Caesars Entertainment was a large casino operator in the United States that had been purchased in a 2008 leveraged buyout by Apollo and TPG. In January 2015, Caesars Entertainment Operating Company (CEOC), its largest subsidiary, filed for Chapter 11. This set up a battle between the company and a set of large, distressed investors. At issue was not only how to restructure the business and reduce Caesars' debt, but also multiple lawsuits alleging that the company had damaged creditors in their quest to preserve equity value. Of particular focus were a series of transactions that took place during 2013 and 2014 to sell assets from one subsidiary to another and to eliminate a valuable parent guarantee that had been granted to CEOC creditors. This case provides a good example of a variety of "defensive maneuvers" employed by companies and their private equity sponsors to protect a troubled investment.
In 2016, India passed a new bankruptcy law (IBC) to counter a brewing bank crisis and increased corporate distress. Homebuilder Jaypee Infratech, one of India largest distressed companies (the "dirty dozen") began restructuring under the IBC in 2017. Two years later, the situation remains unresolved, the Supreme Court is involved, there are two interested bidders for the company, and a creditor group that includes Indian banks and local homebuyers. Should York Capital bid to purchase some of Jaypee's secured debt and at what price?
Hertz filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in response to ABS obligations and the COVID-19 pandemic. Enthusiastic Robinhood investors and shrewd negotiating tactics helped Hertz stabilize. Roughly nine months into the bankruptcy, Hertz received several bids to reorganize the company. Now, key Hertz advisors William Derrough and Tom Lauria must decide (i) whether the valuations implied by these bids are high enough, (ii) how they can negotiate higher valuations, and (iii) when to exit bankruptcy.
In October 2020, Revlon faced a crossroads. While it had been struggling with high levels of debt before COVID-19, the pandemic had caused it to go further into debt. Unlike other financial crises, many consumers had stopped buying skincare or cosmetics, and sales of Revlon products had fallen. Now, a series of bonds maturing in February 2021 loomed, and Revlon faced a series of options on how to renegotiate its debts with its creditors.
In 2019, ESL Investments' $5.2 billion offer to purchase Sears Holdings out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, was accepted, despite opposition from the company's unsecured creditors and other parties. ESL, which was led by Eddie Lampert, had acquired a stake in Sears following its 2005 merger with. Kmart. Lampert was chairman and CEO. During Lampert's ownership, Sears and Kmart shrunk their store base from 5,670 to 687 stores, and over 200,000 employees lost their jobs. Some attributed Sears' woes to a challenging operating environment, others argued that Lampert's actions over the last decade benefitted himself and other shareholders at the expense of other Sears stakeholders. Was a sale of the company to ESL the best outcome?
In 2016, a trial began to determine the future of Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation's $3 billion chapter 11 reorganization plan. The plan called for first and second lien secured creditors to receive new claims representing approximately 98% of the reorganized company's enterprise value, leaving unsecured creditors, owed $1.4 billion, to recover less than two cents on the dollar. The plan had the support of the secured creditors, but unsecured creditors were strongly opposed. At the heart of the unsecured creditors' objections to the plan was a dramatically different view on valuation. How much were Sabine's oil and gas reserves worth today? How much were they worth at the time Sabine filed for chapter 11? And, based on these valuations, what was a fair recovery for Sabine's creditors?
Comparison of the U.S. Government response, using the $700 billion TARP fund, to downturns in the banking and auto industries during the global financial crisis.
In 2015, Ukraine needs IMF funding to bridge a projected $40 billion funding shortfall and is proposing a 40% "haircut" to Ukraine's $18 billion of Eurobonds. Can Ukraine negotiate a deal with its many creditors that will give it the funding the country needs on terms they can accept?