In May 2018, Singapore's publicly-listed Hyflux Ltd, which was once the world's fifth largest desalination plant supplier, filed for court-supervised reorganisation of its liabilities and businesses. The company's total liabilities had escalated to S$3.4 billion (Including contingent liabilities); while its readily available cash balance was S$18.9 million and its market capitalisation was S$165 million. The court granted the company a debt moratorium, which was extended several times as Hyflux explored options of capital injection from strategic investors, asset sales and rescue financing. The revelation that the once-star company was under water and drowning in debt shocked the stakeholders. How and why did this reversal of fortune happen? Were there any red flags leading to this fallout? How would the financial restructuring affect the stakeholders? Finally, what lessons in financial management could be drawn for the company, creditors, banks and investors?

Founded in 1989, Olam International Limited began as a small trader of cashew nuts. Over the years, it grew into a multi-country, multi-product integrated agribusiness. In 2016, Olam was one of the 30 largest Singapore Exchange-listed companies by market capitalization and recorded annual turnover of US$14.2 billion. This case examines Olam's corporate strategy in three chronological phases: (i) 1989-2005 (organic growth); (ii) 2006-2012 (organic and inorganic growth); (iii) 2013-2016 (sustainable growth and generation of positive free cash flow). In November 2012, Olam temporarily put the brakes on its expansion drive following a short seller's attack. The third phase (2013-2016) saw Olam conducting a strategic review, re-calibrating its strategic plan, implementing restructuring initiatives, and working towards new goals and its new vision. During this period, Olam attracted capital from two strategic investors - Singapore's Temasek Holdings and Japan's Mitsubishi Corporation. Besides describing Olam's financing strategy, this case also summarizes Olam's major acquisitions, divestments, joint ventures and greenfield investments. This case may generate a discussion on the challenges that Olam would have to overcome in its quest to become the most differentiated and valuable global agribusiness.

On 27 July 2016, Swiber Holdings Limited, a Singapore Exchange-listed provider of offshore engineering, procurement, installation and construction services for oil and gas companies, filed for voluntary liquidation. Two days later, Swiber withdrew the liquidation application and filed for judicial management instead. Swiber's actions shocked its stakeholders and the market. Its total notes payable was about US$437 million as of 27 July 2016; its debts owed to suppliers and subcontractors were about US$264 million as of 31 May 2016. In contrast, Swiber's market capitalization had shrunk to about US$37 million at the close of 27 July 2016. This case chronicles the rise and fall of Swiber's fortunes, describes the company's financing strategy through the years, and discusses the warning signs that heralded the company's collapse during the prolonged downturn in the oil and gas industry.

Singapore Post Limited (SingPost), Singapore's sole Public Postal Licensee, had set its sights on becoming the regional leader in e-commerce logistics and trusted communications. This goal was achieved through multi-million-dollar acquisitions in warehouses, freight forwarders, and parcel pickup services. Among the acquisitions were the 'Famous Acquisitions' comprising Famous Holdings Pte Ltd, FS Mackenzie Limited, and Famous Pacific Shipping (NZ) Limited. Between December 2015 and May 2016, a chain of events related to the 'Famous Acquisitions' unfolded at SingPost: its public admission of lapses in corporate governance disclosure, a special audit, a corporate governance review, resignation of the lead independent director, and change of the board chairman. The case discusses these events and describes what SingPost subsequently did to improve its corporate governance practices.

The case documents an acquisition bid on Air Sahara by Jet Airways. To implement the merger, the two airlines formed a joint management group (JMG) and set March 2006 as the deadline for its completion. The deadline was later extended to June 2006. On 20 June 2006, a day before the expiry of the extended deadline, Jet Airways proposed a new price for the merger deal, leaving Air Sahara with two options: re-price the deal or allow it to expire.