Case A explores Goldman's corporate strategy and growth, charting its history from when Marcus Goldman moved to the US and launched a commercial paper business in 1869. It follows the firm's expansion in terms of its products/services, and its growth via acquisitions and alliances. Throughout the 20th century it built a reputation for innovation as a leader in M&A advisory, but remained firmly focused on investment and wholesale banking (the B2B side). Subsequently, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and a period of underperforming on the stock market, Goldman pivoted to retail banking in search of new growth and more stable sources of income. How effective its strategy would be remained to be seen. Case B explores how Goldman Sachs built the capabilities to enter consumer finance - a whole new market. Whereas others entered the market through acquisitions, alliances, or internal development, Goldman began by recruiting talent and gradually building a consumer business internally, then adding a combination of bolt-on acquisitions, partnerships, and further internal initiatives. The case ends in 2022 with the question: Did Goldman Sachs choose the right strategy?
Case A explores Goldman's corporate strategy and growth, charting its history from when Marcus Goldman moved to the US and launched a commercial paper business in 1869. It follows the firm's expansion in terms of its products/services, and its growth via acquisitions and alliances. Throughout the 20th century it built a reputation for innovation as a leader in M&A advisory, but remained firmly focused on investment and wholesale banking (the B2B side). Subsequently, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and a period of underperforming on the stock market, Goldman pivoted to retail banking in search of new growth and more stable sources of income. How effective its strategy would be remained to be seen. Case B explores how Goldman Sachs built the capabilities to enter consumer finance - a whole new market. Whereas others entered the market through acquisitions, alliances, or internal development, Goldman began by recruiting talent and gradually building a consumer business internally, then adding a combination of bolt-on acquisitions, partnerships, and further internal initiatives. The case ends in 2022 with the question: Did Goldman Sachs choose the right strategy?
Facing constant pressures to grow, established firms increasingly harness external innovation by collaborating with and eventually acquiring startups. To succeed in their exit through acquisition, startup firms and incumbents have to master three steps (the "3 Cs") that enhance the co-specialization with the acquirer: establishing the Complementarity of offerings, generating Customer endorsement, and attracting an acquirer executive Champion. Drawing on a multiple-case, inductive study of seven Israeli startup acquisitions completed by two acquirers from the information and communications technology (ICT) industry, this article illustrates the different approaches pursued by the startup firms and their acquirers to succeed in managing pre- and post-acquisition processes.
At the BMW Group, Gregor Gimmy, a serial entrepreneur and former consultant, introduces the Venture Client (VCL) model to engage with start-ups and boost corporate innovation. The case discusses its initial success at BMW and the rationale that drove Gimmy to establish a new model of external corporate venturing (ECV). It also provides background information on the key forces shaping the auto industry today, the challenges faced by legacy automakers as technological developments accelerate, and the emergence of new rules and new players.
Research on cross-border acquisitions shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, they don't hamper domestic operations--they add to their efficiency and productivity. By acquiring foreign companies, firms gain a great deal of knowledge through exposure to new market ecosystems, R&D capabilities, functional skills, organizational processes, and managerial practices.
Bell Canada, a publicly listed Canadian telecom firm, receives takeover offers from LBO (leveraged buyout) firms. A strategic acquirer, Telus, is also potentially interested. The case describes the synergies and efficiency gains available to both types of acquirer, which allows for a discussion about the respective contributions that a financial buyer (PE/LBO firm) and a strategic acquirer could bring to the target firm.
After the transformation of Lloyds Bank from an unfocused and underperforming group to a focused highly-performing bank under Brian Pitman (1983-1996), the incoming CEO takes on the challenge of redefining the bank's strategy and operations, facing difficult choices regarding the firm's scope and internationalization. Ultimately, Lloyds's board of directors end up facing significant corporate governance issues with long-term implications for the future of the company.
After the transformation of Lloyds Bank from an unfocused and underperforming group to a focused highly-performing bank under Brian Pitman (1983-1996), the incoming CEO takes on the challenge of redefining the bank's strategy and operations, facing difficult choices regarding the firm's scope and internationalization. Ultimately, Lloyds's board of directors end up facing significant corporate governance issues with long-term implications for the future of the company.
After the transformation of Lloyds Bank from an unfocused and underperforming group to a focused highly-performing bank under Brian Pitman (1983-1996), the incoming CEO takes on the challenge of redefining the bank's strategy and operations, facing difficult choices regarding the firm's scope and internationalization. Ultimately, Lloyds's board of directors end up facing significant corporate governance issues with long-term implications for the future of the company.
Executing a new strategy nearly always requires new resources and capabilities-and most firms seek them out the wrong way. In a 10-year study of 162 telecom companies, the authors found that organizations deploying all the methods available to them outperform those that stick with a narrow approach. Yet most firms doggedly pursue one chief method, whether it's developing what they've already got internally, entering into contracts with providers, forming partnerships, or using M&A. The framework in this article will help companies weigh their options more strategically. To select the best tactics for the situation you face, ask whether your existing resources are relevant to your new needs. If the answer is yes, internal development makes sense; otherwise, you'll need to go outside the firm. Next, to figure out what kind of relationship you should pursue with a provider, determine whether all parties would have a shared understanding of the resources' value. If so, a purchase contract is a sensible choice; if not, consider a partnership or a corporate acquisition. Because M&A is the most complex option, reserve it for cases in which it really pays to have a deep relationship with the resource provider.
The case first describes the evolution of Cisco Systems of San Jose, California, from a narrowly-focused routing and switching equipment vendor, with a highly effective competitive strategy, into a diversified networking and IT giant. This growth was fuelled by many acquisitions, the rationale of which developed over time, in light of the growth opportunities and challenges which Cisco encountered. The events described in the case took place in early 2007, while Cisco was considering the acquisition of IronPort, a security software company. A decision to purchase IronPort would symbol a continual divergence from Cisco's old and famous acquisition strategy of acquiring young entrepreneurial firms, to complement its internal development efforts and become a one-stop-shop for its networking customers. This divergence started a few years earlier, with the acquisition of large firms like Linksys and Scientific Atlanta, labeled by Cisco's management as "platform" deals.
Most cases on M&As focus on the value of an individual deal (synergies, price, integration issues). In the case series "Acquisition Wave in the Fine Chemicals Industry", we take another perspective. We aim to describe how managers' decisions to make an acquisition and to determine the acquisition price are likely to be influenced by the merger activity in their industry and their competitors' actions. Driven by shareholder pressure to focus their portfolios, leading specialty and fine chemicals players such as Degussa, Clariant and Rhodia entered into major fine chemicals acquisition in 2000 and overpaid. Subsequently, this led to decreasing stock prices and financial turmoil. The fact that the other firms overpaid, despite publicly available signals from stock markets indicating the overpayment, and the nature of the chemicals industry and management, are clear indicators for irrational herd behavior.
Most cases on M&As focus on the value of an individual deal (synergies, price, integration issues). In the case series "Acquisition Wave in the Fine Chemicals Industry", we take another perspective. We aim to describe how managers' decisions to make an acquisition and to determine the acquisition price are likely to be influenced by the merger activity in their industry and their competitors' actions. Driven by shareholder pressure to focus their portfolios, leading specialty and fine chemicals players such as Degussa, Clariant and Rhodia entered into major fine chemicals acquisition in 2000 and overpaid. Subsequently, this led to decreasing stock prices and financial turmoil. The fact that the other firms overpaid, despite publicly available signals from stock markets indicating the overpayment, and the nature of the chemicals industry and management, are clear indicators for irrational herd behavior.
Most cases on M&As focus on the value of an individual deal (synergies, price, integration issues). In the case series "Acquisition Wave in the Fine Chemicals Industry", we take another perspective. We aim to describe how managers' decisions to make an acquisition and to determine the acquisition price are likely to be influenced by the merger activity in their industry and their competitors' actions. Driven by shareholder pressure to focus their portfolios, leading specialty and fine chemicals players such as Degussa, Clariant and Rhodia entered into major fine chemicals acquisition in 2000 and overpaid. Subsequently, this led to decreasing stock prices and financial turmoil. The fact that the other firms overpaid, despite publicly available signals from stock markets indicating the overpayment, and the nature of the chemicals industry and management, are clear indicators for irrational herd behavior.