• Silicon Valley Bank: Gone in 36 Hours

    This case examines factors contributing to the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) in March 2023, an event as unpredicted as it was quick. SVB funded nearly half of all U.S. venture-backed startups and at the end of 2022 held $173 billion in deposits, largely comprising the venture capital those startups had raised. On February 28, 2023, Moody's warned SVB about a potential credit rating downgrade, reflecting concerns over "funding, liquidity, and profitability" which factored in substantial unrealized losses on SVB's debt securities. To strengthen its balance sheet, SVB sold $21 billion in securities on March 8, but the move shocked its customers, as it resulted in a realized loss of $2 billion. The ensuing bank run intensified as SVB proved unable to placate investor fears or raise capital to plug that hole, and SVB was placed in receivership on the morning of March 10. Finger-pointing began immediately. Some argued that misguided pressure from Moody's over the fair value of SVB's debt securities prompted the bank's death spiral. Others blamed SVB management and directors, its regulators, and the venture capitalists whom SVB otherwise benefited. What went wrong, and what lessons could be learned?
    詳細資料
  • Revenue Recognition at Stride Funding: Making Sense of Revenues for a Fintech Startup, Spreadsheet Supplement

    Spreadsheet supplement for case 124015.
    詳細資料
  • Revenue Recognition at Stride Funding: Making Sense of Revenues for a Fintech Startup

    The case explores the challenges of revenue recognition and financial reporting for Stride Funding (Stride), a fintech startup that has disrupted the student loan market. Stride leveraged proprietary machine learning and financial models to underwrite alternative student loans via Income Sharing Agreements (ISA). Under an ISA, borrowers agree to share a portion of their future earned income with a lender for a set period of time. Stride has adopted a distinctive business model that is analogous to the Software as a Service (SaaS) business. Rather than issuing ISAs directly, Stride performed as a program manager and created lending platforms that enabled educational institutions and programs to fund ISAs using their own capital. As a fund manager, Stride was responsible for developing credit models, administering the ISA contracts, managing account status, producing the loan documents, and updating the platform and program structure. In return for their services, Stride charged various fees to the institutions and programs. Having successfully completed its Series A round, Stride experienced substantial growth and improved business performance. As the company grew, its executives recognized the need to change its current financial reporting based on cash accounting to comply with U.S. GAAP. They anticipated that this change would affect how to report some of its revenues which are important financial metrics for early-stage companies like Stride. The CEO of Stride Funding wanted to know the full financial impact of this change and its implications for the next funding round. Moreover, they needed to determine whether it made sense for Stride, with its innovative business model, to adopt the GAAP reporting at this juncture.
    詳細資料
  • Accounting for Loan Losses at JPMorgan Chase: Predicting Credit Costs

    The case examines how to account for risks associated with loan assets (or receivables) through financial reporting for loan losses (or bad debt expenses) in the context of the adoption of the new accounting standard, Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) model. CECL required banks to consider future economic conditions and to include forward-looking credit loss estimates in the setting of allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL). This marked a departure from the previous standard, which is called the incurred loss model. Under that model, credit losses were recognized when it became "probable and estimable" that a credit loss had incurred based on historical data and current economic conditions. The case also explores what banks, regulators, and investors thought about the new method. Both bankers and regulators called CECL the biggest change ever to bank accounting. JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon called CECL accounting crazy. Financial Accounting Standards Board member Hal Schroeder indicated CECL would lead to a safer financial system and a more resilient economy. Investors and analysts were trying to figure out the new CECL method and what impact it would have on financial statements.
    詳細資料