The chief executive officer (CEO) of the soon-to-be completed CUHK Medical Centre Ltd. (CUMC) in Hong Kong must make a decision regarding health care logistics services. The hospital's tender board is scheduled to meet in June 2019, and the CEO must recommend whether the logistics services needed by the hospital should be provided internally or by a third-party logistics (3PL) provider, and, if a 3PL provider, which provider should be awarded the business.
SenseTime Group Limited was founded in Hong Kong in 2014 to commercialize artificial intelligence for digital recognition of images, particularly human faces. After only three years in business, the company was profitable, with annual sales revenue of about US$100 million. In 2018, it employed over 2,000 workers and was referred to as the world's most valuable artificial intelligence start-up, with a valuation of US$7.6 billion. China had become the largest market in the world for facial recognition technologies, with its share of global sales expected to grow from 29 per cent in 2017 to 45 per cent in 2023. And the global facial recognition market was forecast to be worth US$6.5 billion by 2021. SenseTime Group Limited aimed to empower more industries throughout the world with its artificial intelligence platform. A key question in early 2019 for the company's co-founder and chief executive officer was how to adapt its strategy to achieve that mission in an increasingly fraught global environment.
In March 2012, Hon Hai Precision Industry Company, Ltd. (Hon Hai) announced its investment in the Sharp Corporation (Sharp). The deal was structured in two parts: the first had Hon Hai investing in Sharp, and the second involved Hon Hai founder and chairman and CEO Terry Guo personally purchasing a stake in Sharp's unprofitable Sakai manufacturing plant. This case explores the dynamics of the deal and specifically focuses on valuation of the investment in the Sakai plant as well as the structure of the deal. It presents a vehicle by which to consider net present value (NPV) calculations and corporate deal structuring.
A leading Chinese energy firm, active in coal mining and electric power generation, analyzes coal-to-liquids technology in light of energy security and environmental concerns.
Having been able to follow its own "three-year plan" on course constantly, Li & Fung Limited fell short of meeting its stretch earnings target for the first time in almost two decades, leading to a double-digit drop in stock price overnight. Questions were raised on the company's strategies pursued to meet such targets, and on the validity of its Three-Year Planning process.
As China's largest homebuilder, China Vanke Co. Ltd. (Vanke) was facing an industry downturn sparked by strong government intervention. Faced with falling prices, Vanke's president must decide whether to keep the company's pricing and product positioning intact, and how aggressively to pursue its greener building strategy. Follow-up cases present additional decisions, including how, and how aggressively, to improve safety and quality (A-2), and whether to expand into other asset classes, such as commercial real estate.
China Vanke's president and his team must decide on a plan of action after reviewing the quality issues the company faced in early 2012 after a series of highly publicized incidents concerning the quality of the homes they built.
China Vanke's president is considering whether and how the company might make further inroads into the commercial real estate sector, while continuing to lead in the residential sector. He is also considering whether to branch into overseas residential markets such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and the United States.
The case describes Vanke's response to the decisions posed in the A1, A2, and A3 cases and asks whether Vanke should expand its strategic scope by defining itself as an "urban facilities provider" rather than a "residential housing developer." The management team is also reviewing the company's forays in places such as Hong Kong, Singapore, the U.S., and Europe.
In June 2012, Cheah Cheng-Hye and his colleagues at Value Partners, a Hong-Kong-based investment firm, received a copy of a short-seller report alleging that Evergrande, one of China's largest property developers, was using fraudulent accounting and paying bribes to secure business. Evergrande's stock plummeted, and Value Partners, which had a sizable holding of Evergrande stock, had to determine how to respond to the allegations. The case provides an opportunity to review Value Partners' research approach to investing in Chinese companies and to assess the merits of the Evergrande allegations.
When ChiNext opened in October 2009 as the second tier market of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), it aimed to provide Chinese entrepreneurs with equity capital and to facilitate the exits of venture capital firms and other investors which had previously relied on the New York, London, and Hong Kong markets for public offerings. A year into ChiNext's operation, Dr. Wei Chen, Chairman and founder of Oriental Fortune Capital, one of the fastest-growing venture capital firms in China, met with an SZSE research fellow to discuss how the rules governing the market might be adjusted to allow more firms to list and, more importantly, to improve efficiency and transparency in order to make ChiNext a better stock exchange.
Steve Tucker, the Deputy CEO of Gallagher Group Limited (GGL), the world's largest electric fence company, was about to present a new branding strategy to the company's senior managers and Bill Gallagher, Jr., CEO. After spending more than 18 months with brand consultants, Tucker devised an umbrella brand strategy that would instill a uniform brand across all three business units: Animal Management Systems, Security Management Systems, and Fuel Pumps, which marketed themselves under the respective brand names of Gallagher, Cardax, Powerfence, and PEC. However, Tucker knew that the unit heads believed the differences in their clienteles, product categories, and distributor relationships made it impractical to adopt one single brand. GGL's overseas distributors had also raised concerns about a uniform brand. In many cases, GGL only owned minority interests in these distributors and retained limited control over their activities.
Stan Shih, founder-CEO of Acer, Inc., had proactively chosen and transitioned the "perfect" successor as CEO, but was now faced with major problems. Over the last two years, his heir apparent, Leonard Liu, had made the changes he had been hired to make, including revamping the organization structure and instilling a new corporate culture that emphasized accountability. However, such changes had caused numerous clashes between him and other cofounders of the company, in particular, Shih's wife, Carolyn. Liu had now suggested that "Carolyn should retire into her kitchen." Faced with office infighting and increasing clashes between the markedly different Western and Chinese styles of management, Shih needed Liu to manage the increasing complexity of global competition. However, Shih was now wondering if he had made the right decision to appoint Liu as his successor.
Second phase of auction for a prime retail development parcel in Chengdu, China. Competition forces the firm to revisit all of its land purchase criteria. Hang Lung Properties is known for rigorous due diligence, for discipline in buying property, and for good understanding of market cycles. The (B) case reveals the firms assumptions in the Chengdu situation, as compared to what students had to derive on their own in the (A) case. The (B) case also reviews strategic focus with respect to asset classes and geography, as well as best practices for what to look for in cities that will be attractive for superblock mixed use projects.
A residential real estate developer competes in a heated auction for a prime retail development site in the interior of China during the 2009 boom. Total project cost might be in excess of $1billion US for over 4,000,000 square feet of building. Hang Lung Properties has enjoyed success in residential building in Hong Kong but has focused on very limited projects in China, notably two retail properties in Shanghai. After a decade in Shanghai the firm decides to enter second tier Chinese cities including Chengdu, a city of 11 million in interior China. The case covers Hang Lung Properties' due diligence and thought process with respect to anticipated rental income, construction costs, and land costs. The auction includes many other well capitalized firms and the price escalates. Hang Lung's team must decide whether to participate or withdraw. Students need to use judgment with respect to estimates of key variables including stabilized income, construction cost, and minimum expectations for return on investment in order to prepare their bids. The (B) case goes into further steps in the auction as well as Hang Lung Properties' internal discipline with respect to asset types, infrastructure in target cities, and baseline returns.
Grace Vineyard was a rare family-owned, private winery in China that was set on establishing itself as a world-renowned, quality vintner. Judy Leissner, the second generation company leader was at a crossroads in how she wanted to grow the business that her father founded in 1997. Their wines were rapidly growing a strong following and had won international awards. How could the company capitalize on this success? Should Grace expand its operations to multiple Chinese provinces? Should Grace continue as a premium boutique winery serving a growing but ultimately limited niche market in China, or should it seek to make a mark internationally? Or should Grace respond to buy-out offers?