfold the story of Mothers of Rotterdam-an entrepreneurial social service program based in the Netherlands-from its inception through the board of directors meeting. The program's stakeholders, eager to broaden the impact of Mothers of Rotterdam grapple with how the program can best be scaled up. Of significance is the role of the organization's charismatic founder, Barend Rombout, who is credited with driving the program's successful-if unorthodox-approach to social service delivery. Case number 2128.0

In 2012, amid much fanfare, Peru's President Ollanta Humala launched an ambitious program on early childhood development called Cuna Más. The program, based on a successful home visiting intervention in Jamaica, was designed to improve the cognitive and emotional development of children below the age of three, living in poverty. The government's aim was to scale the program nationwide. Initially, despite the logistical challenges of reaching rural communities in a geographically diverse country-from communities residing high up in the Andes to those deep in the Amazon jungle-the program grew at a rapid rate, increasing coverage by 50 percent or more each year between 2012 and 2015. By early 2016, however, Cuna Más encountered a formidable set of challenges. Amid political pressure to increase coverage quickly, the program had to ensure that it continued to deliver a quality service-even as Cuna Más staff navigated the delicate task of convincing communities to adopt a program that, at its heart, relied on the willingness of families to let strangers into their homes. Cuna Más staff was nonetheless hopeful. In many instances, it was the first social program to reach remote, vulnerable populations across Peru. But some civil society groups that had initially hailed President Humala for focusing on early childhood now argued that the program was hobbled by operational challenges that threatened the long-term sustainability of the program. As the April 2016 elections loomed on the horizon a crucial question about Humala's flagship program lingered. Could Cuna Más deliver with quality at scale? Case number 2115.0

In 2002 the Jamaican government redesigned its social safety net programs for children and the elderly. Their goal was to simplify and better target support to those individuals most in need. This case examines the new design for the PATH program, a conditional cash transfer program that rewarded mothers for getting the recommended well-child healthcare for their children and for sending their children to school regularly. The program design is complex and requires the coordination of individuals in a number of national and local institutions. In order to analyze the roll-out and implementation of the PATH Program, students need to map the program, identify points at which implementation is likely to meet challenges and design a strategy for assessing program implementation at those key points. To do this, students need to consider not only the questions they want to answer, but also the most effective strategy for gathering that information. They need to think about data sources (observation, personal interviews, focus groups, surveys, analysis of administrative data), sampling, and research design. Case number 2058.0

This epilogue accompanies Case Number 2058.0, "Implementation of a New Country-Wide Social Safety-Net Program: The Jamaica PATH Program." In 2002 the Jamaican government redesigned its social safety net programs for children and the elderly. Their goal was to simplify and better target support to those individuals most in need. This case examines the new design for the PATH program, a conditional cash transfer program that rewarded mothers for getting the recommended well-child healthcare for their children and for sending their children to school regularly. The program design is complex and requires the coordination of individuals in a number of national and local institutions. In order to analyze the roll-out and implementation of the PATH Program, students need to map the program, identify points at which implementation is likely to meet challenges and design a strategy for assessing program implementation at those key points. To do this, students need to consider not only the questions they want to answer, but also the most effective strategy for gathering that information. They need to think about data sources (observation, personal interviews, focus groups, surveys, analysis of administrative data), sampling, and research design. Case number 2058.1

In 2013 the Kentucky legislature passed legislation that made the child welfare agency (DCBS) responsible for investigating reported cases of Commercially Sexually Exploited Children and responding to their needs, but gave them no additional resources. What is the nature of the CSEC problem in Kentucky? How do these youth come to the attention of DCBS? How does DCBS respond to their needs? It is not clear that this policy was designed in a way that it could ever be effective? Why did Kentucky choose this strategy? What can other states learn? Case number 2076.0

A newly elected city council member is facing her first vote -- an appropriations measure to increase funding for the Scared Straight program. Juvenile crime is rising in the city, citizens are concerned and want the government to do something, and the police chief is promoting the Scared Straight Program as one part of the solution. But the council member learns from a colleague at the community college that research shows the Scared Straight Program has a negative effect on youth -- causing more crime among some. How should she vote? How could she explain the research to constituents who are concerned and afraid and want action?

This case study is set in Harvard Square in 2012-2013, and explores how a diverse group of local stakeholders (e.g. the Cambridge Police Department, city agencies, churches, nonprofit service providers, Harvard Square businesses) comes together to understand and respond to the influx of "travelers." These young homeless individuals travel from city to city in a nomadic way, and Harvard Square has become more popular on the travelers' circuit. The travelers' aggressive behavior and drug use challenge local stakeholders who have developed reasonably effective strategies to support the chronically homeless population on Cambridge streets. Better forms of collaboration and collective action are required to address this new set of challenges. This case study describes the stakeholders involved, the multiple interests at stake, and the broader context in which collaboration and collective action must take place.

In late 2006, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg created the Center for Economic Opportunity (CEO). Born out of recommendations made by the Bloomberg appointed public-private Commission for Economic Opportunity, CEO was designed to be an innovations lab that would test anti-poverty programs by applying a results-based approach. With a budget of $100 million, CEO would closely monitor new programs and hold them accountable for producing measurable results. Uniquely, CEO would cut funding for programs that did not "make the grade." Bloomberg named Veronica White the Executive Director of CEO. White had decades of experience working in executive positions in several New York City agencies but with CEO she had daunting tasks ahead. She would have to redefine how poverty was measured in the city, facilitate cross agency partnerships, and most important, develop an effective and achievable evaluation system for all programs. This case traces the CEO team's challenges in placing program evaluation at the core of their mission. CEO programs are geared toward three target populations-working poor adults, young adults between the ages of 16 and 24, and families with children ages five and below. In the first year of operation, White and her team launched a slate of anti-poverty programs that varied widely in scale and scope and ranged from New York's first ever conditional cash transfer program to a program that would accelerate graduation rates in community colleges. But from the beginning, CEO's evidence-based programming was put to the test. White faced constant pressure to "produce results quickly." With the 2008 recession, however, CEO endured significant cuts in its evaluation budget. White and her team had to make the most of limited resources while still sustaining a comprehensive evaluation policy. Case Number 1971.0

The Wraparound Milwaukee program was created in 1995 by Milwaukee County, Wisconsin and provides services and treatment to severely emotionally and behaviorally disturbed children and youth. The program utilizes the "wraparound philosophy" to provide the children and youth it serves with a highly individualized, community and strength-based approach to care. The delivery of services are facilitated by a Care Coordinator who works with the family to choose the right services from Wraparound Milwaukee's network of individual providers and community based organizations. The program's funding is pooled from several state and county agencies. Wraparound Milwaukee's innovative approach to care has brought considerable savings to the county $3,878 per month per child for Wraparound Milwaukee versus $8,000- $10,000 per month per child that the county paid for residential placement. Wraparound Milwaukee has seen positive outcomes in the youth it serves after disenrollment in terms of clinical health indicators as well as other indicators. HKS Case Number 1927.0

In the early 1970s, the Missouri Division of Youth Services (DYS) took its first steps toward radically changing the way it dealt with youthful offenders remanded to its custody. For years, like most states, it had incarcerated juveniles convicted of felony or misdemeanor offenses in large quasi-penal facilities called "training schools." Instead, DYS began establishing smaller "cottage-style" residential programs that emphasized rehabilitation over punishment and applied a therapeutic approach to its troubled young charges. Over the next three decades, DYS expanded this approach to encompass its entire juvenile offender population. By the mid-2000s, the "Missouri model," as it became known, was perhaps the most admired-and, many considered, most effective-juvenile corrections system in the US. This case describes the Missouri model-including the population it serves, the educational and therapeutic programs it offers, and the frontline staff of "youth specialists" it employs to work closely with young offenders. The case also provides an overview of Missouri's impressively low recidivism figures and a brief discussion of the complexities of comparing such figures among states. It concludes with a discussion of the challenges the Missouri DYS has faced in sustaining its highly regarded, but demanding, approach over many years. The case can be used in classes on child welfare policy and criminal justice. HKS Case Number 1904.0