In late 2017, Camber Creek, a real estate technology focused venture capital firm, had to evaluate a potential investment in Measurabl Inc. which provides real estate companies of all sized with a full SaaS solution for sustainability data.
Credit and charge card issuer American Express (Amex) had developed a strong reputation among consumers due in part to its Membership Rewards (MR) loyalty program, first established in 1991. Through MR, all Amex cardholders could accumulate and redeem "points" based on how much they spent, while customers with Amex's Gold and Platinum Cards received additional perks. By 2016, however, the U.S. credit card market had become increasingly competitive, with many credit card companies increasing their sign-on point bonuses for new customers. Chris Cracchiolo, Amex's vice president of U.S. loyalty, strategy, and global partnerships, had to decide how to position the MR program in the face of this competition. Should Amex begin offering more competitive sign-on bonuses and point redemption rates, or would this dilute the company's strong brand?
In January 2017, the leadership team of Bega Cheese-the Australian dairy company-was considering a bid for Mondelēz International's Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) grocery business, which included several leading consumer brands such as Vegemite, the iconic Australian spread. The team must decide whether to bid for the division and, if so, how much to offer and how to finance the all-cash bid. Making these decisions was difficult because this would be Bega's largest acquisition ever and it would extend the firm outside of its core dairy business. In addition to the valuation and financing issues, the leadership team must decide whether shifting from the firm's current B2B business model (manufacturing and processing dairy products) to a more B2C business model (a producer of branded consumer foods) made sense strategically.
This case explores the long-term relationship between Tempur Sealy (TPX, a mattress manufacturer) and Mattress Firm (MFRM, a bedding retailer and TPX's largest customer). For almost 20 years, the firms enjoyed a mutually beneficial and commercially prosperous relationship. Yet in August 2016, Steinhoff (a large, South African retailer) made an offer to acquire MFRM. Whether this acquisition will affect the symbiotic relationship that had existed between TPX and MFRM was the subject of intense speculation. While some industry observers believed it would increase MFRM's bargaining power vis-Ã -vis TPX, others argued it would not alter the balance of power, and that the incentives to collaborate would remain intact.
In September 2014, Tom Montgomery (SVP of strategic initiatives at the De Beers Group) and his team launched a pilot program in the United States to explore the $1 billion diamond market for pre-owned (recycled) diamonds. According to Montgomery, the motivation for the pilot program was to improve the consumer reselling experience and to enhance "diamond equity". Somewhat paradoxically, consumers typically received very low prices when they tried to sell diamonds (5-20% of the original retail price) leaving them reluctant to purchase diamonds in the future and making them into ambassadors of ill will. At a meeting scheduled for November 2015, the De Beers Executive Committee would have to decide whether to end the pilot program, extend it for another year to gather more information, or convert it into a new standalone business unit. Because De Beers had historically focused on producing rough diamonds (the "upstream" business), yet the new business unit offered an opportunity to enter and enhance the market for polished diamonds (the "downstream" business), the decision was particularly noteworthy.
In September 2014, Tom Montgomery (SVP of strategic initiatives at the De Beers Group) and his team launched a pilot program in the United States to explore the $1 billion diamond market for pre-owned (recycled) diamonds. According to Montgomery, the motivation for the pilot program was to improve the consumer reselling experience and to enhance "diamond equity". Somewhat paradoxically, consumers typically received very low prices when they tried to sell diamonds (5-20% of the original retail price) leaving them reluctant to purchase diamonds in the future and making them into ambassadors of ill will. At a meeting scheduled for November 2015, the De Beers Executive Committee would have to decide whether to end the pilot program, extend it for another year to gather more information, or convert it into a new standalone business unit. Because De Beers had historically focused on producing rough diamonds (the "upstream" business), yet the new business unit offered an opportunity to enter and enhance the market for polished diamonds (the "downstream" business), the decision was particularly noteworthy.
In November 2015, Square, Inc. launched its initial public offering (IPO). The IPO had an offering price of $9 per share, lower than the $11 to $13 estimate that had been outlined in the preliminary prospectus and 42% below the $15.50 share price in its most recent financing less than a year before. The lower than anticipated pricing of Square's IPO, and the implied valuation, had left investors and market observers wondering if this was an indication of a valuation bubble, or a shift in the market. The case provides an overview of the IPO process, and examines U.S. IPO trends from the 1980s to mid-2010s. It explores the rationales behind an increasing number of $billion + private valuations, known as 'unicorns', and explores who the winners and losers are when such firms go public at lower valuations.