In November 1977, U.S. Air Force officials expressed mounting concern about the restrictions on their tactical capabilities that resulted from a string of problems with the new F100 engine in F-15 and F-16 fighter jets. The F100 engine, produced by Pratt and Whitney Aircraft, was a powerful new engine that played a critical role in the U.S. air-defense system. Development of the engine had started in the late 1960s, and its performance specifications pushed the envelope of the technological possibilities. Although setbacks had to be expected, there had long been a growing concern about the unreliability of the F100 engine in combat situations. The Air Force felt that Pratt had been largely unresponsive in prior discussions of these problems and was now reviewing its options.

The B case recounts the events that culminated in the development of an alternative to Pratt and Whitney's F100 jet engine. Following an initial development program, the Air Force announced a split order for 120 engines from General Electric for the F-16 and 40 engines from Pratt and Whitney for the F-15. While this order would only meet the needs for the year 1985, Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr had decided to hold off on any long-term commitments and to observe contractor performance and field experience during the first year. A few days later, the Navy chose General Electric's F110 engine as a replacement for Pratt's TF30 in the F-14. See also the A (UV3883) and C (UV3886) cases.