The internet has empowered consumers and changed the way they search and shop for products and services by increasing the availability and transparency of pricing and other comparative information. However, what is less clear from a managerial perspective is just how transparent pricing information should be. While it might seem that increasing price transparency would reduce consumer search, we find that it may actually increase search and delay. In this article, we review the use of firms'application of price transparency in practice and propose that specific types of information can influence how transparent prices are to consumers, and how such transparency can influence consumer decisions in a way that is beneficial for the firm. We focus on a specific form of transparency: whether or not the consumer knows the range of pricing. We also discuss whether a high variability pricing approach versus a low variability pricing approach influences consumer decision making-and whether this influence is moderated by transparency.
Health insurer IFA and grocery chain ShopSense have formed an intriguing partnership, but it threatens to test customers' tolerance for sharing personal information. For years, IFA's regional manager for West Coast operations, Laura Brickman, had been championing the use of customer analytics--drawing conclusions about consumer behaviors based on patterns found in collected data. She came away from a meeting with the grocer's analytics chief, Steve Worthington, convinced that ShopSense's customer loyalty card data could be meaningful. In a pilot test, Laura bought ten years' worth of data from the grocer and found some compelling correlations between purchases of unhealthy products and medical claims. Now she has to sell her company's senior team on buying more information. Her bosses have some concerns, however. If IFA came up with proprietary health findings, would the company have to share what it learned? Meanwhile, Steve is busy trying to work out details of the sale with executives at ShopSense. Many have expressed support, but COO Alan Atkins isn't so sure: If customers found out that the store was selling their data, they might stop using their cards, and the company would lose access to vital information. Though CEO Donna Greer agrees, she knows that if things go well, it could mean easy money. How can the two companies use the customer data responsibly? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0705A and R0705Z are George L. Jones, the CEO of Borders Group; Katherine N. Lemon, an associate professor of marketing at Boston College; David Norton, the senior vice president of relationship marketing for Harrah's Entertainment; and Michael B. McCallister, the president and CEO of Humana.
Health insurer IFA and grocery chain ShopSense have formed an intriguing partnership, but it threatens to test customers' tolerance for sharing personal information. For years, IFA's regional manager for West Coast operations, Laura Brickman, had been championing the use of customer analytics--drawing conclusions about consumer behaviors based on patterns found in collected data. She came away from a meeting with the grocer's analytics chief, Steve Worthington, convinced that ShopSense's customer loyalty card data could be meaningful. In a pilot test, Laura bought ten years' worth of data from the grocer and found some compelling correlations between purchases of unhealthy products and medical claims. Now she has to sell her company's senior team on buying more information. Her bosses have some concerns, however. If IFA came up with proprietary health findings, would the company have to share what it learned? Meanwhile, Steve is busy trying to work out details of the sale with executives at ShopSense. Many have expressed support, but COO Alan Atkins isn't so sure: If customers found out that the store was selling their data, they might stop using their cards, and the company would lose access to vital information. Though CEO Donna Greer agrees, she knows that if things go well, it could mean easy money. How can the two companies use the customer data responsibly? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0705A and R0705Z are George L. Jones, the CEO of Borders Group; Katherine N. Lemon, an associate professor of marketing at Boston College; David Norton, the senior vice president of relationship marketing for Harrah's Entertainment; and Michael B. McCallister, the president and CEO of Humana.
Most executives today agree that their efforts should be focused on growing the lifetime value of their customers. Yet, few companies have come to terms with the implications of that idea for their marketing management. Oldsmobile, for example, enjoyed outstanding brand equity with many customers through the 1980s. But as the century wore further on, the people who loved the Olds got downright old. So why did General Motors spend so many years and so much money trying to reposition and refurbish the tired, tarnished brand? Why didn't GM managers instead move younger buyers along a path of less resistance, toward another of the brands in GM's stable--or even launch a wholly new brand geared to their tastes? Catering to new customers, even at the expense of the brand, would surely have been the path to profits. The reason, argue the authors, is that in large consumer goods companies like General Motors, brands are the raison d'etre. They are the focus of decision making and the basis of accountability. But this overwhelming focus on growing brand equity is inconsistent with the goal of growing customer equity. Drawing on a wide range of current examples, the authors offer seven tactics that will put brands in the service of growing customer equity. These include replacing traditional brand managers with a new position--the customer segment manager; targeting brands to as narrow an audience as possible; developing the capability and the mind-set to hand off customers from one brand to another within the company; and changing the way brand equity is measured by basing calculations on individual, rather than average, customer data.
As relationships and service become increasingly pivotal in business, the profitability of customers is becoming more important than the profitability of products. In this environment, marketing success will be equivalent to generating maximum profits from a firm's total set of customers. Doing so requires allocating managerial resources to the groups of customers that can be cultivated most efficiently by a firm. This article presents a management methodology called the "Customer Pyramid" that enables a firm to supercharge its profits by customizing its responses to distinct customer profitability tiers. The Customer Pyramid provides a tool for managers to strengthen the link between service quality and profitability and to determine the optimal allocation of often scarce resources to maximize profitability. Product and service strategies, customized for each customer tier, become more closely aligned with an individual customer's underlying utility functions. This results in more effective and profitable strategies for serving the customer. Also provides numerous examples and practical guidelines for improving firm profits by moving customers up the Customer Pyramid.
Designed primarily to give students the opportunity to evaluate brands by breaking down individual attributes and analyzing performance in these areas. In doing so, students will be able to isolate a brand's distinct characteristics and decide which areas are the most important for improving brand performance.